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The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 37 
The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada 

Copyright 1903 by The University of Chicago 
New Impression 1960 : 
Printed in the United States of America 


Paut SHorey 



Ὄσβινα the past twenty years Platonic Forschung has come to mean the investi- 
gation of the relative dates of the dialogues by the statistical study of vocabulary and 
idiom. The general trend of modern philology and the reaction against mystical and 
metaphysical Platonism favored this tendency, and the work would perhaps not have 
been done at all if the. workmen had not cherished illusions as to its value. To 
combat these illusions or to test in detail the logic of Sprachstatistik is not the purpose 
of this paper. A merely negative attitude toward any harmless form of human 
endeavor is unfruitful. But granted, since life is short, all that is claimed by the 
enumerators of καθάπερ and τί μήν, the essential quality of Plato’s thought remains for 
some Platonists' a more interesting topic of discussion than the conjectural chronology 
of his writings. It has become the fashion to assert that the one depends upon the 
other, that we cannot interpret Plato’s philosophy until we have determined the 
historic sequence of the dialogues, and with it the true order of development of his 
thought. But we have always known that the Laws and Timeus are late, that the 
Republic belongs to Plato’s full maturity, and that the minor Socratic dialogues are as 
a whole presumably early. ‘To affirm that more is necessary is to beg the question; 
it is to assume the very point in controversy that the philosophy set forth in the 
dialogues did develop in the sense required by the argument. The question is partly 
verbal, Every man’s thought is developed out of nothing somewhere between infancy 
and maturity. Any author whose literary activity, like that of Plato, extends over 
half a century undergoes many minor changes of opinion, and reflects many varying 
moods of himself and his contemporaries. But it is not true of all, or of a majority, of 
the world’s great thinkers that their first tentative gropings toward a philosophy and 
a criticism of life are depicted as in a votive tablet in their earliest published writings, 
or that the works of their riper years present a succession of shifting and dissolving 
views. Yet something like this is the assumption made by the increasing number of 
investigators who, in emulation of the triumphs of the statistical method, are endeav- 
oring to confirm, refute, or correct its results by a study of alleged inconsistencies, 
contradictions, or developments in Platonic doctrine. Abstractly the followers of this 
method would probably repudiate the principle here attributed to them. In their 
practice the desire for striking arguments and definite results leads them to assume 
that Plato was capable of producing a masterpiece like the Protagoras before his most 
characteristic philosophical and ethical conceptions had taken shape in his mind, and 

1Notably for Bontrz ; see the judicious observations in Platonische Studien, 3d ed., pp. 270 ff. and passim. 

4 Tue Unity oF Puato’s THOUGHT 

that throughout the period of his maturest writings his leading ideas were in a state 
of Heraclitean flux, or were being casually developed from year to year. This method 
misleads scholars of great acumen and erudition to make false points, to labor fantastic 
analogies, and to cite irrelevant parallels. It betrays them into misplaced emphasis, 
disregard of the context, and positive mistranslation. In short, it necessitates the 
systematic violation of all the canons of the simple, sane, and natural interpretation of 
literature.’ Plato avoided rather than sought a rigid technical terminology, and 
prodigally varied the language and imagery in which he clothed his most familiar 
thoughts. Every variation of phrase and imagery is pressed to yield significant 
contradictions or developments. The most far-reaching conclusions are drawn from 
the different shades of meaning attached to such words as “opinion,” ‘‘dialectic,” 
‘‘philosophy,” ‘sensation,’ ‘“‘reminiscence,” ‘ participation,” ‘‘presence,” ‘“com- 
munion,” freely and untechnically employed by Plato to suit the theme and context.’ 
The absence in any work of explicit insistence on a thought is supposed to prove the 
absence of the thought from Plato’s mind at the time, and as a consequence, we are 
expected to believe in the most incredible combinations of maturity and naiveté within 
the same writing. Or we are taught that Plato’s development, like some Sophoclean 
sentences, proceeds in the order aba, and consisted in the acceptance, the rejection, 
and the re-acceptance of the same idea. The most reckless assertions are made that 
certain elementary thoughts appear for the first time in certain dialogues. The 
emphatic introduction of a term or idea is, according to the exigencies of the theory, 
now taken as proof that it is a novelty, and now explained away as a mere dramatic 
artifice. The rapid outline of an argument is alternately regarded, according to the 
requirements of the “chronology,” as an anticipatory germ or a later résumé of the 
fuller treatment found elsewhere. Fantastic conceits or bare possibilities as to Plato’s 
literary motives and polemical intentions are treated as absolute psychological and 
historical certainties and made the basis of serious arguments.‘ 

May there not be some πρῶτον ψεῦδος involved in a conception that thus betrays 
its advocates? Itis of course a priori conceivable that Plato’s thought did unfold 
itself in this tentative and fumbling fashion. Examples of such mutations and nuta- 
tions can be found among the Fichtes and Schellings of modern philosophy. They 
are still more frequent, as Professor Gildersleeve has wittily shown, in the history 
of modern philology, and, as I may add, in the interpretation of Plato. But it is at least 
equally probable that Plato’s philosophy and his conception of life had taken shape 
at the age of thirty or thirty-five, and that his extant works, though not of course a pre- 
determined systematic exposition, are the naturally varied reflection of a homogene- 
ous body of opinion, and of a consistent attitude in the interpretation and criticism of 

2 Examples throughout the paper. alized statements and criticisms of tendencies in the 
thought of the time, and especially the hypothesis that he 
satirized contemporaries under the names of earlier 
Sophists. Such hypotheses will be wholly disregarded in 

4To this category belong nearly all conjectures as to the following study, asa mere hindrance to the apprehen- 
the particular philosophers referred to in Plato’s gener- sion of Plato’s own meanings. 

3Infra, and LutTostawski, Origin and Growth of 
Plato’s Logic, passim. 


contemporary life. And if this were the fact, it would be a far more important fact for 
the interpretation of his writings than the determination of the relative dates of the 
Phedo and Symposium or even than the demonstration that the Sophist, Statesman 
and Philebus follow rather than precede the Republic. I am not arguing against 
such a dating of the dialectical dialogues. I do not deny the value of the more vivid 
conception that we gain of Plato’s later mood and manner by combining and compar- 
ing the traits of these dialogues with those of the Laws and Timeus. This is no 
ἀργὸς λόγος directed against all sober critical investigation of the difficult problem of 
Plato’s chronology. But the attempt to base such a chronology on the variations and 
developments of Plato’s doctrine has led to an exaggeration of Plato’s inconstancy that 
violates all sound principles of literary interpretation and is fatal to all genuine intelli- 
gence of his meaning. The implicit canon of this method is that variation in literary 
machinery and expression must be assumed to imply divergence or contradiction in 
thought. To this I wish to oppose an interpretation based on the opposite canon: 
that we are to assume contradiction or serious alteration in Plato’s thought only in 
default of a rational literary or psychological explanation of the variation in the form 
of its expression. As Professor Maguire says in his forgotten but very acute essays 
on the Platonic ethics: “If we are anxious to find out inconsistencies in appearance, 
we shall find them in abundance. But the student of Plato will perhaps discover that 
it is more fruitful, because more philosophical to commence with the points of agree- 
ment.” The ultimate test of the two methods must lie in the appeal to specific texts 
and contexts, and there will be no lack of this in the following pages. But by way of 
preparation it is first advisable to enumerate some of the general features of Plato’s 
writings that make the sane and simple literary interpretation of his meaning so diffi- 
cult and so rare. 

1. Plato is not only a thinker, but also a dramatic artist and an impassioned moral 
and religious teacher. Although, as Schopenhauer says, he is really the most severe 
and consistent of logicians, and holds the threads of his design in an iron hand, his 
dramatis personae affect to follow whither the argument blows,’ and he often seems 
more concerned to edify or entertain than to demonstrate and conclude. Wherever 
his esthetic or moral preferences are involved he cavils on terminology and breaks 
into seemingly irrelevant eloquent digressions in a Ruskinian fashion sorely puzzling 
to those not in sympathy with his mood. If forced to accept the substance of a repug- 
nant theory, he translates it into language more consonant with his feelings. This 
peculiar mixture of rhetoric and logic, of edification and science, misleads both the 
sentimentalist and the scientific puritan. The one often mistakes the ornament for 
the substance, the other distrusts perfectly sound reasoning because of his distaste 
for its emotional accompaniment. 

Again, Plato stimulates our own speculation in so many ways that we are apt to mis- 
take the drift of his meanings not because it is not clearly defined, but because we abandon 

ὃ Not only in the earlier dialogues, but in Rep., 894 Ὁ ; Thecetet.,172D; Laws, 667 A. 

6 Tue Unity or Puato’s THovuGHT 

it to pursue our own. The clever essayist tells us what he himself thought ἃ propos of 
this or that brilliant suggestion. The investigator too often begins by selecting a few 
detached notions and formulas as adequately representative of each dialogue, and then 
proceeds to juggle with ingenious combinations of these and the interpretations put 
upon them by his predecessors. Neither interprets Plato’s real thoughts as they lie 
open to any competent reader who will patiently study him to the end and report the 
things on which he lays most stress.° 

2. In the second place, Plato’s dramatic quality affects not only the artistic setting 
and the personages, but the ideas which he brings upon the stage. Plato’s serious 
meaning detaches itself with perfect distinctness for the faithful student. But the 
hasty reader is more likely than not to receive as Platonic ideas that have a purely 
dramatic significance; or that are falsified by isolation from their context.’’ And the 
investigator in pursuit of a thesis too often attributes specifically to Protagoras, 
Antisthenes, Euclid, or Isocrates ideas that Plato has generalized and decked out 
beyond all recognition, as representatives of the spirit of the age. 

Again, arguing for victory, the maintenance of a thesis in jest to test an oppo- 
nent’s metal or display one’s own ingenuity was a common practice in the world which 
Plato depicts, and is frequently illustrated in his writings. The Platonic Socrates, 
under cover of an ironical profession of ignorance, employs a similar method to 
expose showy pretenders to universal knowledge, to produce a salutary conviction of 
ignorance, or to stimulate youthful thought, and prepare the way for a more serious 
analysis by an exposition of the antinomies latent in conventional opinions. It fol- 
lows that the ostensible failure to conclude an argument, the avowal of bewilderment 
and perplexity, the admission even of positive fallacies of logic in any given dialogue 
prove nothing as to the stage of development of Plato’s own thought at the time. The 
hypothesis that the fallacy was intentional, and that the ἀπορία was affected for a 
purpose, has at least an equal claim to be tested by all the probabilities in each case. 

3. Expositors of Plato seem strangely oblivious of the limits thus far set to all 
systems of philosophy. They treat as peculiar defects of Plato the inconsistencies 
which they detect in his ultimate metaphysics after they have elaborated it into a 
rigid system which he with sound instinct evaded by poetry and myth. They 
habitually write as if they themselves and their intelligent readers were in possession 
of a final philosophy which reconciles all conflicting claims of metaphysical analysis 
and common sense, and from the heights of which they may study merely as a his- 
torical phenomenon Plato’s primitive fumbling with such problems as the nature of 

6Such a reader is Bonitz for the most part in his ad- 
mirable analyses. 

7A notable example is Herbert Spencer’s inference 
from Rep., 339D, that Plato, like Hobbes, makes state 
enactments the source of right. So President Eliot has 
been recently misled by ZELLER’S misuse of Rep., 421 A 
(Phil. der Griechen, 4th ed., Vol. II, No. 1, p. 890), to prove 
that Plato would not educate the masses. Many scholars 
still seem to think that the etymologies of the Cratylus 

were intended seriously, and not a few continue to quote 
Theeetet., 156 ff., as Platonic doctrine. Under this head 
fall most of the ‘‘ fallacies’’ discovered in Plato: those of 
the Parmenides, which, as we shall see, are intentional; 
those of the Gorgias, dramatically justifiable against the 
extreme thesis maintained by Callicles; those of Rep., I, 
333 E, and 349 B, which Zeller (p, 652) thinks Plato did not 


universals, the antinomy of unity and plurality in thought and things,’ the relation of 
mind and body, the possibility of a consciousness of self or a knowledge of knowl- 
edge, the proof of immortality, the freedom of the will, the difficulty of conceiving or 
defining good except in relation to evil, the alternative of excepting thoroughgoing 
relativism and phenomenalism or of positing a nowmenon that cannot be described or 
brought into intelligible relation with phenomena. We are told that he has “keine 
Ableitung des Sinnlichen,” as if there were somewhere extant a satisfactory deduction 
of the sensible world from some higher metaphysical principle. It is objected that 
the relation of the ideas to the Deity is undefined, and that the personality of God is 
not investigated, as if any results could follow from an attempt to define the relation 
of the metaphysical nowmenon to the Deity, or from an investigation of the person- 
ality of God. The absence of a complete table of categories is taken as a defect in 
Plato’s system or as a proof of the immaturity of the Phedrus, as if the Aristotelian 
and Kantian categories were not mere illusions of the metaphysical instinct, and Plato 
was not far wiser in proposing only such categories and classifications as the argument 
in hand required. 

A chief merit of Plato is that he clearly recognizes and sharply defines the limits 
of scientific thought in these matters. When the interests of the moral and religious 
life, as he conceives them, are at stake he resorts to myth to express his hopes and 
aspirations. Where the epistemological problem compromises the foundations of prac- 
tical certainty and sound method, he arbitrarily postulates the solution that will best 
serve his chief purpose — the extrication of a practicable working logic from the hope- 
less dialectical muddle of his time. But he is always careful to distinguish his neces- 
sary practical postulates from his mythical and metaphysical assumptions.’ The 
dogmatism of his later works has been as much exaggerated as the Socratic doubt of 
the minor dialogues.” 

4. As a fourth cause of misapprehension we may count a certain quaint and curious 
subtlety in the use of abstraction and antithesis characteristic of all Greek writers, but 
carried to its farthest extreme in Plato. His reasoning often proceeds by what 
seem to us excessively minute verbal links. This is generally thought to mean 
merely that the modern mind has learned to abridge the formal process by taking some 
things for granted. But it is often due to Plato’s anxiety to anticipate the cavils and 
quibbles of the age before logic; or his wish to bring out neglected shades of meaning. 

Again, Plato, like all serious reasoners, employs unreal abstractions to express 
ideals and test hypotheses by extreme cases." But in addition to this the Platonic 
Socrates meets a fallacious and fantastic abstraction from the conditions of reality, not 

8Astonishment is often expressed at the attention 
bestowed by Plato upon the problem of the one and the 
many, as if, transferred to psychology, it were not still 
the crux of all our metaphysics. 

9 Meno, 86B; Pheedr., 252 C, 266 Ο, 2146 ; Rep., 416 BC, 
517 B, 506 C. 

10 Tim., 12D, Laws, 641D, 799 D, 812 A. The percentage of 

apodictic replies in the “later” works proves nothing that 
is not already involved in the fact that they are not dra- 
matic disputations. A consenting respondent naturally 
gives “‘apodictic’’ answers. 

118. g., the isolation of pleasure and intelligence in 
Phileb., 21, to which Grote objects. 

8 Tue Unity ΟΕ Puato’s THouGHtT 

by exposing the fallacy, but by translating all the real facts into the language of 
abstraction. There is no real fallacy in such procedure, but a sense of fallacy results 
for the modern reader.” Allied to this is the use or abuse of antithesis. Opposite 
views are first stated with ruthless consistency in their most abstract and extreme 
form. And the truth is approached through a series of compromises and mediations.” 
Dramatically, Plato is right. This is the course of discussion among ordinary men in 
all ages. But the elaborate refutations which Plato thinks fit to give of the crudest 
form of hostile theories sometimes produces an impression of unfairness upon modern 
critics. They forget two things: first, that he always goes on to restate the theory 
and refute its fair meaning; second, that in the case of many doctrines combated by 
Plato there is no evidence that they ever were formulated with the proper logical quali- 
fications except by himself.” 

5. In the fifth place, and finally, we may mention the difficulty of confining 
the infinite variety and suggestiveness of Plato’s thoughts in the framework of 
any system either of philosophy or of exposition. It is possible to present 
Plato’s ethical and social ideals in a fairly systematic résumé. The theory of 
ideas may be restated in the Platonic terminology, which does not teach us much, 
or analyzed in relation to the underlying psychological and ontological problems. 
Special chapters might be written on Plato’s attitude toward inchoate physical science, 
the temper in which he faced the religious problems of an age of transition, his portrayal 
and criticism of the literary and artistic life of his time. But a complete system 
of philosophy with principles subordinate, derivative, and interdependent, and a fixed 
technical terminology, cannot be extracted from the Platonic writings. This will not 
greatly grieve those who are aware of the perfect futility of all such system-building, 
even when the architect possesses the genius of a Spinoza, a Kant, or a Schopen- 
hauer. But the expositor of Plato can hardly avoid attempting to cast his exposition 
into some systematic form, and the recalcitrance of his material is to him a serious 
problem. No method is quite satisfactory. The atomism of Grote, Jowett, Bonitz, 
and Horn, that treats each dialogue as an isolated unit, is the renunciation of all 
method. The clever attempts of a succession of French expositors to deduce all Platon- 
ism symmetrically from a few principles are more ingenious than convincing.” The 
exhaustive schematism of Zeller, applied alike to all philosophers from Thales to 
Plotinus, is philologically a masterly achievement of German erudition. But, though 

12 Ε΄, g.,in Rep., 1, 346, the separation of μισθωτική, the 
wage-earning power, from the other functions of each art 
and craft. 

13 Philebus, Thecetetus, Rep., I and II, Gorgias. 
14H. g., in the Cratylus, 385 A, the theory that language 

451 E, 453B, 489D. Similar is the treatment of Homo Men- 
sura in the Protagoras, and the claim of pleasure to be the 
chief good in the Philebus. 

15 Plato may have found hints and suggestions of the 
views he brings on the stage in Euripides and the Sophists 

is a mere convention is first stated in the most extreme 
form. Inthe Gorgias a long argument is spent to drive 
Callicles from a position which he affirms was assumed in 
jest (499B). In Rep., 338C., Thrasymachus’s definition of 
justice is taken in a grotesquely unfair sense in order to 
force him to state it more clearly. Cf. Laws, 714C; Gorg., 

(DtUmMuER, Prolegomena zu Platons Staat). But so far as 
we know, he is the first thinker who could present a com- 
plete logical statement of any philosophiéal theory in all 
its bearings. 

16 See my review of ΗΑ νυ, Théorie platonicienne des 
sciences, Philosophical Review, Vol. Y, p. 522. 


rarely admitting gross and palpable errors, Zeller’s exposition frequently misses the 
true proportions, perspective, and emphasis that would be brought out by a more 
flexible literary and philosophic interpretation. 

The present study, though it touches on most topics of the Platonic philosophy, 
does not attempt a complete historical survey. Some subjects I have discussed else- 
where. There are many details (in the Laws and Timeus, 6. g.) which would be 
irrelevant to the main purpose of emphasizing the unity of Plato’s thought. The order 
of presentation adopted after many attempts is a compromise between the systematic 
and the atomistic. The Platonic ethics, the theory of ideas, and an outline of the 
psychology will first be set forth as a whole. A group of logical and metaphysical 
problems will be discussed in connection with the Sophist and Parmenides. Other 
topics and some repetitions from a different point of view will follow in a survey of the 
principal dialogues taken one by one. 


The chief topics of the Platonic ethics are these: (1) the Socratic paradoxes; 
(2) the definition of the virtues, and, more particularly, the determination of their 
relation to a postulated supreme science or art, to happiness, to the political or royal 
art, to the idea of good; (3) the problem of hedonism; and (4), associated with it, 
the attempt to demonstrate the inseparability of virtue and happiness.” 

1. Plato always formally maintained that all wrongdoing is involuntary;” that 
virtue is insight or knowledge, is in its essence one, and can in some sense be taught.” 
Sometimes he merely dramatically illustrates the conflicts that arise between these 
paradoxes and common-sense. Elsewhere, most explicitly in the Laws,” but by impli- 
cation even in the minor dialogues, he reveals his perception that these propositions 
can be reconciled with experience only by the conscious employment of words in a 
special sense.” Wrongdoing is involuntary (1) because all men will the good or what 
they deem the good;” (2) because no man who knows the right will do the wrong, if 
we take knowledge in the highest sense, or refuse the term to any cognition that does 
not control the will;” (3) because the conditions that shape conduct lie far more in 
heredity, education, and environment than in our conscious wills.“ The contradiction 
noted by Aristotle between this charitable principle and the edifying proclamation 
“virtue is free,” ™ is emotional rather than scientific.” The modern free-will contro- 
versy arises out of two conceptions not connected with this problem by Plato: the 

17 These are, as a matter of fact, the chief topics of the 20689 Ὁ, 696C, T10A, ἥν τις σεμνύνων ἂν λέγοι, φρόνησιν 
ethical dialogues. If we base Plato’s ethics on the idea of σπροσαναγκάζων εἶναι τὸ σωφρονεῖν, 
good, or on any other metaphysical principle or schema- 21 Laches, 196 E; Laches, 191 E, avépeioe . . . ἐν ἡδοναῖς, 
tism, we shall distort his meanings. cf. Laws, 633DE, and Rep., 429D; Rep., 443E, 444A; 
18XEN., Mem., 8, 9, 4; 4,6,6; Apol.,26A; Protag., 345 Ὁ, Theeetet., 176 C; Polit., 306A. 
358 CD; Meno, 717,78; Gorg., 466 Εἰ, 467 B= Rep., 511 E= Laws, 22 Meno, 11; Euthydem., 219; Symp., 205A; Gorg., 468. 

688 B; Rep., 382 A (?), 413 A (Ὁ). 492 E (7), 589C; Phileb., 22 B; 23 °B: L 9: Thecetet.. 1166 
Soph., 228C, 230A; Tim., 86D; Laws, 181 C, 184 Β, 860 D. lice ia aaa edt ages a 

19 Euthydem., 282C; Laws, 644A, ὡς οἵ ye ὀρθῶς πεπαιδευ- 24 Tim., 86 Ὁ. 2% Rep., 617 B, ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον, 
μένοι σχεδὸν ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται, 26 Cf. my note in A. J. P., Vol. X, p. 77. 

10 Tue Unity or Puato’s ΤΗΟΟΘΗΤ 

infinite foreknowledge of God, and the absolute continuity of physical causation. It 
is, then, unprofitable to inquire whether Plato taught free-will or determinism.” 
But it should be distinctly noted that in the Laws he employs precisely the logic of 
modern determinism to prove that the involuntary character of wrongdoing is com- 
patible with the distinction for legal purposes of voluntary and involuntary acts.” 
Virtue is knowledge because it must be assumed to be a good, and the only certain 
good, the only sure guide to the good use of what the world calls good, is knowledge.” 
Opinion and habit may often suffice to regulate action, but persistent right opinion 
presupposes knowledge in its teachers, and the highest rule of conduct must be 
deduced from and referred to a rational apprehension of ultimate good.” Virtue is 
one because each of the virtues is a form of knowledge,” or because each, when taken 
in the highest sense, involves all the others.” Virtue is teachable in the senses in 
which knowledge and right opinion may be taught. The capacity for knowledge, the 
divine faculty, is innate, but teaching and guidance may direct it toward the good.” 
The ordinary virtues of habit and opinion may fairly be said to be taught when they 
are systematically inculcated by superior wisdom enlisting all the forces of society jn 
its service.™ This is not the case at Athens,” and therefore the Platonic Socrates 
alternately affirms and denies the possibility of teaching “virtue,”” and at the close 
of the Meno declares that under present conditions it comes by a grace divine which 

is equivalent to chance.” 

Plato uses, but is not himself confused by, the Socratic analogy between the 
virtues and the arts and sciences.” That comparison, though it ignores the distinctively 

ethical element, contains a certain measure of truth. 
Knowledge as ordinarily understood is not virtue, but it 

in that which he knows.” 

27 ZELLER, p. 853; JOWETT, Vol. ITI, pp. 408, 425. 

28 861-864C. The meaning of the passage, though often 
misunderstood, is perfectly clear, and Plato warns us, 
864 B, not to cavil about the terminology. 

29 Huthydem., 281, 289; Meno, 880. Cf. from another 
point of view Phedo, 69AB; Protag., 356, 357, with Phileb., 

30 Meno, 91B; Meno, 100A, οἷος καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι, ete. Cf. 
Euthyd., 292 1); infra, p. 16: Laws, 951 B. 

31_Laches; Protag.; Phedo, 69AB. Meno, 71D ff., is 
logical rather than ethical. The unity of ἀρετή is postu- 
lated, like that of any other abstract idea, as a precondi- 
tion of a definition. 

32Gorg., 501A; Laws, 696C. There is a suggestion of 
this also in the (of course intentional, Bonrrz, Platonic 
Studies, p. 265) fallacies of Protag., 330, 331. 

33 Rep., 518B, 519A. This apparently contradicts the 
statement of the Meno, 99A, and.Protag., 361B, that ém- 
στήμη alone can be taught. But the objection is captious. 
The Republic is satirizing the exaggerated claims of the 
Sophists and is speaking of the faculty, not the content, of 
knowledge. The whole higher education is a teaching of 
knowledge in a sense. And, on the other hand, though 
both Plato and Aristotle limit teaching in the strict sense 

In a sense, each of us is good 

to knowledge, opinion is imparted ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ, 429C, i. «., 
is virtually taught. 

34 Rep., ὅ00 Ὁ, 429 Ο Ὁ; Polit./309D; Laws, passim. 

35 Rep., 492E; Tim., 81B; Meno, 93B ff.; Protag., 820; 
Rep., 520B; Euthyphro, 2CD; Gorg., 521D; Apol., 24, 25; 
Laches, 179 C Ὁ. 

36 Protag.; Meno; EHuthyd., 282C (214 Ἐ). 

37 For this interpretation of θείᾳ μοίρᾳ see MAGUIRE, p. 
63, and ZELLER’Ss full refutation of other views, p. 594, n. 4, 
Rep., 492, 493, At present good men spring up αὐτόματοι 
(Rep., 520B; cf. Protag., 320A; Huthyd., 282C); even in 
vicious states, Laws, 951 B, ἀεὶ θεῖοί τινες οὐ moddoi.... 
φνυόμενοι οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐν εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν ἢ καὶ μή. 

88 ΤῊΘ lesser Hippias (certainly by Plato) presents the 
fallacy inits most paradoxical form (the voluntary lie better 
than the involuntary) and by its obvious irony (872DE, 
376C) shows that Plato ‘“‘already’’ in the Socratic period 
does not take it seriously, but merely uses it for dramatic 
or propsedeutic purposes. ZELLER, p. 597, takes this as 
Plato’s real opinion, citing Rep., 535D and 382, which 
merely use the paradoxical terminology to emphasize the 
thought, acceptable to Mill or Huxley, that the mere intel- 
lectual love of truth (knowledge) ought to be counted a 
virtue as well as the ordinary virtue of truthfulness. 

39 Laches, 194D; Lysis, 210D; Rep., 849 E. 

Ῥασῦι, SHOREY 11 

does away with many forms of wrongdoing. Τί is not courage, but the man who knows 
how is less likely to be afraid.” It is not σωφροσύνη, but it is incompatible with many 
forms of ἀφροσύνη. The wise man knows his own limits, and will undertake only what 
he can perform.“ Partly for these reasons, and partly because he did not or, in ironical 
assumption that others were even as himself, would not recognize that men know the 
right and yet the wrong pursue, the Platonic Socrates seems to ignore the chief ethical 
factor, a virtuous will, and argues that he who knows justice is just.” But such “fal- 
lacies” are for Plato merely the starting-point of a fuller analysis. All knowledge is 
good and commendable,” but the supreme knowledge that may be identified with 
“virtue” is plainly something different from the specialties of the arts and sciences.“ 
Courage, for example, apart from mere animal and temperamental fearlessness, may be 
defined as knowledge of what is and is not to be feared. But this involves real knowl- 
edge of good and evil, a complete ideal of life, either that of the Sophists and average 
Athenian opinion, or that unfolded by Plato himself in the Republic. The attempt to 
define courage in the absence of these distinctions merely illustrates the inadequacy 
of conventional ethical thought.* 

The effective application to these problems of the obvious distinction between 
science and right opinion requires the larger canvas of the Republic. Andeven then 
it remains true that the courage most worthy of the name implies a complete philo- 
sophic mastery of the conception of life that educates the masses in such right opinion.“ 
Plato tacitly assumes that this supreme knowledge will be inseparable from the vir- 
tuous will in his philosophic statesmen as it is in Socrates.” And thus on this higher 
plane the Socratic paradox becomes true again. 

It matters little to the consistency and unity of Plato’s thought whether we 
regard this harmony of the intellect and the will as a mere ideal or as a practicable 
postulate realized in Socrates and to be fulfilled by others in a reformed society. The 
distinction once drawn, the ideal once affirmed, Plato can afford to make concessions 
to common-sense. He can admit that in present experience a kind of bravery is 

40 Laches, 193; Protag., 350. 

41 ΧΕΝ,, Mem., 2, 2, 24; Charm., 111 DE; Ale., I, U7 DE; 
Sophist, 229C; Laws, 732A. 

42Gorg., 460 B. The fallacy, so far as it is one, is in- 
tentional. Observe κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, and the explana- 
tion in Rep., 438 D E, that the knowledge of health, though 
differentiated from knowledge in general, is not neces- 
sarily healthful. Cf. also the recognition of common-sense 
in 444 Ὁ, τὸ μὲν δίκαια πράττειν δικαιοσύνην ἐμποιεῖ, But for 
the broad purposes of the argument of the Gorgias it is 
true (460 E) that rhetoric, if-really the science of the just, 
could not be the instrument of injustice which Gorgias 
with unconscious immorality complacently represented it 
tobe. Socrates is οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἣ τῷ 
λόγῳ, Crito, 46 Β; cf. Laches, 188 Ὁ) ἘΠ; Gorg., 488A. Hence, 
as Aristotle (Eth. nic., 7, 2,1), quoting Protag., 352 B, says, 
he thought it monstrous that any other impulse in man 
should prevail over his better knowledge. And Plato in 
his latest work refuses the term ‘‘ knowledge ” to any belief 
that does not control the will, and pronounces discord 

between the desires and the ethical convictions the grossest 
form of “ignorance.” 

43 Protag., 318 B; Laches, 182 Ὁ. 

44 Charm.,165C; Euthydem., 282 E, 290; Protag., 311, 312, 
319A; Laws, 961E ff. 

45 Laches; Protag., 349, 350, 360 Ὁ; Rep., 429, 430. 

46The courage defined in 429C is only πολιτικήν ye. Cf. 
δημώδη ye, Laws, T10A; Polit., 309E; Pheedo, 82A. There 
are, strictly speaking, three or four grades; brute animal 
courage, the courage of soldiers and citizens in ordinary 
states, the citizen courage of the Platonic state, the philo- 
sophic courage. 

47 This harmony is the chief point in the selections and 
tests applied to them; Rep., 485, 486, 589 Ὁ ff. Cf. Polit., 
309A B. The Laws emphasize character, as compared with 
intellect, still more, and preserve the identity of the moral 
and the intellectual ‘‘ which are ever dividing, but must 
ever be reunited” (Jowett), by reserving the word ‘‘ wise” 
for the virtuous, 689 D. 

12 Tue Unity oF Puato’s THOUGHT 

found dissociated from the other virtues.” He can allow the word σωφροσύνη to be 
used merely for the instinctive temperamental moderation in appetite that is the for- 
tunate endowment of some children and animals.“ He can recognize that knowledge, 
or at least quickness and acumen of thought, is not infrequently associated with 
intemperance and injustice.” But he prefers to translate the facts into a more edify- 
ing terminology. Conventional virtue is a worthless currency unless redeemable and 
redeemed by and in the coin of wisdom.” And, on the other hand, we will refuse the 
name of wise to him whose will does not follow his judgment of right; and we will 
grant it to the man who knows enough to obey his acquired belief in the good rather 
than the innate promptings of appetite, though he know not how to swim or recite 

the alphabet.” 

2. Plato found the suggestion of the cardinal virtues and of the predominance of 
justice in the poets. He also mentions ὁσιότης ἢ and μεγαλοπρέπεια, the latter some- 
times with irony.* But the number four was consecrated by its incorporation in the 
scheme of the Republic. This implies no change of doctrine. Even in the Republic 
other virtues are mentioned.* And in the Luthyphro it is hinted that piety is a form 

of justice.” 

Plato would always recognize piety as one of the chief virtues, or perhaps as a 
synonym of all virtue,” and he would always shrink from giving so problematical a 

concept a place in a scientific scheme.” 

Several of the minor dialogues turn on the attempt to define the virtues and allied 
notions. The Laches and Charmides are both Socratic quests for definition—of 
courage in the one case, of temperance in the other. Both involve the antithesis of 
the quiet and the energetic temperament.” Both terminate in perplexity—in the 
puzzle that, if any one virtue is identified with the supreme knowledge that will make 

48 Protagoras maintains this view, Protag., 350, and is 
not answered by Socrates, who refutes him only indirectly 
by the proof that all virtue is one—the science of measur- 
ing pleasure and pain. But the obvious fact of experience 
is presumably as clear to Plato when he allows Protagoras 
to state it as when it ist'enunciated more explicitly in the 
Politicus, 306 B, or the Laws, 631C. ZELLER (p.599) incom- 
prehensibly affirms that the plurality in unity of virtue is 
found only in the Republic! 

49 Laws, 110A B. 

50 Rep., 519A; Laws, 689 Ὁ, ὅσα πρὸς τάχος τῆς ψυχῆς; 
Theeetet., 1166. 

51 Pheedo., 69B. 

82 Laws, 689D, μήτε γράμματα μήτε νεῖν. Cf, Thecetet., 
116 C, τῷ οὖν ἀδικοῦντι, . . . μακρῷ ἄριστ᾽ ἔχει τὸ μὴ συγχωρεῖν 
δεινῷ ὑπὸ πανουργίας εἶναι, The whole passage is in the 
mood and temper of the Laws. 

53 Protag., 329C; Meno, 78D; Laches, 199 Ὁ. 

54 Meno, T4A; Rep., 560E. In Meno, 88A, εὐμάθεια and 
μνήμη are included. 

45 402 C, ἐλευθεριότης, μεγαλοπρέπεια 536 A. 

56 Cf. also Protag., 331 A. 

sv If it were desirable to produce a Platonic definition 

of piety, Ishould accept that of Bonitz as formulated by 
Proressoz HEIDEL (introduction to his edition of Euthy- 
phro, p. 24). It is the endeavor to realize the good felt as 
the service of God, and as a willed co-operation with Him. 
But this is a mood in relation to, or an emotional synonym 
of, all virtue. It is not one aspect of virtue which it is 
necessary to distinguish in relation to a special field of 
conduct or a particular classification of the faculties of 
the soul, 

58The suggestion that the Euthyphro “eliminates” 
piety, and that the Meno may be dated by its recognition 
of ὁσιότης (78 D) is utterly fantastic. 

59 Of. Charm., 159 Β ff., with Polit., 307A B. Tempera- 
ment is not virtue, but is the basis of the seeming opposi- 
tion between bravery and temperance (Polit., 306, 307; Rep., 
410 DE, 503 Ο D; Laws, 735A, 681 B, 118 Β, 831E; Protag., 
349). Nicias and Laches, for want of this distinction, 
maintain opposite paradoxes. Socrates calls our attention 
to this by attributing to Nicias the doctrine ὁμοίως λέοντα 
καὶ ἔλαφον... .. πρὸς ἀνδρείαν --- πεφυκέναι (196 E). In the Re- 
public (430 Β), Plato chooses to deny the term bravery” 
to mere animal courage. In the Laws, 963 E, he attributes 
a kind of courage to children and animals, But ὁμοίως 
πεφυκέναι pointedly ignores the distinction of tempera- 


us happy, the distinction between the virtues vanishes;” or in the tautology that the 
knowledge that is good is knowledge of the good.” 

It is often assumed (1) that Plato was serious in these attempts to express by a 
phrase or a substituted synonym the essence of a virtue and the various and contradic- 
tory meanings of its conventional name; (2) that the failure and pretended perplexity of 
Socrates at the close mark the point reached by Plato’s own thought at the time. This 
is ὦ priori conceivable. But the following considerations make it highly improbable: 

a) Plato, in this unlike Xenophon,” always proceeds as if he were aware of the 
true theory and use of the definition and of the multiple meanings of ethical terms. 
All attempts in his writings to work out abselute and isolated definitions fail.“ His 
own definitions, when not mere illustrations,* are always working hypotheses” or 
epigrammatic formulas, subordinate to and interpreted by the argument of which 
they form a part, and recognized as imperfect, but sufficient for the purpose in hand.” 
The definitions of the virtues in Rep., 429 ff. cannot be understood apart from their 
context, and are never used again. They are declared to be a mere sketch— 
ὑπογραφήν, ὅ04 1). How shall we explain this on the supposition that he was under 
any illusion as to the value of absolute and isolated definitions? 

b) Plato repeatedly refers in a superior way to eristic, voluntary and involuntary,” 
and more particularly to the confusion, tautology, and logomachy into which the vulgar 
fall when they attempt to discuss abstract and ethical problems.” Some of these 
allusions touch on the very perplexities and fallacies exemplified in the minor 
dialogues.” They do not imply that Plato himself had ever been so confused." Why 
should we assume that he deceives us in order to disguise his changes of opinion, or 

60 Laches, 199 E. 

61 Charm., 114 B; cf. Rep., 505 BC—a connection gener- 
ally missed. 

62The Xenophontic Socrates perceives no difficulties, 
is never in doubt, and propounds dogmatically such defini- 
tions as νόμιμον = δίκαιον, Mem., IV, 4, 12. 

63 Except the not quite serious definitions reached by 
dichotomy in the Sophist and Politicus. Cf. Charmides, 
Laches, Lysis, Meno, Theetetus, Euthyphro, Hippias Major, 

647dxos, Laches, 192B; σχῆμα, Meno, 15, 16; πηλός, 
Thecetet., 147C; ἥλιος, ibid., 208 Ὁ. 

65 Pheedr., 237 D, ὁμολογίᾳ θέμενοι ὅρον. Cf. 263 DE. 

66 Κα, g., ῥητορικηξεπολιτικῆς wopiov εἴδωλον, Gorg., 463 D, but 
in Pheedr., 261A, ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, Cf. the defini- 
tions of σωφροσύνη, Pheedr., 237 E. 

Ἴ 67 The Laws repeats the substance of the definition of 
justice, 863 E: τὴν yap τοῦ θυμοῦ... . καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐν ψυχῇ 
τυραννίδα... πάντως ἀδικίαν προσαγορεύω. Cf. 689 A Β, τὸ 
γὰρ λυπούμενον καὶ ἡδόμενον αὐτῆς (86. τῆς ψυχῆς) ὅπερ δῆμός 
τε καὶ πλῆθος πόλεώς ἐστιν. Cf. Rep., 442A, ὃ δὴ πλεῖστον τῆς 
ψυχῆς, etc. 

68 Rep., 454A; Phileb., 14 Ὁ, ἐκοῦσί τε καὶ ἄκουσιν; The- 
αἰοῖ., 206 Β, ἑκόντα ἣ ἄκοντα παίζειν; Theetet., 161 Ἐ 
Sophist, 259D; already in Lysis, 216 Β, Cf. infra, ν. 19. 

69 Pheedr., 237 C, 263, and, from a slightly different point 
of view, Rep., 538D; Phedo, 900. This is largely due to a 
false conceit of knowledge, Phedr., 237C, which the Elen- 
chus as described in Soph., 230B, and practised in the minor 

dialogues cures. Cf. Meno, 84 ἃ Β. So Soph., 232 AB, gives 
the raison d’étre of passages (Gorgias, Protag., Jon) in 
which a pretender to universal knowledge is pressed for a 
specific definition of his function which he naturally is 
unable to give. 

τὸ Polit., 306 ff., especially 806A, τὸ γὰρ ἀρετῆς μέρος 
ἀρετῆς εἴδει διάφορον εἶναί τινα τρόπον τοῖς περὶ λόγοις ἀμφισβη- 
τικοῖς καὶ μάλ᾽ εὐεπίθετον πρὸς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας, Cf. Laws, 
621 D, εὐσχημοσύνης .... ῥημάτων πρὸς τὸν τῶν πολλῶν λόγον. 
Repub., 848 E, εἴχομεν ἄν τι λέγειν κατὰ τὰ νομιζόμενα λέγοντες, 
with reference to the arguments of Gorg., 414 Ὁ ff. Of. Laws, 
837A, with reference to the problem of the Lysis; Laws, 
661 B, 687, 688, 688 B, where the paradox of Gorg., 467, is 
reaffirmed, ef μὲν βούλεσθε ὡς παίζων, εἰ δ᾽ ὡς σπουδάζων: 
Republic, 505 B, with Charm., 113-114 Β; Rep., 505 Ο, with 
Gorg., 499 B, where Callicles is forced to admit that some 
pleasures are bad. ZELLER(p. 604) thinks that Rep., 505C, 
refers to the Philebus. But the advocates of a late date 
for the Philebus rightly deny any specific parallel. 

71 Even after the Republic and Politicus, Plato in Laws, 
963 ff., approaches the problem of the ‘political art” and 
the unity of virtue precisely in the manner of the tentative 
dialogues. There is no reason for taking seriously Socrates's 
dramatic bewilderment as to the “political art’? in Euthy- 
dem., 292 D E, that would not apply equally to the avowal of 
ignorance in Laws, 963B, or in the Politicus itself, 292C. 
The political art, i.e., ultimate ethical and social ‘‘good,” 
was always a problem to Plato, as it must be to any 
thoughtful, conscientious man (Rep., 451A). In the Laws, 

14 THE Unity or Puato’s ΤΗΟΌΘΗΤ 

obliterate the traces of his mental growth? Have we not a right to expect dramatic 
illustration of so prominent a feature in the intellectual life of the time, and do we not 
find it in the Laches, Charmides, Lysis, and the corresponding parts of the Pro- 
tagoras? In brief, the Huthydemus, 277, 278; Phedrus, 261, 262; the Thectetus, 
167 E; the Republic, 454, 487 BC; the Sophist, 230 B, 251 B, 259C, and Philebus, 
20 A, 15 ΕἸ, show a clear consciousness of dialectic, not merely as a method of truth, 
but as a game practiced for amusement or eristic, to purge the conceit of ignorance 
or awaken intellectual curiosity. When we find this game dramatically illustrated 
why should we assume naive unconsciousness on Plato’s part? 

c) The Republic, in which Plato explicitly states his solution of these problems, 
is a marvelous achievement of mature constructive thought. But the ideas and dis- 
tinctions required for the solution itself are obvious enough, and it is absurd to affirm 
that they were beyond the reach of a thinker who was capable of composing the Pro- 
tagoras,” the subtle Lysis and Charmides, or the eloquent and ingenious Gorgias. 
That the highest rule of conduct must be based upon complete insight and is the 
possession of a few; that the action of the multitude is determined by habit’ and 
belief” shaped under the manifold pressure of tradition and public opinion; that the 
virtues may be differently defined according as we refer them to knowledge or to 
opinion and habit; that opinion in the Athens of the Sophists and of the Peloponne- 
sian war was not guided by true philosophy, and therefore was not the “ right opinion” 
which should become the fixed habit of the populace in a reformed society; that the 
Sophists who professed to teach virtue taught at the best conformity to the desires 
and opinions of the many-headed beast, and that therefore in the proper sense virtue” 
was not taught at all at Athens;" that virtue is one regarded as knowledge, or as the 
spiritual harmony resulting from perfect self-control (443 E), but many as expressing 
the opposition of contrasted temperaments and different degrees of education; and 
that endless logomachies result from the inability of the average disputant to grasp 
these and similar distinctions “"— these are reflections that might present themselves to 
any intelligent young man who had listened to Socrates, and surveyed the intellectual 
life of the time, though only the genius of Plato could construct a Republic from 
them. They could occur to Plato at the age of thirty or thirty-five as well as at forty 
or forty-five; and it is extremely naive to assume that so obvious a distinction as that 
between science and opinion, familiar to every reader of Parmenides, and employed to 
bring the Meno to a plausible dramatic conclusion, was a great scientific discovery, 
marking an epoch in Plato’s thought.” 

964 ff., as in the Republic, he finally limits himself to indi- 
cating the kind of training that will prepare the mind to 
apprehend it best. But as against the ideals of Athenian 
sophists and politicians, his beliefs were defined ‘‘already ” 
in the Euthyphro, 2C, and the Gorgias, 463 D ff., 521 Ὁ. 

72*One of the finest specimens of analysis in all his 
writings.”—JoHN STUART MILL, Dissertations and Discus- 
sions, Vol. IV, p. 250. 

13 Pheedo, 82A; Rep., 522 A, 619C; Laws, 9660. 

74 Rep., 492, 493. 

% Laws, 964A, διανοοῦ δὲ ws ἐρῶν καὶ ὃπῃ τέτταρα ὄντα 
ἕν ἐστι, καὶ ἐμὲ δὲ ἀξίον, σοῦ δείξαντος ὡς ἕν, πάλιν ὅπῃ 

16 Νοῦ to dwell on the resemblance of Meno, 99C, and 
Apology, 22C (cf. also the Jon), why, if Plato has no dra- 
matic reserves, is ὀρθή δόξα ignored in the Huthydemus? Or 
is the Euthydemus, with its mature logic and its assump- 
tion that virtue can be taught, earlier than the Meno? 

Paut SHOREY 15 

d) Lastly the structure and logic of the minor dialogues are indicative of dramatic 
design rather than of tentative inquiry. The systematic evolution of the argument 
and of the antitheses which it involves;" the emphasis laid on the very difficulties 
elucidated by the latter theory;” the reserves and qualifications of the argument and 
the hints of dramatic purpose”—all point to Plato’s possession of the clue. The argu- 
ment based on the absence from the “Socratic” dialogues of certain features of the 
longer works begs the point at issue. 

Assuming that Plato undertook to illustrate in brief dramatic discussions the 
ethical logomachies of the day, he would by hypothesis as a rule abstain from Pytha- 
gorean myths, criticism of pre-Socratic thinkers, demonstrations of immortality, psycho- 
logical or physiological digressions, and dogmatic developments of his own philosophy. 
It may be argued that such dramatic dialogues form as a whole an earlier group. It 
cannot be maintained that they mark the stages of Plato’s own progress.” The defini- 
tions of the virtues proposed in the fourth book of the Republic, interpreted by their 
context, meet the dramatic difficulties of the Laches, Charmides, Protagoras, and 
Meno. Courage is not animal fearlessness, neither is it precisely knowledge of things 
terrible and the reverse. But the courage to be expected of the masses in a reformed 
state is the conservation by disciplined feeling of the opinion about things terrible or 
not terrible inculcated by the possessors of such knowledge." Σωφροσύνη is not pre- 
cisely quietness, nor doing one’s own business, nor self-knowledge, though each of 
these definitions emphasizes one of the shades of meaning which Greek usage assigned 
to this “mixed mode.’’ It is in man and state the willing acceptance by all the psychic 
faculties and the corresponding classes in the population of a harmonious scale of 

71In the Charmides σωφροσύνη is first defined by the 
quiet temperament, 159 B, then by the associated modesty, 
αἰδώς, 159 Εἰ, which is elsewhere its virtual synonym, Pro- 
tag., 322CDE; then by τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, 161 Β, another 
rhetorical equivalent, Tim., 712A, which, however, requires 
an interpretation that Critias is unable to give, even though 
assisted by a hint from Socrates (161E). He cannot gen- 
eralize minding one’s own business, and distinguish (1) the 
economic, (2) the social and political, (3) the psychic 
division of labor; Rep., 443. The formula is allowed to 
drop, and the equally ambiguous expression “self-knowl- 
edge” is substituted (164), which is found to involve puz- 
zles that Critias can neither untie nor cut (cf. 167A with 
Meno, 80E; Theeetet., 188 A). 

In the Laches, Laches insists exclusively on the tem- 
peramental aspect of bravery which opposes it to other 
virtues, Nicias on the cognitive element which identifies it 
with them. Laches’s theory tends to show how the virtues 
are many, that of Nicias how they are one (Laws, 963 E ff.). 
But neither can expound his own view completely, still less 
reconcile it with the truth of-his adversary. They exemplify 
the logomachy described in Polit., 306, 307. This is the chief 
object of the dialogue, and not the reduction of all virtue 
to knowledge (Zeller), nor the unity of virtue (Horn), nor 
even the establishment of the definition φρόνιμος καρτερία 
which Bonitz says is the only suggestion not disproved. 

In the Lysis we begin with purely verbal quibbles, pass 
to the suggestive antithesis of the attraction of like and 
unlike in nature and man (214, 215), and conclude with 

the problem of good and evil, aud the ultimate nature of 
desire and the good. 

78 Note the repeated demand that it be shown how σωφρο- 
σύνη is a good, Charm., 159C, 161 A, 165 D, 172 D, 174 B, with 
Rep.,50. Cf. infra, p.17. Also Laws, 110, when, even after 
the Republic, it is recognized that σωφροσύνη as the mere 
passive conditio sine qua non of the usefulness of the active 
virtues ἀλόγου σιγῆς ἄξιον ἂν εἴη, Again, cf. the association 
of τὰ éavtod πράττειν in 161 with the division of labor, and 
Rep., 370A, 482A, 434C, 443}. So in the Laches, Nicias is 
driven to admit that the knowledge of things really terrible 
and the reverse is not the property of any craftsman even 
in his own field, but is some higher knowledge of final ends 
which he cannot define —i. e., obviously the ‘political art” 
or the idea of good. 

79 Charm., 160 B, ἔκ ye τούτον τοῦ λόγον; the obvious de- 
sign of humbling Critias, 162 Ὁ D; Charmides’s disbelief in 
Socrates's ignorance, 116 Β. Cf. Phedr., 262D, ὡς av ὃ 
εἰδὼς τὸ ἀληθὲς προσπαίζων ἐν λόγοις παράγοι τοὺς ἀκούοντας, 
Laches’s unfamiliarity with dialectic and the awakening 
effect of the Elenchus upon him; 1% AB. 

80As UEBERWEG says (Untersuchungen, p. 280): ‘Far 
das Verstandniss des Platonismus ist kaum ein anderer 
Irrthum gefdhrlicher, als der, eine Zuraickhaltung, die 
Plato aus methodischen Granden abte, mit einem Noch- 
nichtsein zu verwechseln.” 

81 Rep., 429C D, 442C. 

10 Tue Unity oF PuLato’s THovueat 

subordination from higher to lower.” It is thus the precondition and obverse aspect 

of justice which is the fulfilment of its own function by each faculty and class—a 
higher than the economic division of labor in the soul and in society.” These defini- 
tions are stated in terms of being rather than of doing, and Plato preferred this form 
of statement to the end.“ But he is careful to add that the one includes the other 
and that the justice within the soul will express itself in just action.” 

3. These definitions, then, meet the chief difficulties of the minor dialogues and fill 
their place in the literary economy of the Republic. But Plato warns us that they 
are not the final definitions of a complete philosophy.” It is not enough to define the 
virtues psychologically on the assumption that their sum is good.” A final definition 
must relate virtue to, and deduce its utility from, an ultimate standard or ideal of 
good.” Such a definition is rather a regulative conception than a practical possibility. 
The Platonic Socrates is always prepared to silence by dialectic or overwhelm by his 
eloquence those who deny that “virtue” is a real good.” But a formal, positive enu- 
meration of the reasons why courage and justice are good and desirable can never be 
complete, and will always prove unedifying: ‘Does law so analyzed coerce you 
much?” Plato wisely attempts nothing of the kind. He merely describes the dis- 
cipline and education” that will enable his philosophic rulers to prove, if required, the 
coincidence of virtue and happiness, and systematically inculcate efficacious right 
opinion, thus teaching virtue and molding character and institutions in the light of a 
reasoned and unified conception of the true scope and good of individual: and public 

82432 A, 442 D. This definition is adapted to the literary 
machinery of the Republic. It does not estop Plato from 
employing the word in its normal Greek sense (Rep., 
389 Ὁ E, ws πλήθει, etc.), or from recognizing that itis a con- 
dition of virtue rather than an active virtue; supra, p. 12. 

83 Allowance once made for the literary schematism of 
the four virtues, the three faculties, and the analogy be- 
tween the man and the state, and account once taken of 
Laws, 696 C, 710, and Politicus, 306 ff., it becomes a little 
naive to complain that the distinction intended between 
σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη is not clear, and a little pedantic 
to institute a learned philological inquiry to ascertain it. 

84 Laws, 864 A, τὴν δὲ τοῦ apiorou ddtav ... , ἐὰν αὕτη Kpa- 
τοῦσα ἐν ψυχαῖς διακοσμῇ πάντα ἄνδρα, κἂν σφάλληταί τι δίκαιον 
μὲν πᾶν εἶναι φατέον τὸ ταύτῃ πραχθέν. 

85 442 BE, 443 A. 

86 Grote, followed by many others, denies this. But 
that is because he persists in attributing to Plato the 
doctrine that ethical abstractions (‘‘mixed modes”’) have 
one meaning only which can be expressed in an absolute 
definition; ¢f.supra. But, on the contrary, the very cause 
of the confusion, according to Plato, is that men fail to take 
notice of the different meanings and sub-species covered 
by one generic term (Pheedr., 161,162; Euthydem., 277, 278; 
Laws, 837A; Phileb., 12E ff.; Euthyphro, 7D. with Phedr., 
263B, and Polit., 285E; Polit., 306A). lLaches, Nicias, 
Charmides, Critias, discuss the virtues without distin- 
guishing temperament, convention, habit, systematic dis- 
cipline, opinion, and complete insight. They are unable to 
attach any precise meaning to the conventional phrases 

“know thyself’ and “‘ minding one’s own business.’ There 
is not one temperance or bravery, but three or four. There 
is no incompatibility between this view and Plato's insist- 
ence on the necessity of the definition and the final unity 
of virtue. If the word has many meanings, the first step 
in rational argument is to define the one intended. And 
the unity of virtue is to be sought, not in a verbal defini- 
tion, but in the unity of the moral life, the idea of good, the 
political art, the σκοπός (cf. infra, τι. 102). The definition 
is a hypothesis at the beginning, or a stage in the progress 
of the argument (Charm., 163A; Euthyphro, 9D, 11C; 
Pheedr., 281), ὁμολογίᾳ θέμενοι ὅρον, 263D E). It cannot be 
an end, and for this reason dialogues that seek a definition 
fail. This dialectical relativity of the definition, of course, 
does not preclude Plato from arguing that his ideal of the 
moral and social life is better than that of average Athenian 
opinion, and that the definitions which embody it are right 
as against formulas that express some aspect of the tradi- 
tional belief. 

87 Rep., 427E, οἶμαι ἡμῖν τὴν πόλιν... 

. τελέως ἀγαθὴν 

δῆλον δὴ ὅτι σοφή 7’ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σώφρων καὶ 

88 Ibid., 504 BCD, 506 A, ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ idea... . ἡ δίκαια 
καὶ τἄλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται. 

89 Gorgias; Rep., I. 

90The “longer way,’’ Rep., 504C, is for the guardians, 
not for us who are reading the Republic. See Laws, 964. 
9660. Neglect of this point has caused much misinterpre- 

tation. See Idea of Good, in “ University of Chicago Clas- 
sical Studies,” Vol. I, p. 190. 


life. The attainment of this mastery he poetically describes as the vision of the Idea 
of Good. But it must never be forgotten that all this mysticism culminates in the 
precise and purely logical statement of 534 BC, which affirms little more than Phe- 
drus, 278 C, or than Mill when he says: ‘There is no knowledge, and no assurance 
of right belief, but with him who can both confute the opposite opinion and success- 
fully defend his own against confutation.” Many secondary suggestions attach them- 
selves to the phrase by association with the goodness of God, the universal cause, in 
the Timeus,” the vision of the absolute ideas in the Phedrus and Symposium, the 
fantastic enumeration in the Philebus (66) of the elements of ‘‘good” conceived at 
once as an ethical and a cosmical principle.” Its chief logical and ethical significance 
for the Republic has been hopelessly misunderstood, owing to the failure to connect it 
rightly with the problem of the “‘good” as presented in the minor dialogues.“ In 
these dialogues Socrates repeatedly tests definitions of the virtues by demanding that 
they be related to happiness, the political or royal art, or the good. A virtue by 
hypothesis must be a καλόν and ἀγαθόν. The definitions proposed repeatedly break 
down because Socrates is able to instance cases in which the rule prescribed does not 
conduce to happiness—is not good.” Similarly the rhetorician, the sophist, and 
other pretenders to some supreme knowledge are confounded by Socrates’s demand 
that they shall sharply discriminate their art and science from all merely instrumental 
and technical specialties which effect good or evil according as they are rightly or 
wrongly used, and show its identity with the art of arts, the art of final ends, the 
political art, the good.” 

In some of the minor dialogues the negative dialectic seems to go too far, and 
Socrates makes demands that neither Platonism nor any other doctrine can meet. Thus 
in the Charmides the familiar expression ‘‘ knowing one’s self,” “ knowing one’s limits,” 
“knowing what one can or cannot do,” is made a puzzle by confounding it with the 
psychological question of self-knowledge or self-consciousness, and the fallacy or 
problem about knowing and not knowing the same thing;” and, waiving this point, 
Socrates demands proof that knowing the things one cannot do and intrusting them 
to experts is a good—a fundamental axiom of Platonism.” The explanation is that 
the phrase, like τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν above, is taken externally of adminicular and 

91 Dissertations and Discussions, Vol. IV, p. 283. the “opinion of the best’ is treated as a potent cause. 

9229B, ἀγαθὸς ἦν. On the identification of the good with 
God see Idea of Good, pp. 188, 189. 

93 Fantastic because due (1) to the wish to depress 
ἡδονή to the fifth place; (2) to the neo-Platonic device of 
extending the intelligible hierarchy by the interpolation of 
new members between the highest and the lowest. It 
belongs to rhetoric or religious emotion, then, not to Plato’s 
scientific ethics. 

94 #. g., one hundred and fifty pages separate ZELLER’S 
treatment of the idea of good (p. 707) from his discussion 
of the ethical good (p. 867). In elucidation of the former 
he quotes little or nothing from the ethical dialogues and 
cites neither Phedo, 99A, nor any other passage in which 

Finally he identifies the idea of good with God by a sophis- 
tical interpretation of παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ (Tim., 29E) and a 
false construction of (92 B) εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ (sc. ζῴου not θεοῦ, 
ef. 380 Ὁ). 

95 Meno, 87D; Laches, 192C, 193 Ὁ; Protag., 349E; Hipp. 
Maj., 284D; Rep., 332, 333, 

96 See Idea of Good, pp. 200-204. 

91 Buthyd., 282E, 290, 291C; Charm., 170B; Protag.. 
319A; Gorg., 501A B, 503D; Polit., 289C, 293D,309C; Rep., 
428 Ὁ. 

98 ΟἹ. Meno, 80E; Euthydem., 286D., Thecetet., 191B, 

99 Cf. XEN., Men., 4,3, 24; Ale.,I, 111 DE; Laws, 732A. 

18 Tue Unity or Puato’s THOUGHT 

mechanical arts and sciences, not as in the Republic, with reference to the division of 
labor or function in the soul and the supreme arts of life and government. To ask 
why Critias is allowed to be baffled for lack of this distinction is to ask why Plato 
wrote short dramatic dialogues at all—why he did not incorporate the fourth book 
of the Republic in the Charmides. So in Euthydemus, 292 H, the suggestion that 
the good achieved by the possessors of the political art will be the training up of 
successors to know it is treated as a vicious circle or an infinite regress, although, when 
accompanied by the fuller explanations of the Republic, it is evidently in part the true 
Platonic doctrine.” And similarly in the Lysis the theory, virtually repeated in the 
Symposium, that that which is intermediate between good and evil desires the good 
as a remedy against evil, is rejected because it makes the good a mere means to an 
end.” But the general meaning that emerges from the ἀπορίαι of the minor dialogues, 
and the answer to them given in the Republic, is as simple as it is sound. A philo- 
sophic ethics must systematically relate its definitions and prescriptions to some con- 
sistent conception of final ends and good—be it the realization of spiritual health and 
order in a reformed society, the development of personality, the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number, the fulfilment of the will of God, the renunciation of the will to 
live, or the survival of the fittest. The statesman rises above the politician, the 
thinker and artist above the rhetorician, the true teacher above the charlatan, by his 
possession of an aim and a standard, his apprehension of a type of perfection toward 
which all his thoughts, and words, and acts converge.” 

Plato’s own ethical and social conceptions were thus co-ordinated and unified. 
Those of the brilliant sophists and rhetoricians who figure in his pages were not. 
They may have been very estimable and ingenious men. They could not in Plato’s 
judgment be true philosophers, statesmen, or teachers of statesmen, because they 
lacked both the “idea of good” and the synoptic and unifying dialectic required for 
its systematic application in ethics and politics, and in the education of the masses to 
“virtue.” This recognition of the logical significance of the idea of good for the 
Republic and the Socratic dialogues does not commit us to an acceptance of all Plato’s 
social ideals. It does not even require us to admit that the doctrine of the Republic 
really solves all the difficulties suggested by Plato’s “‘negative dialectic.” But it 
creates the strongest presumption that it was present to his mind when he wrote the 
Laches, Charmides, and Euthydemus. 

Parallel to the quest for the definition of the cardinal virtues leading to the idea 
of good is the study of friendship, love, passion, culminating in the apprehension of 
the idea of beauty at the point where it is hardly to be distinguished from the good.” 
No complete philosophy can ignore these things. Plato’s reflections upon them have 

100 Cf, Meno, 100A, οἷος καὶ ἄλλον ποιῆσαι πολιτικόν, etc. 102 Gorg., 508 E, 501 C, 517, 518; Rep., 484C, 500 Ὁ E, 520C; 
Cf. Rep., 412A B, 491C Ὁ; Laws, 950B ff.; Polit., 309D, τὸν Laws, 625 E, 630C, 688 B, 693 B, 706 A, 717A, 733C D, 962A. 
Pai, ANTONY τες, τας NEO chan τῇ. φὴς; Eee Er 103 Lysis, 219, 220; Symp., 205 D, 210, 211; Pheedr., 250D ff. ; 

τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ὀρθῶς μεταλαβοῦσι παιδείας, which, 
however, refers partly to the lower education as well. 

101 Of. Lysis, 218A, with Symp., 203 E. 

Phileb., 64E. viv δὴ καταπέφευγεν ἡμῖν ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δύναμις 
εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν. 


become the commonplaces of the philosophy and poetry of modern Europe: the 
strange antinomy between the love of like for like and the attraction of dissimilars in 
man and nature; the exaltation of character and mood in passionate love and friend- 
ship; the transfiguration of the passion in the love of esthetic, moral, and intellectual 
beauty; the overloading of the instinct to achieve the ends of nature—the immor- 
tality of the species. The student of the Lysis, Phedrus, Symposium, Republic, 
and Laws will find it impossible to fix a date at which these ideas first presented 
themselves to Plato’s mind.™ The mood, the treatment, the emphasis varies. Some 
of the thoughts are omitted in each dialogue, none are treated in all, and contradic- 
tions and developments may be “proved” by uncritically pressing the language and 
the imagery. But the differences between the Symposium and Phedrus, both pre- 
sumably works of the middle period, are as noticeable as those found in any other 
works that touch on the theme. The Symposium mentions one idea, the Phedrus 
several; the former ignores immortality and ἀνάμνησις, the latter is one of the chief 
sources for both.” The Phedrus ignores the thought that love is the yearning of 
the mortal for immortality, the Symposium virtually omits the doctrine of μανία and 
enthusiasm. In the Symposium love is not a god, but a demon; in the Phedrus he 
is θεός or (to escape explicit contradiction) 7 θεῖον. These and other differences pre- 
sent no difficulties to a rational literary interpretation. On no reasonable theory of 
Plato’s development can they signify real changes in Plato’s beliefs in the interval 
between the composition of the two dialogues. 

The Lysis, though a slight Socratic dialogue, displays extreme subtlety of dialec- 
tic,* and implies some of the most characteristic thoughts of the Symposium. The 
failure to establish a formal definition, and the Socratic avowal of ignorance at the 
end prove nothing. There is a plain hint that Menexenus is an “eristic,” and 
Socrates’s treatment of him, so different in tone from the edifying little conversation 
with Lysis, is a mere dramatic illustration of the πλάνη or ἀπορία that results from 
failure to discriminate the different meanings of an ambiguous term. Love, as the 
Phedrus tells us, is such a term — including subordinate and contradictory species.” 
For, as the Laws say, 837 A, δύο yap ὄντα αὐτὰ καὶ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τρίτον ἄλλο εἶδος Ev ὄνομα 

104 Zeller’s theory that Eros is der philosophische Trieb is 
a somewhat rigid and matter-of-fact interpretation of this 

105 Symp., 207D; Laws, 721, 118 E. 

106 Cf, Rep., 402, 403, with Symp., 210C; Rep., 490A B; 
Laws, 688B, φρόνησις... καί νοῦς καί δόξα μετ᾽ ἔρωτός τε 
καί ἐπιθυμίας ; Rep., 499C, with Laws, 711 1), ὅταν ἔρως θεῖος 
τῶν σωφρόνων τε καὶ δικαίων ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐγγένηται, Laws, 
841 D, 686 Ο, παρὰ φύσιν, with Phedr., 251A; Laws, 837; 
Gorg., 414 Ὁ E, generalization of καλόν as in Symp. 

107 LUTOSLA WSEI (p. 242) fails to tell us where ἀνάμνησις 
is ‘alluded to in the speech of Aristophanes.” 

108The conception of eristic, 216A B, arguing to the 
word, not the meaning, is as clear as it is in Rep., 454A, 
or Euthydem., 295 BC, and the fallacy by which it is illus- 

trated, the identity of opposites as such, recurs in sub- 
stance in Parmen., 148A B, and belongs to the same class as 
the quibble on ἕτερον, Euthydem., 301B; Thecetet., 190C; 
Parmen., 147E. Cf. also ἀνομοιότατον͵ Phileb., 13D; Par- 
men., 127E, 148 BC. 

109 FY, g., θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ, etc , Symp., 203 E, which 
LuTOSLAWSEI (p. 239) thinks an important new point, in 
advance even of the Cratylus, is ‘‘ already” in Lysis, 218 A. 
Zeller, who is ‘unable to suppose” that Plato had ‘“al- 
ready” attained the guiding thoughts of his later system 
(p. 614), argues that_in the Lysis the psychological analysis 
is carried as far as is possible on a Socratic basis, but that 
the metaphysical explanation was revealed later. If Plato 
must tell all he knows in every dialogue, why is ἀνάμνησις 
not associated with ἔρως in the Symposium and Republic? 

110 263 C, 265 E. 


περιλαβὸν πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν καὶ σκότον ἀπεργάξεται. How familiar the two εἴδη were to 
Plato appears from the almost technical use of the phrase δι᾽ ὁμοιότητα φιλίαν in 
Phedr., 240 C. Menexenus’s bewilderment is precisely on a par with that of Kleinias 
over the two meanings of μανθάνω in the Huthydemus.™ Plato is no more confused 
in the one case than in the other. The mood of the Symposium and Phedrus is 
compatible with youth or maturity, hardly with old age. The thoughts are naturally 
not repeated in their entirety, but many of them appear in the Republic, or are sug- 
gested elsewhere. They are nowhere contradicted,” and there is no reason to doubt 
that they were essential permanent elements of Plato’s criticism of life. But he was 
not always in the mood to dwell upon them. 

4, In another aspect the Platonic ethics is a polemic against hedonism. This must 
not be confounded with the modern utilitarian controversy. The modern opponent of 
utilitarianism is chiefly concerned to prove that the moral law cannot be deduced from 
experiences of utility, but has an ὦ priori origin and requires a supernatural sanction. 
Plato does not directly discuss the origin of morality, but he explicitly disclaims the 
necessity of the sanction derived from the hope of immortality,” affirms with great 
emphasis that the useful is the right,“ and bases all virtue on the supremacy of the 
λογιστικόν or calculating reason.” In the Protagoras Socrates is represented as 
maintaining against Protagoras by purely Benthamite arguments the identity of 
pleasure and the good.” 

The seeming contradiction between this and the anti-hedonism of the Gorgias and 
Philebus demands explanation. It has sometimes been argued that Plato’s own 
opinions on this point were reversed between the composition of the Protagoras and 
that of the Gorgias. Another explanation is that Socrates merely develops a paradox 
for the bewilderment of the Sophist. And it is true that in some parts of the dialogue 
Socrates is obviously jesting,”” and that we are warned against accepting the result 
too seriously by the reminder that both Socrates and Protagoras have maintained 

111277 E. 

112 Grote says that in the Theetetus the spectacle of a 
beautiful youth is not required as the indispensable initia- 
tory stimulus to philosophy. But the Symp., 210C, κἂν 
σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ, and the Rep., 402 D, emphasize the unim- 
portance of the beauty of the body as compared with that 
of the mind, And in the same vein Socrates says, καλὸς yap 
el ὦ Θεαίτητε... ὃ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων καλός, etc., 186E. The 
Platonic Socrates is still the ἐρωτικός as he was in the Lysis, 
nor can we suppose that he would ever have found the 
beautiful Meno as helpful an “‘initiatory stimulus to philos- 
ophy”’ as the snub-nosed Thestetus. 

113 Rep., 863 BC D, 367 E, 612BC. The Gorgias does not 
differ herein from the Republic, as Ritchie (p. 156) seems to 
think. The argument is complete without the myth, and the 
phrases at the end about living justly in order to prepare 
for the judgment of Minos prove no more than the ἵνα of 
Rep., 621C. 

114 καλόν, Rep., 451 Β. 

115 Rep., 440 E, 571 C, 605 B. 

116 Protag., 353-8. 

117340 ff. In 341 Ὁ, Protagoras, anticipating Philebus, 
12E, and in language suggesting the protest against eristic 
in Sophist, 259 Ὁ, points out that (generic) resemblance is 
compatible with difference and even contrariety (cf. also 
Meno, 74D). He does not explain himself fully, however, 
and Socrates, ignoring the point, proceeds to trip him up 
by a fallacious use of the principle that one thing can have 
only one opposite. Whatever the date of the Euthydemus, 
its author was aware that a word used in two senses may 
have two opposites, quite as early as he was capable of 
writing the Protagoras. The passage is merely a dramatic 
illustration of Socrates’s superiority in the game of ques- 
tion and answer. Again in 350B-351A, when it is argued 
that bravery is knowledge because knowledge imparts con- 
fidence, Protagoras points out that we cannot convert the 
universal affirmative proposition, ‘tall bravery is confi- 
dence,”’ and distinguishes as bravery the confidence that 
arises from nature and training. Though nota match for 
Socrates, Protagoras is a far better reasoner than Laches 
or Nicias, and again Socrates refutes him only by taking 

PavuL SHOREY 21 

theses incompatible with the positions from which they started."* But the full expla- 
nation lies deeper. In the Republic Plato undertakes to demonstrate the intrinsic 
desirability of virtue against two forms of disbelief—the explicit skepticism of the 
cynic, who affirms that natural justice is the advantage of the stronger and human 
justice an artificial convention, and the unfaith of the ordinary man, who virtually 
admits this theory by commending justice solely on external and prudential grounds.” 
The Callicles of the Gorgias represents the former view, Gorgias himself and (less 
obviously) Protagoras the latter. Like other Sophists, he is the embodiment of average 
public opinion which his teaching reproduces.” He himself says that all men teach 
virtue. He modestly claims at the most only to teach it a little more effectively and 
persuasively than the layman.” Plato would.admit both assertions, with the reserva- 
tion that the virtue so-taught hardly deserves the name, and that the teaching is 
neither systematic nor philosophical. 

The molding power of public opinion, operating through countless social and 
educative agencies, is admirably depicted in the myth attributed to Protagoras, the 
main thought of which is repeated in the Republic.” There, however, the philosophic 
rulers are to employ this irresistible force for the inculcation, not of average Greek 
opinion, but of Platonic virtue. The Protagoras dramatically illustrates the dialectic 
incapacity and philosophic” superficiality of the great popular teacher. His ethical 
teaching is spiritually and logically on a level with the precepts of the worthy sires 
and guardians satirized by Adeimantus."* However unlike in temper and practical 
effect, it is philosophically akin to the individual hedonism of Callicles and Thrasy- 
machus who reject all morality as an unreal convention. Protagoras is naturally 
unaware of this. Like the populace, he recoils from the naked exposition of the 
principles implied in his preaching and practice. He accepts the terminology of indi- 
vidual hedonism only under compulsion of Socrates’s superior dialectic. But Socrates’s 
explicit challenge to him and the assembled Sophists to name any other final good 
than ἡδονὴ is a proof that one of Plato’s objects was to identify the Sophistic ethics 
with hedonism.“ But neither this nor the demonstration of Protagoras’s inability 
to cope with Socrates in dialectic exhausts the significance of the dialogue. 

Plato, however reluctantly, always recognized a certain measure of truth in the 
Benthamite analysis here attributed to Socrates. He knew that ‘act we must in 
pursuance of that which (we think) will give us most pleasure’’ Even the Gorgias 
contains phrases of utilitarian, if not hedonistic, implication.” The Eudemonism of 

up a new line of argument—the identity of pleasure and 
good, and the consequent unity of the virtues in the 
“measuring art.” Plato of course was aware here, and inthe 
Euthyphro (12), and everywhere, that a universal affirma- 
tive cannot be directly converted. But it isa part of the 
scheme of the dialogue that Protagoras should make some 
good points, though defeated inthe end. And Socrates is 
baffled in or fails to complete other proofs of the unity of 

119 Rep., 362 E ff. Cf. ZELLER, p. 603, ἡ. 1. 
120 Rep., 492 ff. 121 Protag., 328 B. 

122 RITCHIE (p. 156) says: ‘The argument of the Sophist 
Protagoras .... is now fully accepted by Plato,” οἷο. as 
if Plato was not the author of the Protagoras. 

123 Rep., 362 E. 124 864 D, 358 A. 

virtue, and so is driven to rely on the proof from hedonism, 
which is the chief feature of the dialogue. 

118 Protag., 361. 

125499 Ὁ. RuiTcHIE (p. 155) strangely says that in the 
Republic Plato recognizes, in marked advance upon the 
position of the Gorgias, that there are good pleasures as 
well as bad! 

22 THe Unity ΟΕ Puato’s THovuGat 

the Republic has often been pointed out,” and in the Laws Plato explicitly declares, 
in language recalling that of the Protagoras, that it is not in human nature to pursue 
any course of action that does not promise a favorable balance of pleasure.” But the 
inference which he draws is not that it is safe or desirable to proclaim that pleasure 
is the good, but that it is necessary to demonstrate that the good—the virtuous life — 
is the most pleasurable. 

To a Benthamite this will seem a purely verbal or rhetorical distinction. And 
Aristotle himself hints that Plato’s aversion to the name of pleasure cast a suspicion 
of unreality over his ethical teaching.” But Plato is not alone in his aversion to the 
word. Matthew Arnold acknowledges a similar feeling. And Jowett, in his admirable 
introduction to the Philebus, has once for all set forth the considerations by which 
many clear-headed modern thinkers, who perfectly understand the utilitarian logic and 
accept whatever is true in its psychology, are nevertheless moved to reject its language. 
The Greek word ἡδονή is much more closely associated with a low view of happiness 
than the English word ‘‘pleasure;” and Plato had, or thought that he had, much 
stronger reasons than the moderns have, for identifying hedonism with the negation of 
all moral principle. 

The Gorgias and Philebus nowhere explicitly contradict the thesis of the Pro- 
tagoras that a preponderance of pleasure, rightly estimated and abstracted from all 
evil consequences, is good.” The doctrine which they combat is the unqualified iden- 
tification of pleasure and good, coupled with the affirmation that true happiness is to 
be sought by developing and gratifying the appetite for the pleasures of sense and 
ambition.” Plato represents Callicles and Philebus as unable or unwilling to limit 
these propositions even by the qualifications of the Protagoras.” It is he, not they, 
who introduces the distinction of pure and impure,” true and illusive,“” wholesome 
and unwholesome,™ necessary and unnecessary pleasures.” The modern critic may 
object that Plato was not justified in attributing to any contemporaries either this 
dialectical incapacity or this cynical effrontery. Plato thought otherwise. It is a 
question of historical evidence. But it is not legitimate to attribute to the Callicles 
and the Philebus of the dialogues the utilitarianism of Grote or John Stuart Mill, or 
even that of the Protagoras, and so convict Plato of self-contradiction.™ 

With these remarks we may dismiss so much of the Gorgias and Philebus as is 
merely dialectical, dramatic, or rhetorical, directed against the crudest form of hedonism 
which Plato chooses to bring upon the stage before grappling with the problem in 

126 357 B, ἡδοναὶ ὅσαι ἀβλαβεῖς goods per se; 457 B, 458 E, 
581 E (with Laws, 732 E), μὴ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον Kai αἴσχιον ζῆν 
μηδὲ τὸ χεῖρον Kal ἄμεινον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἥδιον καὶ ἀλυπότ- 

127 Laws, 733, 734; of. 663 A. 128 Eth. nic., X, 1. 

129 Phileb., 60 A B, is verbally a direct contradiction of 
Protag., 355 B. 

130 Gorg., 495 A, 492 Ὁ E; Phileb., 12A, 12 D, 27 E. 

131The verbal identification of ἡδονὴ and ἀγαθὸν in 355 
has been preceded by such phrases as καθ᾽ ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν͵ 351 C, 

and the explanation that some painful goods are medicinal 
(354A = Rep., 357C), and is checked by the calculus of all 
consequences, all of which is ignored by Callicles and 

132 Phileb., 51, 52. 133 Ibid., 860 ff. 

134 Tbid., 41A; Gorg., 499 DE. 135 Rep., 558 D. 

136 Plato, as Jowett says, is ‘‘ playing both sides of the 
game.... butit is not necessary in order to understand 
him that we should discuss the fairness of his modes of 


earnest. The real arguments which he employs, not so much to refute the thesis of 

the Protagoras as to limit its practicable application and justify his repudiation of its 
terminology, may be summed up as follows: The distinction between good and 
bad pleasures once admitted, the statement that pleasure as such is the good, becomes 
an unreal abstraction.” The reality is specific kinds of pleasure and the principle of 
distinction, whether intelligence, measure, or the will to obey the “opinion of the 
best,” becomes more important than the bare name of pleasure, and more nearly 
allied to the good.” The “measuring art” postulated in the Protagoras is impracti- 
cable. Pleasure and pain are, like confidence and fear, foolish counselors; either 
deprives the mind of the sanity required for a just estimate.” No scale of human 
judgment can be trusted to weigh the present against the future, and make allowance 
for all the illusions of memory, hope, and contrast."* The most intense pleasures and 
pains are associated with a diseased condition of mind and body.“* And the habit of 
pursuing pleasure, of thinking and speaking of it as the good, tends to make the world 
of sense seem more real than that of thought and spirit.” The contrary is the truth. 
The world of sense is a pale reflex of the world of ideas,“* and the pleasures of 
sense are inherently unreal, illusory, and deceptive, and may in sound logic be termed 
false, as fairly as the erroneous opinions that accompany them.’ They are false 
because composed of hopes and imaginations not destined to be fulfilled; false, 
because exaggerated by the illusions of distance in time or contrast; false, because 

137 Phileb., 55 AB, and Gorg., 495 Ο, 499 B, show that the 
arguments of Gorg., 495 C-499 B, are, in the main, a con- 
scious dialectical sport. I recur to this point so often be- 
cause the Gorgias and the first book of the Republic are the 
chief source of the opinion, widely spread by Grote, Mill, 
and Sidgwick, that Plato is a magnificent preacher, but 
often a weak reasoner. Cf. MILL, Diss. and Discuss., IV, 
291: ‘This great dialogue, full of just thoughts and fine 
observations on human nature, is, in mere argument, one 
of the weakest of Plato’s works.” Cf. Idea of Good, pp. 

138 Phileb., 12 DE. In answer to the question, πῶς yap 
ἡδονή ye ἡδονῇ μὴ οὐχ ὁμοιότατον ἂν ein; Socrates shows that 
generic (verbal) identity is compatible with specific differ- 
ence or even opposition, a logical principle “already” 
glanced at in the Protag., 331 D, with the same illustration 
of μέλαν and λευκόν. LuTosLAws&I, Ρ. 467, misunderstands 
134, τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πίστευε, τῷ πάντα τὰ ἐναντιώτατα ἕν 
ποιοῦντι ---" we need not attempt a reconciliation of all con- 

139 Pheedr., 237D, ἔμφυτος... ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν. ... 
ἐπίκτητος δόξα, ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀρίστον. Cf. Laws, 644), 645 A. 
Pheedo, 99 A, ὑπὸ δόξης φερόμενα τοῦ βελτίστου. 

140 Ρηϊϊοῦ., 646, τί... 
ἡμῖν τοῦ πᾶσι γεγονέναι προσφιλῆ τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν : with 
the context. 

141 Cf, Tim., 69D, with Laws, 644 C. 

142 Rep., 402E; Phileb., 63D; Pheedo, 688. 

183 Cf. Phileb., 41Eff., with Protag., 356, 357; Gorgias, 
500 A, dp’ οὖν παντὺς ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐκλέξασθαι, etc. Laws, 663 B, 

. μάλιστ᾽ αἴτιον εἶναι δόξειεν av 

σκοτοδινιᾶν δὲ τὸ πόρρωθεν ὁρώμενον πᾶσί τε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν... 
παρέχει, and the rhetorical repudiation of the whole hedo- 
nistic calculus, Pheedo, 69 AB. 

144 Phileb., 45 B-E, ἔν τινι πονηρίᾳ ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος 
sees μέγισται μὲν ἡδοναί, etc. 

145 Cf, Pheedo, 88 D, with James’s Psychology, Vol. II, p. 
306: ‘‘ Among all sensations, the most belief-compelling are 
those productive of pleasure or pain.” 

146 Rep., 509, 510, 514 ff., the allegory of the cave. 

147 Phileb., 86 Ο ff. As Berkeley and Huxley argue from 
the subjectivity of pain to that of sensations and ideas; as 
Epicurus proceeds from the reality of pain to that of the 
other secondary qualities; so, reversing the order, Plato 
infers the falsity of pleasures and pains from that of the 
associated perceptions and beliefs. Grote, Jowett, Horn, 
and others pronounce the whole train of reasoning falla- 
cious. But it is to be observed: (1) that their objections 
as usual are anticipated by Plato (Phileb., 388A), who hasa 
right to use his own terminology provided his meaning is 
unambiguous (Charmides, 163D); (2) that the epithet 
‘false’ is used either with reference to a postulated objec- 
tive judgment of life as a whole, or as a mere rhetorical 
expression of the disdain or pity felt byan onlooker. In 
the first sense it is justified by the argument, in the second 
by the usage of the poets—falsa licet cupidus deponat 
gaudia livor (Propert., 1, 8, 29); (3) having demonstrated 
against Sophistic negations that ψευδής applies to δόξα, 
Plato was naturally tempted to extend it to ἡδονή. 

148 Phileb., 89E, 40C. Cf. ‘we are all imaginative, for 
images are the brood of desire’ (George Eliot). 

149 Tbid., 41, 42B; Laws, 663 B. 

24 Tue Unity ΟΕ Puato’s THOUGHT 

what we mistake for positive pleasure is usually the neutral state, the absence of 
uneasiness, the cessation of pain.’ 

This doctrine of the negativity of what men call pleasure is the fundamental basis 
of Plato’s ethics, as it is of Schopenhauer’s. On this, in the last instance, rests his 
refutation of hedonism, and, as we shall see, his demonstration that virtue and happi- 
ness are one.” Sensuous pleasures are in their nature impure and illusory. They are 
preconditioned by, and mixed with, desire, want, pain. “Surgit amari aliquid” is ever 
true of them. They are the relief of an uneasiness, the scratching of an itch, the 
filling of a vacuum.” To treat them as real, or to make them one’s aim (except so 
far as our human estate requires), is to seek happiness in a process rather than a 
state,” in becoming rather than in being. It is to bind one’s self to the wheel of 
Ixion and pour water into the bottomless jar of the Danaids.™ Far happier, far more 
pleasurable, is the life that consistently aims at few and calm pleasures, to which the 
sensualist would hardly give the name, a life which he would regard as torpor or 

Both the physiology and the psychology of this doctrine have been impugned. 
It has been argued that, up to the point of fatigue, the action of healthy nerves involves 
no pain, and must yield a surplus of positive sensuous pleasure. Itis urged that the 
present uneasiness of appetite is normally more than counterbalanced by the anticipa- 
tion of immediate satisfaction. Such arguments will carry no weight with those who 
accept Plato’s main contention, that the satisfactions of sense and ambition, however 
inevitable, have no real worth, and that to seek our true life in them is to weave and 
unweave the futile web of Penelope. Whatever qualifications modern psychology may 
attach to the doctrine, it is the logical basis of Plato’s ethics. The unfeigned recogni- 
tion of the inherent worthlessness of the lower pleasures removes at once the motive 
and lures to evil. It is the chief link in the proof that virtue is happiness. It 
insures the domination of reason over feeling and appetite. It molds man into that 
likeness to the divine pattern which is Plato’s favorite expression for the ethical ideal,” 
for the divine life knows neither pleasure nor pain.’* It is the serious argument that 

some moderns, that pleasure is not strictly Ξε κίνησις is 
beside the point. 

154Gorg., 493B, τετρημένος πίθος, etc.; Phedo, 844, 
ἀνήνντον épyov .. . . Πηνελόπης ---ἰστόν, Gorg., 507E; Phileb., 
54 E. 

180 Phileb., 42C ff.; Rep., 583 Ὁ. 

151The argument that pleasure is γένεσις, not οὐσία, is 
not, as ZELLER says (p. 604), the nerve of the proof. It is 
obviously, as the language of 53C implies, one of those half- 
serious metaphysical and rhetorical confirmations used to 

make a strong case where Plato’s feelings are enlisted. It 
does not occur explicitly in the Republic which speaks, how- 
ever, of pleasure as κίνησις, 583 ΕἸ, 

152‘*Already’’ in the Gorgias, 493E, 494C, and the 
Pheedrus, 258 ἘΠ, ὧν προλυπηθῆναι δεῖ ἣ μηδὲ ἡσθῆναι, etc.; Rep., 
5844 Β. It has even been argued that the Phedrus passage 
takes for granted the fuller discussion of the Philebus (W. 
H. THompson, Pheedrus, ad loc.). And why not? Anything 
may be argued if the dialogues are supposed to grow out of 
one another and not out of Plato’s mind. 

153 Phileb.. 58C ff.; 54E virtually =Gorg., 493E. The 
literal-minded objection of ARISTOTLE, Eth. Nic., X, 4, and 

155 Phedo, 64B; Gorg., 492E; Phileb., 543, καί φασι ζῆν 
οὐκ av δέξασθαι, etc. In Laws, 733, 734 B, the hedonistic calcu- 
lus of the Protagoras is retained, but is applied not directly 
to the individual acts, but to types of life. The life of 
moderate pleasures is a priori the more pleasurable 
because it necessarily yields a more favorable balance 
than the life of intense pleasures. 

146 Pheedo, 66C; Rep., 586 A B, 588. 

1 Theetet., 176 B ff.; Laws, 716D, 728A B; Rep., 352 B, 
612E; Phileb., 391 E. 

158 Phileb., 33 B. 


explains Plato’s repudiation of the hedonistic formulas of the Protagoras, and justifies 
the noble anti-hedonistic rhetoric of the Gorgias, the Pheedo, and the Philebus. 

4. Plato’s insistence on the necessity of proving the coincidence of virtue and 
happiness marks another difference between him and modern writers. The question 
is rarely put in the forefront of modern ethical discussion, except for the polemical 
purpose of proving that an opponent’s philosophy supplies no basis or sanction for 
morality. The majority of modern ethical writers relegate the problem to a digression 
or a footnote. They are content to establish a “general tendency” or “strong proba- 
bility.” Or they frankly admit that while everybody would be glad if the proposition 
could be proved, it is not susceptible of mathematical demonstration. But this was 
not enough for Plato. His own faith was adamantine."” He was as certain that hap- 
piness is inseparable from virtue as of the existence™ of the Island of Crete. 
Even if it were only a probability, he would not permit it to be impugned in a well- 
ordered state.” Just how much positively immoral and cynical philosophy was cur- 
rent in Plato’s day is, as we have seen, a disputed historical question. But Plato 
himself was haunted by the thought of the unscrupulous skeptic who sought to justify 
his own practice by appeals to the law of nature or theories of the origin of justice in a 
conspiracy of the weak against thestrong.™ His imagination was beset by the picture 
of some brilliant young Alcibiades standing at the crossways of life and debating in 
his mind whether his best chance of happiness lay in accepting the conventional moral 
law that serves to police the vulgar or in giving rein to the instincts and appetites of 
his own stronger nature."* To confute the one, to convince the other, became to him 
the main problem of moral philosophy. It is a chief duty of the rulers in the Republic 
and the Laws, and the Socrates of the dialogues is at all times ready and equipped to 
undertake it. 

Plato is not always overnice in the arguments by which the skeptic is refuted. It 
is enough that the “wicked” should not have the best of the argument. Socrates in 
the first instance puts forth just enough dialectical strength to baffle a Callicles or a 
Thrasymachus.™ This, as we have seen, is the quality of much of the argument of 
the Gorgias, though it is intermingled with hints of deeper things, and supplemented 

tration of the game of question and answer. Thrasymachus 
sets up the thesis, οἱ ἄδικοι φρόνιμοι καὶ ἀγαθοί, and Socrates 
forces him to contradict himself. Zeller (p. 752) lists it 
among Plato’s fallacies. 

167 Strictly speaking, Socrates’s dialectic is employed 
merely to force from Callicles the admission that some 
pleasures are bad (49BC; cf. Rep., 505C). From this 

159 Gorg., 507, 512, 513; Pheedo, 69; Phileb., 66A ; Rep., 580 B. 

160 Gorgias, 509A; Rep., 360 B, bis A. 

161 Laws, 662 B. 

162 Rep., 392A B; Laws, 663 B, πιθανός y’, εἰ μηδὲν ἕτερον, 
πρὸς τό τινα ἐθέλειν ζῇν τὸν ὅσιον Kai δίκαιον βίον. 

163 Rep., 358, 359, 365; Gorg., 483ff. Cf. Rep., 858, 
διατεθρυλημένος τὰ ὦτα; Protag., 333 C, ἐπεὶ πολλοί γέ φασι; 

Euthydem., 219 B, ἴσως γὰρ ἄν τις ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητήσειε; Philed., 
66E; Gorg., 511B; Laws, 889DE, with Theetet., 1110 Ὁ. 

164 Rep., 365B; Gorg., 510D; Laws, 662E. 

165 Thecetet., 116 D; 177B, «ae ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκεινὴ πὼς 
dmowapaiverat, The whole passage is a description of the 
Gorgias. Cf., 527A, viv δὲ ὁρᾷς, ὅτι τρεῖς ὄντες ὑμεῖς, οἵπερ 
σοφώτατοί ἐστε τῶν νῦν Ἑλλήνων... οὐκ ἔχετε ἀποδεῖξαι, etc. 
Laws, 907C, μή ποτε λόγοις ἡγῶνται κρατοῦντες, etc. 

166 ΑΕ]. g., the argument in Rep., 349, 350, is a mere illus- 

point the argument, abandoning ethical theory, discusses 
social and political ideals at Athens. ‘“‘Good” is treated as 
distinct from “pleasure,”’ as it is in Phedr.,239C. But the 
question whether it may not ultimately prove to be the 
favorable balance of pleasure (Protag.) is not raised. The 
crude identification of the terms is rejected for reasons 
still held valid in the Philebus. Cf. Philed., 55B, with 
Gorg., 498C. There is no contradiction. The three dia- 
logues, differing in mood, are logically consistent and sup- 
plement one another. 

20 THE Unity ΟΕ Puato’s ΤΗΟΘΗΤ 

by noble eloquence. In the Republic, however, Plato undertakes not only to confute 
and silence, but to convince.“ The real ground of conviction is the total underlying 
conception of the true nature, harmony, health, and consequent happiness of the soul. 

But the formal proof is summed up in the ninth book in three arguments which, 
as Plato repeatedly tells us, constitute the framework of the whole design.” To these, 
in form at least, all other interests of the book are subordinate—the construction of 
the ideal state, the higher philosophical education, the idea of good, the character- 
sketches of degenerate types. The first argument is based on the comparison of the 
individual and the state which runs through the entire work from the second to the 
ninth book. It takes two forms: (1) That of a mere external analogy. As the hap- 
piness of the ideal state is to the misery of the ochlocracy or the tyranny, so is the 
happiness of the well-governed just soul to the wretchedness of the man whose soul is 
the prey of a mob of appetites, or the slave of a ruling passion.” (2) The force of 
this external analogy is derived wholly from the psychological truth that it embodies. 
Unity or factious division, the sovereignty of reason, or the usurpations of passion 
and appetite, harmony or discord, health or disease, as used of the soul, are more 
than mere figures of speech; they are the exact expression of inevitable alternatives 
resting on indisputable psychological facts. The dominance of the higher reason over 
disciplined emotion and controlled appetite is the sole and effective condition at once 
of the unity, harmony, and health of spiritual life which is happiness, and of the 
unswerving fulfilment of obligation which is the external manifestation of justice and 
virtue.” To ask whether happiness is compatible with a diseased soul is still more 
absurd than to expect it to dwell in a diseased body.” 

The second argument is very brief, and Plato is probably aware that at the best 
it commands assent rather than inspires conviction.” The three faculties of the soul, 
taken abstractly, yield three types of pleasure—the pleasures of pure intelligence, of 
ambition, and of appetite. Plato assumes that the pleasures of intelligence belong to 
the man in whom the intellect directed toward the good controls the other faculties. 
In other words, he takes for granted the coincidence on the highest plane of intellect 
and virtue which he found in Socrates and which the education of the Republic secures 
in the guardians."* Now, the advocate of the intellectual and virtuous life has neces- 
sarily had some experience of the pleasures associated with gratified ambition and 
appetite. The ambitious man and the sensuous man know little or nothing of the 
higher order of pleasure. The preference of the “intellectual” for his own type of 
pleasure must be ratified as based on a completer experience. It would be a waste of 
time to cavil on minor fallacies or rhetorical exaggerations with which Plato burdens 
the argument in his eagerness to make a strong case.'” The argument itself is familiar 

168 Rep., 357 AB, 358 B, 367 A B, 367 ΕἸ. 173 Rep., 580 D ff. 114 Cf. supra, Ὁ. 11. 
169 369 A B, 392 AB, 427D, 445A, 544A. 15Grote and Mill object that this argument, even if 
110576.C ff. 171442 E. conclusive, is addressed to the wrong point, because the 

J ᾿ς aA life supposed is not that of the simple, just man, but that 
172445 A, 591 Β, 589E; Gorg., 512A, 479B; “already” in of the philosopher But the case of the simple just man is 
Crito, 41 Ὁ E. met by the main arguments drawn from the order, har- 


enough through its acceptance in substance by John Stuart Mill; who, however, seems 
to think Plato’s use of it fallacious. It has been rejected as a fallacy on the ground 
that pleasure is not an objective measurable entity, but a relative individual feeling. 
Again at the limits of human thought we are confronted by an alternative the terms 
of which it is impossible to realize distinctly. Is it better to be a completely con- 
tented pig than a man? But if we waive the claim that the argument is an absolute 
proof, and turn from these unreal abstractions to the facts of life, what Plato affirms is 
simply that it is more pleasurable in the end to develop and foster the capacity for 
the ‘‘higher’’ pleasures than that for the lower, as is shown by the judgment of those 
who have experienced both. In this less absolute form the argument leans for support 
on that which precedes, and still more on that which follows it. 

In the third place, the lower pleasures as compared with the higher are illusory, 
unreal, and impermanent, and they tend to destroy the healthy balance of faculties 
which is the condition of all true pleasure.“° This is a repetition or anticipation” 
of the theory of the negativity of pleasure which we have already met in the polemic 
against hedonism. 

This completes our sketch of the Platonic ethics. The rest is exhortation, inspi- 
ration, myth, things οὐκ ἀηδέστερα ἀκούειν, but not within the scope of the present 
study, nor indeed reproducible in any study. For the ethical and religious spirit that 
informs every page of Plato we must go to the master himself. 


Plato’s theory of ideas is (1) primarily a realistic way of speaking of the univer- 
sal; (2) a poetic and mythical extension of this realistic language, by which the uni- 
versal is treated, not only as a thing, but as a thing of beauty and object of desire and 
aspiration; (3) in relation to metaphysics, it is the definite and positive assertion that 
the substantive essences, or rather the objective correlates, of general notions consti- 
tute the ultimate ontological units of reality to which psychological and _ logical 
analysis refer us as the only escape from a Heraclitean or Protagorean philosophy of 
pure relativity. In the first sense the ideas occur throughout the dialogues. It is 
irrational to look for the other forms of the doctrine except when the argument natu- 
rally leads up to them. A Kantian does not expatiate upon the Ding-an-sich in an 

mony, and health of the soul, and from the analysis of 
pleasure. Here Plato is renewing the debate between the 
“ philosopher,” the sensualist, and the politician begun in 
the Gorgias. He is indulging his feelings in a demonstra- 
tion that in the Athens of his day the “ philosophic” life 
is a higher and happier type than the life of the politician 
or the sensualist; and he holds that no real reform is pos- 
sible until men can be found who approach political life as 
anecessary, not a desirable, thing, condescending toit from 
a life which they feel to be higher and more pleasurable 
(cf. Rep., 521 B).’ The form of the argument of the Republic 
is determined by the purpose of contrasting the extreme 
types of the virtuous philosopher and the finished tyrant. 
But it applies to other men in proportion as they ap- 

proximate to these types. And the statement of the argu- 
ment in the Laws applies to the simple just man, 663C, 
τὰ ἄδικα... ἐκ μὲν ἀδίκου καὶ κακοῦ ἑαυτοῦ θεωρούμενα ἡδέα, 
etc., ... . τὴν δ᾽ ἀλήθειαν τῆς κρίσεως ποτέραν κυριωτέραν élvat 

φῶμεν; πότερα τὴν τῆς χείρονος ψυχῆς ἢ τὴν τῆς βελτίονος, 
116 Rep., 583 B-586 C. 

117 Zeller thinks it a résumé of the fuller treatment of 
the Philebus. Those who put the Philebus late regard it 
as a preliminary sketch. The Philebus is probably late, 
as Mill affirmed before Sprachstatistik was conceived. 
But the psychology of pleasure in the two dialogues sup- 
plies no evidence. Cf. infra, ‘Plato's Psychology,” and 
Part II. 

28 THE Unity oF Puato’s THOUGHT 

essay on universal peace. Plato discussed many topics that did not require embellish- 
ment by the mythical description of the idea as type, or the explicit reaffirmation of 
the idea as nowmenon. And the apparent absence of either from a given dialogue 
proves nothing. 

Plato’s fearless and consistent realism is so repugnant to “common sense” that 
modern critics either take it as proof of the naiveté, not to say childishness, of his 
thought, or extenuate the paradox by arguing that he could not have meant it 
seriously and must have abandoned or modified the doctrine in his maturer works. 
All such interpretations spring from a failure to grasp the real character of the meta- 
physical problem and the historical conditions that made Plato adopt and cling to this 
solution. From Heraclitus to John Stuart Mill human thought has always faced the 
alternative of positing an inexplicable and paradoxical nowmenon, or accepting the 
“flowing philosophy.” No system can escape the dilemma. Plato from his youth up 
was alternately fascinated and repelled by the philosophy of Heraclitus. No other 
writer has described so vividly as he the reign of relativity and change in the world 
of phenomena.” Only by affirming a nowmenon could he escape Heracliteanism as 
the ultimate account of (1) being, and (2) cognition.” He chose or found this nowme- 
non in the hypostatized concepts of the human mind, the objects of Socratic inquiry, 
the postulates of the logic he was trying to evolve from the muddle of contemporary 
dialectic, the realities of the world of thought so much more vivid to him than the 
world of sense.” This is the account of the matter given by Aristotle and con- 
firmed by the dialogues. Except in purely mythical passages, Plato does not attempt 
to describe the ideas any more than Kant describes the Ding-an-sich or Spencer the 
“Unknowable.” He does not tell us what they are, but that they are. And the diffi- 
culties, clearly recognized by Plato, which attach to the doctrine thus rightly limited, 
are precisely those that confront any philosophy that assumes an absolute. 

Plato’s particular selection of the hypostatized concept for his absolute seems 
more paradoxical only because, from the common-sense point of view of a convenient 
but inconsistent conceptualism, we ignore the real philosophical alternative of consist- 
ent nominalism or consistent realism, and forget the historical conditions that forced 
Plato to make his choice. Realism was for Plato not merely the only metaphysical 
alternative to Protagorean relativity; it was the only practicable way of affirming the 
validity of universals and abstract thought. The psychology and logic of modern 
nominalism as gradually worked out by Locke, Berkeley, John Stuart Mill, and 
Taine, did not exist. The modern flowing philosopher can give a plausible account of 

118 Symp., 207 Ὁ E; Tim., 43 BC, 44 A B, 52 Εἰ, 69 C D; 
Thecetet., 156 ff. 

179 Cratyl., 439, 440; Thecetet., 179 ff., 185, 186; Tim., 27D, 
28A, 49D ff., 51BC. Less directly pertinent are Soph., 
249B; Cratyl., 386; Phileb., 58 E, with Rep., 533B. 

1801 do not mean that Plato said: “Ἃο to, I need a 
noumenon, I will hypostatize the Socratic concepts,” 
which a malicious critic might infer from APELT’s argu- 
ment (Beitrdge, pp. 81-3), that Plato would have made all 

concepts ideas (which he did!) if his starting-point had 
been the hypostatization of the concept, and (which is 
partly true) that he would not have put forth the paradox 
at all if he had not felt the necessity of positing some 
reality beyond the world of sense. This last Apelt confirms 
by Met., 1040b, 27, which, however, proves nothing for Plato, 
as it merely states a favorite thought of Aristotle. 

181 Met., 1, 6, 987a, 29 ff., 10860. 

Pauut SHOREY 29 

the universal, recognizes the general term as a convenient algebraic symbol, and so 
accepts the old logic as a practical working instrument of thought. But in Plato's 
time the old logic was still to be created, and the cruder forms of nominalism and 
relativity which he combated blocked the way by captious objections to the normal 
and necessary use of general terms.’ The theory of ideas, then, often appears to be 
mainly, if not merely, an affirmation of the concept apart from explicit insistence on 
any theory of its psychological or ontological nature.“* But the main issue is 
unaffected by this fact. Even if he had been acquainted with the analysis of Mill 
and Taine,“ Plato would have continued to ask: Are the good and the beautiful and 
similar essences something or nothing?™ Can everything in the idea be explained as 
the natural product of remembered and associated sensations?“ Is not man’s power 
of abstraction something different in kind from any faculty possessed by the brute?" 
Not all the refinements of the new psychology can disguise the fact that the one 
alternative commits us to the “flowing philosophers,” the other to some form of Pla- 
tonism. For the answer that the “good” and the “beautiful” are only concepts of 
the mind is an evasion which commends itself to common-sense, but which will satisfy 
no serious thinker. If these concepts are the subjective correlates of objective reali- 
ties, we return to the Platonic idea —for Plato, it must be remembered, does not say 
what the ideas are, but only that they are in some sense objective and real.“ If the 
concepts are the natural products of casual associations, accidental eddies in the 

stream of sense, the “flowing philosophy” receives us again.” 

182 Phileb., 14D, σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια; 15A, 13DE; 
Parmen., 135C; Soph., 251BC; Theetet., 1514 Β, 167A, 
180D; Euthydem., 301A and passim. 

183 Repub., 596A; Pheedr., 249B, though immediately 
followed by ἀνάμνησις ; Philebus, 16 D, and all passages that 
describe the true method of generalization and division — 
Phedr., 265, 266, 210 Ὁ ; Soph., 226 C, 285 Ο, 253; Polit., 285A; 
Crotyl., 424C; Laws, 894 A, 965C. 

184 To MIuL (Diss. and Discuss., IV, p. 300) the Platonic 
ideas “‘are only interesting as the first efforts of original 
and inventive minds to let in light on a dark subject.” 
They belong to the ‘‘theories which have arisen in in- 
genious minds from an imperfect conception of the pro- 
cesses of abstraction and generalization.” But it is not 
really thinkable that the author of the Sophist, Politicus, 
and Phedrus (249 B) did not ‘‘ understand” the common- 
sense explanation of the universal through abstraction and 
generalization. He rejected it, ou the contrary, precisely 
because he foresaw that, if consistently carried out and 
accepted as the final account of the matter, it leads 
straight to Mill’s ultimate philosophy, which he would not 
have on any terms. 

185 Protag., 330 C, ἡ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμά τι ἐστιν ἢ οὐδὲν 
πρᾶγμα; Pheedo, 65 D, φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἣ οὐδέν ; 16 B, 
TTA, καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, 100 B, καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ ἀγαθόν. 
Thecetet, 151 D, εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει τὸ μή τι εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι ἀεὶ 
ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν, Cratyl., 440 Β, εἰ dé... . ἔστι δὲ τὸ καλόν, 
ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν, Sophist, 247A-B, τό γε δυνατόν τῳ παρα- 
γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίγνεσθαι πάντως εἶναί τι φήσουσιν... 
οὔσης οὖν δικαιοσύνης, etc. Phileb., δῦ Β, πῶς οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστι 

Moreover, though this 

μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι μηδὲ καλὸν... 
130 B, καὶ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ, etc. 

186 Pheedo, 96Β; Theeetet., 156, 157, 184 D, εἰ πολλαί τινες 
ἐν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ 
εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅ τι δεῖ καλεῖν πάντα ταῦτα 
ξυντείνει, Tim., 51C, ἣ ταῦτα ἅπερ καὶ βλέπομεν (cf. ἅπερ 
ὁρῷεν, Rep., 515B; Parmen., 130D), ὅσα τε ἄλλα διὰ τοῦ 
σώματος αἰσθανόμεθα, μόνα ἐστὶ τοιαύτην ἔχοντα ἀλήθειαν, 

,. πλὴν ἐν ψυχῇ. Parmen., 

181 Pheedr., 249B, δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ξυνιέναι κατ᾽ εἶδος λεγό- 
μενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἕν λογισμῷ ξνναιρούμενον, 
τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις, etc. Cratyl., 899 Ο, μόνον τῶν θηρίων 
ὀρθῶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος ὠνομάσθη, ἀναθρῶν ἃ Smwrev, 
Pheedo, 15 Β, ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνον τε ὀρέγεται 
τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, etc. 

188 Parmen., 182, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός: , ... ὄντος ἣ οὐκ ὄντος ; 

. εἶτα οὐκ εἶδος ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ νοούμενον ἐν εἶναι͵ ἀεὶ ὃν τὸ 
αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν: LUTOSLAWSEI, Ὁ. 403, misquotes and mis- 
interprets this passage. Proressor RITCHIE, Plato, pp. 
91, 112, 113, recognizes that it is conclusive against con- 
ceptualism. Cf. ZELLER, p. 668. The further objection 
that if the ideas are thoughts and things partake of them, 
things must think, is generally treated as a verbal equivo- 
cation. Cf. Euthydem., 2831DE. But, for the underlying 
metaphysical problem, see my discussion of Aristotle de 
Anima, 429 ὃ 26 in A. J. P., Vol. XXII, pp. 161 ff. 

1890f, the characterization of positivism or phenom- 
enalism in Rep., 516C Ὁ, καθορῶντι τὰ παριόντα καὶ μνημο- 
νεύοντι μάλιστα, ὅσα τε πρότερα αὐτῶν καὶ ὕστερα εἰώθει καὶ ἅμα 

πορεύεσθαι. Cf. also Phedo, 96 ΒΟ; Gorg., 501A B. 

80 Tue Unity or Puato’s THovestT 

point is not explicitly made by Plato, a concept of the mind, even apart from objective 
reference, either is or is not an entity of another than the natural or sensuous order. 
If it is, we are driven back upon Platonism. For, though the Platonic ideas are more 
than thoughts if thoughts are only decaying sense, thoughts, if radically different 
from sensations, become entities that may assume the réle of Platonic ideas, as they 
do in the ultimate philosophy of Aristotle, and in the interpretation of those Pla- 
tonists, ancient and modern, who conceive the ideas as thoughts of God. This is 
not Plato’s doctrine, but only a plausible development of it by those who cannot 
acquiesce in his wise renunciation of systematic dogmatism. In these matters Plato 
affirms no more than is necessary for his fixed faiths and purposes.” The objective 
reality in some sense of ideas (but no more) was so necessary. That it was a hard 
saying is as well known to him as it is to his critics. And he has anticipated their 
objections. But this doctrine, or something equally and similarly paradoxical, was 
and is the sole alternative to a philosophy which he and the majority of his modern 
critics cannot and will not accept. The burden of proof rests heavily, then, on those 
who affirm that at any time he did or could abandon or seriously modify it. A survey 
of the dialogues discovers no evidence in support of such a contention. 

For this purpose the dialogues fall into three (or four) groups: (1) Those that 
are supposed to precede the doctrine; or (2) to lead up to it; (3) those in which it is 
most specifically affirmed or mythically embellished; (4) those in which it is criticised 
or, as some say, abandoned or modified. In the case of the first and fourth group the 
argument is often made to turn upon the meaning to be assigned to εἶδος, ἰδέα, and 
other terms elsewhere distinctly appropriated to the transcendental idea. We are 
repeatedly warned that the mere use of the words εἶδος and ἐδέα is no evidence of the 
transcendental doctrine. This is obvious; but it is equally true that the possibility of 
taking these words in a conceptual sense raises no presumption that they must be taken 
in that sense exclusively and that the doctrine was absent from Plato’s mind at the 
time. Such an assumption is made by modern critics in the interest of theories of 
development, or to free as many dialogues as possible from the distasteful paradox. 
But Plato was always at liberty to use the terminology of the ideas conceptually for 
the practical logical uses of definition and classification—even in the transcendental 
Phedrus. All Platonic ideas are concepts. It does not follow that they are ever 
in Plato’s intention no more than concepts. And, in any case, the absence of the 
theory from any given dialogue proves no more than does the virtual absence from the 
Laws of all metaphysics, including the “later” theory of ideas. 

190 Cf, infra, Part II, Philebus. 

191 Meno, 86B, καὶ τὰ μέν ye ἄλλα οὐκ ἂν πάνυ ὑπὲρ τοῦ 
λόγου διισχυρισαίμην, etc. 

192 Rep., 532 D, 476A; Parmen., 185BC; Phileb., 15AB; 
Tim., 51CD; infra, p. 36. 

193 237 C, 249 B, 263 E. Cf. also the loose popular use of 
εἶδος and ἰδέα 231 D, 238A, 253 D. Natokpr, Hermes, Vol. 
XXXV, p. 409, infers that the Phedrus, ‘‘ must”’ be earlier 

than the Phedoand Republic; LuTosEAwskI (pp. 840, 841), 
that it must be later, because, if we interpret rightly, we 
‘soon get quit of the riddle of self-existing ideas ” and per- 
ceive that “ἰδέα and εἶδος are used in a meaning which is 
identical with the idea as conceived by Kant, a necessary 
concept of reason.’’ Of course, Kant’s ideas of reason are 
misapplied here and all Lutoslawski means is “ Begriff,” 

Paut SHOREY 31 

Premising thus much, we turn to the first group. In the Apology, Crito, Laches, 
Lysis, Charmides, Menexenus, first four books of the Republic, Protagoras,™ and 
(some affirm) the Huthyphro, Gorgias, and Euthydemus there is no distinct mention 
of the (Platonic) ideas. There was no occasion for it in the Apology, Crito, and 
Menexenus, and little, if any, in the others. The relation of the Lysis, Charmides, 
and Laches to Plato’s mature ethical theories and the subtlety of the Charmides and 
Lysis™ make it improbable that they antedate the main tenet of his philosophy. This 
is still more obvious in the case of the Menexenus (387 (?), wt. 40). The realistic 
language used of the definition in the Huthyphro must be presumed to imply what a 
similar terminology does elsewhere."* The joke about παρουσία in the Huthydemus is 
a distinct and familiar allusion to the Platonic idea of beauty.” Had Plato omitted 
that jest, the absence of the doctrine would prove no more than it does in the case of 

the Protagoras. 

More interesting than this balancing of probabilities is the evidence presented by 

the Gorgias. 
Phedo, Euthydemus, and Cratylus. 
distinguishes and classifies “ideas” 

This magnificent composition may or may not be earlier than the Meno, 
It is certainly not appreciably less mature. It 
in the manner rather of the “later” 


and although it contains no explicit and obvious mention of the transcendental idea,™ 

the doctrine is clearly suggested for all readers who look below the surface. 

worth while to dwell upon the point. 

It is 

In the Cratylus, 389C, employing the termi- 

nology of the ideas in the manner of Republic, 596 A B, 597 B,” Socrates says that 
the workman who makes a tool puts into the material, the iron, the idea of the tool 

that exists in nature.” 

194402C and 437, 438, presumably imply the ideas, but 
could be taken merely of concepts, classes or species. Not 
so 585 in Book IX. Pfleiderer therefore, in order to elimi- 
nate the ideas from Books VIII and IX, pronounces 580 B- 
588A a later addition. 

1% But cf. 8800, ἡ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμά τι ἐστιν ἢ οὐδὲν 
πρᾶγμα; 8498, ἣ ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων ὑπόκειταί τις ἴδιος 
οὐσία καὶ πρᾶγμα ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν ἕκαστον ; 330 Εἰ, αὐτὴ ἡ 

196 Cf. supra, u. 108. 

197 Wilamowitz has somewhere denied the Platonic 
authorship of the Menexenus, but he may have a ‘‘pec- 
cavi” in reserve. Life is short to debate such paradoxes; 
but if any athetizer will stake his reputation on the point, 
μαχοίμην ἂν πάντων ἥδιστα ἑνὶ τούτων, 

1085 Ὁ, ταὐτόν... αὐτὸ αὑτῷ, etc.; 6} Ε', τῶν πολλῶν 
ὁσίων (cf. Pheedo, 18D, τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν; Rep., 596 A, 
εἶδος. .... ἕν 1... περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλὰ) ---αὑ᾽Ἰτὸ τὸ εἶδος ᾧ, 
etc. (Pheedo, 100D, τῷ καλῷ; -Meno, 12, ἕν γέ τι εἶδος... .. 
δι᾽ ὃ), ἀποβλέπων... . παραδείγματι. 

1998014. It is not the word πάρεστι that proves this, 
but the entire context ἕτερα αὐτοῦ ye τοῦ καλοῦ, etc. LuTos- 
LAWSEI (p. 212) affirms that Plato ‘‘ would have said later 
πάρεστι τὸ κάλλος (αὐτὸ καθ᾽ avrs),”” He neverdid say, nor 
could he have said, anything of thekind. Wdpeon.... 
αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ he would have felt as a contradiction in 
terms. (On the correct and incorrect use of αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ, 

Similarly in Republic, 500 D, the philosopher statesman puts 

etc., see my remarksin A. J. P., Vol. IX, No.3, p. 287.) More- 
over, Plato never affirmed the presence absolutely of the 
idea with or in the particular (Parmen., 131A B; Phileb., 
15B), but only its presence or communication somehow. 
The τι of κάλλος Te expresses this and Socrates’s embarrass- 
ment very well. Cf. Pheedo, 100D, εἴτε παρονσία εἴτε κοινωνία 
εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη, So Symp., 211 B, μετέχοντα 
τρόπον τινὰ τοιοῦτον, etc. 

200 JowErTt, Vol. IV, p. 436: ‘‘ The same love of divisions 
is apparent in the Gorgias.” Cf. 454E, 455 A, in manner of 
the Sophist. Cf. 464, 465. It could be plausibly argued that 
the definition of rhetoric πολιτικῆς mopiov εἴδωλον (468 Ὁ) as 
explained in 464, 465, is a fuller and more explicit statement 
of the doctrine of Politicus, 291 Β and 303 E-304 A, as to the 
difficulty of distinguishing the statesman from his imita- 
tors and the true relation of ῥητορεία to δικαστική and 

201 But cf. 414, ἀποβλέπων ; 488 0), τὰ τῶν πόλλων νόμιμα, 
with Rep., 419, τὰ τῶν πόλλων πολλὰ νόμιμα, etc.; Gorg., 
491 E, παρουσίᾳ... .. οἷς ἂν κάλλος παρῇ. 

2026 δημιουργὸς. . .. πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων... ἡ ἐν τῇ 

φύσει οὖσα (κλίνη). 

203On this passage as the chief Platonic source of the 
Aristotelian doctrine of matter and form see my remarks 
in A. J. P., Vol. XXII, No. 2, p. 158. Campbell, overlooking 
this passage, finds in Polit., 288 D, the earliest approach to 
the distinction of matter and form. 

82 Tue Unity ΟΕ Puato’s THouGat 

into the plastic stuff of human nature the forms or ideas of justice and temperance 
which he contemplates as existing in the transcendental world (ἐκεῖ), and so becomes 
an artisan of political and popular virtue.™ Expressed in slightly different imagery, 
this is the function of the statesman in the Politicus, 309 C (of. 808 Ο Ὁ). He is to 
implant in those rightly prepared by education, fixed, true opinions concerning the 
honorable, the just, and the good.” The thought and the imagery belong to Plato’s 
permanent stock. We find them in the Gorgias, 503 E-504D.” Here, too, Plato 
conceives the true teacher, artist, or statesman as contemplating ideas or forms, which 
he strives to embody in the material with which he works, even as the Demiurgus of 
the Timceus stamps the ideas upon the matter of generation. 

The origin, first suggestion, exposition, or proof of the theory of ideas is variously 
sought by different critics in the Meno, the Cratylus, the Thectetus, or even in the 
Phedrus, Parmenides, and Symposium. Obviously Plato could at any time argue 
indirectly in support of the ideas as necessary postulates of ontology and epistemology. 
Our chief concern is with the hypothesis that the exposition of some particular dia- 
logue marks a date in the development of his own thought. The doctrine of remin- 
iscence is introduced in the Meno to meet an eristic use of a puzzle allied to the 
psychological problem of “recognition.” *” How, if we do not already know, shall 
we recognize a truth or a definition when we have found it?”* Socrates replies that 
the soul has seen all things in its voyagings through eternity, and that all our learning 
here is but recollection.’ This theory is confirmed in the case of mathematical ideas 
by Socrates’s success in eliciting by prudent questions a demonstration of the Pythag- 
orean proposition from Meno’s ignorant slave.”” The Phedo distinctly refers to this 
argument as a proof of the reality of ideas,” and the myth in the Phedrus describes 
the ante-natal vision of the pure, colorless, formless, essences of true being.”’ It fol- 
lows that, though the ideas are not there explicitly mentioned, the reminiscence spoken 
of in the Meno must refer to them.” But it is extremely improbable that this repre- 
sents Plato’s first apprehension of the doctrine. Psychologically and historically the 
origin of the theory is to be looked for in the hypostatization of the Socratic concept 
and the reaction against Heracliteanism.”* Its association with Pythagoreanism and 

204% ἐκεῖ ὁρᾷ μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἤθη... τιθέναι 207 Meno, 80D ff. Cf. my dissertation De Platonis idea- 
φόνιον δημιοῦργον .... σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης, Cf. rum doctrina, pp. 15 ff. 
501 B, πυκνὰ ἂν ἑκατέρωσε ἀποβλέποιεν. . . . Kai πρὸς ἐκεῖνο αὖ 

- ; x , 208 οὔτε ζητεῖν οὔτε ἀπορεῖν a προλή; 3 in. 
ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖεν, Cf. Polit., 309D, τοῦτο αὐτὸ Math..1 τὰ ἀπορεῖν avev προλήψεως, Sext. Empir 
ae . 

205 This does not refer exclusively to the higher educa- 
tion, as Zeller affirms. 

209‘ L’univers peut dire comme le Dieu de Pascal: ‘Tu 
ne me chercherais pas, si tu ne m’avais déja trouvé.’ ” — 

. : ae ᾿ Π ᾿ eee. FoumnL¥e. Cf. Polit.,278D; Tim., 41 E, τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν 
206 ἀποβλέπων πρός τι... . ὅπως ἂν εἶδός τι αὐτῷ σχῇ τοῦτο ἔδειξε. ΟΥ̓. infra, Ὁ. 48, 
ν ἣ +P. 48. 

ὃ ἐργάζεται, This is applied first to the body, then to the 

soul. The τάξις and κόσμος of the soul is δικαιοσύνη and 210 82 ff. 
σωφροσύνη. .... πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων, etc. The ῥήτωρ ἀγαθὸς 21173 A, 
καὶ τεχνικὸς here =the true πολιτικός, And we may note in 
passing that the Gorgias ‘‘ already” recognizes that rheto- 
ric might be an art. The popular rhetoric is none because 218The realistic terminology of the definition would 
it ignores the ideas (1) as ethical ideals (Gorgias), (2) justify the same inference. Cf. 74, 75. 

as the basis of scientific dialectic (Phadrus). 214 Cf. supra, Ὁ. 28. 

212 247 fF., 249 C, τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων, etc. 

Paut SHOREY 33 

the ante-natal life of the soul is mythical embellishment; and its application to the 
problem of the a priori element in human knowledge is a secondary confirmation of 
its truth.”* Nevertheless the Meno, which John Stuart Mill pronounces “a little gem,” 
is admirably adapted to serve as an introduction to the Platonic philosophy. It exem- 
plifies in brief compass the Socratic method and the logic of the definition in termi- 
nology that suggests the ideas, touches on higher things in the theory of recollection 
and the problem of a priori knowledge, and clearly resumes the dramatic, ethical, and 
political puazles that prepare for the teaching of the Republic. Socrates’s mention of 
the ideas at the close of the Cratylus as something of which he dreams as an alterna- 
tive to Heracliteanism is taken by some critics to indicate that we have here an intro- 
duction to or a first presentment of the doctrine.”* They overlook two considerations: 
(1) the theory is taken for granted at the beginning of the dialogue, as we have already 
seen ;”’ (2) there are no traces of immaturity in the thought of the Cratylus. The 
polemic against the flowing philosophers and the forms of eristic associated with them 
is, in a jesting form, as sharp, and the apprehension of the real issues as distinct as 
it is in the Thecetetus and Sophist.™ 

Some scholars look upon the Theewtetus as a propzdeutic introduction to the 
ideas,”* while others take it as marking the transition to the later theory. Strictly 
speaking, neither view can be correct, since, though the ideas are not often or very 
explicitly mentioned, there is enough to show the presence of the doctrine in its normal 


almost technical for the affirmation of the ideas.” 
And the close parallel between 186 A B and Republic, 
Among the νοητά which the soul grasps by 

hardly refer to anything else. 
523, 524, admits no other interpretation. 

215 ProressoR RITCHIE’s suggestion (Plato, pp. 86, 87) 
that the Platonic idea is a generalization of the Pythag- 
orean treatment of mathematics is unsupported by evi- 
dence. See, however, ZELLER, pp. 654-6, for suggestions 
of other pre-Socratic influences on the theory. 

216So once SUSEMIHL in his Genetische Entwickelung, 
Vol. I, p.161. LurtosLawsk&I, pp. 224, 225, thinks the ideas 
are not formulated even here, but only a something which 
in later dialogues proves to be the ideas! The terminology 
is sige ee αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι, τὸ φύσει, ποῖ βλέπων 389, εἰ δὲ 
. ἔστι δὲ τὸ καλόν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔστι δὲ ἕν ἕκαστον τῶν 
ὄντων (440 Β). All these phrases might conceivably be used 
of notions, conceptual ideas. But this proves too much. 
For, according to L., it holds of all dialogues except the 
Symposium, Phedo, and parts of the Republic, and he is 
not quite sure of them. His real object is to eliminate the 
self-existent idea altogether. 

211 ΟἹ. supra, p. 31. The doctrine of Cratyl., 389, is 
furthermore identical with that of Repub., 596A ff. 

218 386, 439, 440. On the μὴ ὃν and ψευδής δόξα fallacy, 
429 ff., cf. infra, p. 53. On the ῥέοντες cf, 411 ΒΟ with 
Phedo, 906; Phileb., 483A. LurosLawsk&I affirms (pp. 366, 
367) that the subdivision of κίνησις into φορά and ἀλλοίωσις 
is a new and important discovery of the Theetetus, 181, C. 
He fails to note that the argument of Cratylus, 339, 340, dis- 

The ἀγαθὸν and καλόν, claimed for being as against becoming in 157 D, is 

The παραδείγματα of 176 E can 

tinctly implies that πάντα pet includes qualitative change. 
Cf. 439 D, ὅτι τοιοῦτον, 440 A, ἄλλο καὶ ἀλλοῖον γίγνοιτο, .. 
ὁποῖόν γέ τί ἐστιν, 439 HB, μηδὲν ἐξιστάμενον τῆς αὑτοῦ ἰδέας (cf. 
Tim., 50B, and Rep., 380D). ΟἿ. the whole context of the 
argument and the use of ὑπεξέρχεται, Cratyl., 29D; Theetet., 
182D. In fact, the association of motion and qualitative 
change was always a commonplace with Plato. Both “ be- 
fore” and ‘after’ the Theeetetus μεταβολή and ῥεῖν, etc., are 
used freely in both meanings. Cf. Repub., 380 E ff., which 
alone refutes L.’s “‘discovery.”’ οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ μὲν ἄλλον τὰ 
ἄριστα ἔχοντα ἥκιστα ἀλλοιοῦταί τε καὶ κινεῖται. The fact that 
the Theetetus is slightly more explicit in formal classifica- 
tion proves nothing. The whole argument of the Cratylus 
passage hinges on the distinction precisely as does the argu- 
ment of the Theetetus. It appears explicitly again only 
in the Parmenides, and not in the “late” Philebus and 
Timeus. It is not included in the ten kinds of motionin 
the Laws, 893, 894, and L. finds it only by implication in 
894 E, ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἄρα αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινῆσαν ἕτερον ἀλλοιώσῃ which 
is no more explicit than the Cratylus or Republic. 

219W, J, ALEXANDER in Studies Dedicated to Gilder- 
sleeve, p. 179, thinks its teaching to be: knowledge is of the 
ideas, error arises from imperfect ἀνάμνησις. 

220 Supra, τι. 185. 

84 THE Unity ΟΕ Puato’s THouGHtT 

herself,” and whose essence is apprehended through their relation of opposition,” 
are mentioned, after οὐσία, the ὅμοιον and ἀνόμοιον, the ταὐτὸν and the ἕτερον of the 
Sophist. But also, as in the Parmenides, the ethical ideas, καλόν, αἰσχρόν, ἀγαθόν, 
and xaxév;”* and lastly, as in the Republic, the qualities of sense, σκληρὸν and μαλακόν "3": 
The actual sensation of these opposites comes of course through sense. But the οὐσία 
and the ὅ τι ἐστόν, as in the Republic, is apprehended by the mind as an idea. There is 
no argument for holding these ideas to be mere concepts that would not prove the same 
for the Republic, which of course is impossible.” This point established, we may 
concede that the Theetetus may be, not an introduction to the ideas, but an indirect 
argument in support of the familiar doctrine. The polemic against Heraclitus is 
always that.”* And, though Plato himself may not be aware of it, the statement that 
the syllable is not the sum of its elements, but μία ἐδέα ἀμέριστος, embodies the prin- 
ciple and justification of a realistic logic.”’ The conceptual whole is not the sum of 
its parts, but a new entity and unity.™ 

What has been said of the Theetetus applies to Zeller’s theory” that the second 
part of the Parmenides is an indirect argument for the ideas. That this is not the 
main purpose of the Parmenides will appear in the sequel. And Zeller was mistaken 
in stating that only relative contradictions followed from the being of the one, while 
absolute contradictions resulted from its not being. But the Platonic idea is always 
suggested by the antithesis of the one and the many. And in the eighth hypothesis, 
164 B ff., the “one” and “ others” are no longer treated with dialectical impartiality, 
but there is a hint that the one may be regarded as the symbol of the idea. Symme- 
try leads us to expect the argument that, if the one is not (relative μὴ dv), other things 
both are and are not all contradictory predicates. Instead of ‘‘are’’ we find “appear” 
or “seem.” Other things are indefinite bulks that break up under inspection and 
only seem to partake of unity and other predicates that derive from unity. These 
ὄγκοι certainly suggest the world of matter uninformed by ideas, the “ being” of the 
materialists which the friends of ideas in the Sophist call “becoming” and break up 
into little bits.” And the statement that, as they cannot be other than the (non- 

existent) one, they are the other of one another, reminds us of ἀλλήλοις. . συν- 

22] αὐτὴ ἡ ψνχή 186B. Cf. 187A; Phaeedo, 65C; Rep., 524 
BC, 526 B. 

222 τὴν ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλω, Cf. Rep., 524 D, ἃ μὲν eis 
τὴν αἴσθησιν ἅμα τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἑαυτοῖς ἐμπίπτει, Mr, Henry 
Jackson and others confound this special use of πρὸς ἄλληλα 
with τὰ πρός τι, relative terms generally, by the aid of Par- 
men.,133C. The Thecetetus passage is the source of Her- 
modorus’s distinction of πρὸς ἕτερα into πρὸς ἐναντία and πρός 
τι, which ZELLER (p. 706) says is not found in Plato. 

223130 B after ὁμοιότης. 

224186 B with Rep., 524A. 

225 THOMPSON on Meno, 74 D,says that problems which 
in Phileb.,14D, are δεδημευμένα are made the bases of a 
dialectical course in Rep., 523-6. This is a misapprehen- 
sion. The Republic mentions (525A) that the same object 
is perceived as one and many. It does not sport with the 

paradox, but passes on to show how mathematics leads 
the mind to the apprehension of abstract and ideal unity. 
Philebus, 14 D ff., is concerned with logical method; Rep., 
523-6, with psychology and education. But the thought of 
the Republic is not less mature, and is, indeed, repeated in 
Phileb., 56 E =Rep., 525 DE. 

226 οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό, etc. 157A is the diametri- 
cal opposite of the ideas—elvai τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό, 
Phedo, 100B. 

227 205 C, 203 E. 

228 Cf. Parmen., 157 D, οὐκ dpa τῶν πολλῶν οὐδὲ πάντων τὸ 
μόριον μόριον, ἀλλὰ μιᾶς τινὸς ἰδέας Kai ἑνός τινος ὃ καλοῦμεν ὅλον. 
See also A. J. P., Vol. XXII, No. 2, p. 158. 

229Set forth in his Platonic Studies and the earlier edi- 
tions of his History, but now virtually withdrawn. 

230 Soph., 246 B.C. 


δεδέσθαι in the theory of pure relativity in Thecetetus, 160 B. Similar hints occur in 
the fourth hypothesis, 157 B, which deals with ἄλλα on the supposition that the one 
is.“ The main conclusion that ἄλλα, then, admit all contradictory predicates is indi- 
cated very briefly (159 A). What is emphasized is the fact that ἄλλα per se are 
. ἐν ols τὸ ἕν οὐκ ἔνι, that they are ἄπειρα (of. Phileb.); that it is the one 
which introduces πέρας πρὸς ἄλληλα; and that, having parts, these parts must relate 
to μιᾶς τινὸς ἰδέας καὶ ἑνός τινος, ὅ καλοῦμεν ὅλον. While the main object of the 
Parmenides, then, is to illustrate the communion of ideas and the doctrine of relative 
ὃν and μὴ ὃν set forth in the Sophist, there is a suggestion of polemic here and there 
directed against the infinite and indefinite world without unity of the materialists, 
relativists, and deniers of the ideas. But obviously the first origin and exposition of 
the ideas is not to be sought in a work that deals with problems and difficulties arising 
from the doctrine.” 

The Pheedo, Phedrus, Republic, and Symposium, the dialogues that are fullest 
in explicit affirmation or mythical embellishment of the transcendental idea, need not 
here detain us long. In his exaltation of pure thought and the dialectical method 
Plato clothes the ideas in all the contradictory attributes of a sensuous, esthetic type, 
an ethical ideal, and a metaphysical noumenon. He is perfectly aware of this, and the 
inconsistency is common to all philosophies of the absolute.™ In the Phedrus as 
elsewhere he warns us not to take the myth too seriously.” In the Phaedo he 
describes the doctrine as familiar,” and reminds us that he does not insist upon the 
precise terminology, but only on the central fact.”” In the Republic every termi- 
nology is employed from the most naive to the most severely logical or the most 
transcendental.** Despite these facts, attempts have been made to extract evidences 
of contradiction or development from the varying imagery and terminology of these 
dialogues. The unity of the Republic has been broken up and its books variously 
dated according to the absence of the theory, or its presence in an “earlier” or 
“later” form. It has even been gravely argued in defiance of all psychological and 
historical probability that the Symposium, which in consonance with its theme men- 
tions the idea of beauty only, represents a stage of development in which the Platonic 


Socratic ethical concepts, not Platonic ideas, is refuted by 
the context (ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία... ἀναφέρειν Ta ἐν ταῖς αἰσθή- 
σεσι, etc.). The suggestion that the reference is to con- 
versations abandons the whole case, unless they are limited 
to the interval between the Meno and the Phedo! The 

231 Relative ὃν admitting κοινωνία, 

232 Thecetet., 203, 204. 

233 Of, infra, Part 11. 

234 JOWETT’S common-sense and literary tact have an- 

swered literal-minded objectors once for all: ‘‘When the 
charioteers and their steeds stand upon the dome of heaven 
they behold the intangible, invisible essences which are 
not objects of sight. This is because the force of language 
can no further go.”—Vol. I, p. 412. 

235 265 C, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῷ ὄντι παιδιᾷ πεπαῖσθαι, 

286 Those who think that the ideas have been men- 
tioned in only one preceding dialogue, as the Meno or Sym- 
posium, are much exercised by the θαμὰ λέγειν of 72 E, the 
ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεὶ of 16 D, and the πολυθρύλητα of 100B. LurTos- 
LAWSEI’s statement (p. 292) that these terms may refer to 

simple truth is that Plato may at ahy time refer to any 
part of his permanent beliefs as familiar doctrine. On the 
theory of development, to what discussions is reference 
made in Crito, 44D, and 49AB? To the Gorgias and Re- 
public 1? Where has Plato often said that τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ 
πράττειν is δικαιοσύνη Ὦ (Rep., 433A). Where has Glaucon 
heard οὐκ ὀλιγάκις that the idea of good is the μέγιστον 
μάθημα 1 (Rep., 504 E). 

237100 Ὁ. 

238 596, 597, 585, 534, 532, 514-17, 505-11, 500 D-501 B, 490 B, 
485 B, 476-80. 

86 THE Unity or Puato’s ΤΗΟυΘΗΤ1 

philosophy contained but one transcendental idea, as if the problems of psychology 
and ontology which the theory of ideas sought to meet or evade could have been in 
any wise advanced by the hypostatization of one concept! We have glanced at such 
methods of reasoning already, and shall meet them again. At present we pass on to 
the hypothesis that the Parmenides contains a criticism of the ideas which leads to 
the abandonment or transformation of the theory in the fourth and latest group of 
dialogues. This hypothesis rests on the assumption that the criticism of the Parmen- 
ides is new, that Plato was bound either to answer it or give up the ideas, and that, 
as a matter of fact, the transcendental idea is not found in the later dialogues. These 
assumptions will not bear critical examination. 

The objections brought forth against the ideas in the Parmenides are obvious 
enough, and, as Jowett says, are unanswerable by anybody who separates the phe- 
nomenal from the real. How can we bring the absolute into intelligible relation with 
the relative? How can the absolute (“the Gods’’) take cognizance of us or we appre- 
hend what is adapted to their thought?” How can we without self-contradiction 
apply to it unity or plurality, or any other predicate of human knowledge?” More 
specifically, if the ideas are transcendental unities, how can we predicate multiplicity 
or parts of them as wo must to connect them with one another and with phenomena?™ 
How shall we interpret the figurative expressions that the ideas are present in things, or 
that things participate in or imitate the ideas?” If the idea is the postulated corre- 
late of every idem in multis, why should we not assume an idea to explain the likeness 
of the idea and the particular, and so on in infinite regression?“ To what extent the 
form of these objections is due to contemporary critics, or the misunderstanding of 
students, or the precocity of Aristotle, is an unprofitable inquiry. Their substance is 
in the Republic, not to speak of the Phedo, the Huthydemus, the Timeus, and 
Philebus.“* Their presentation in the Parmenides, then, does not mark a crisis in 
Plato’s thought calling for a review of his chief article of philosophic faith. Plato 
does not and cannot answer them, but he evidently does not take them very seriously,” 
though he admits that it would require a marvelous man to sift and analyze them all.” 
They arise from the limitations of our finite minds.” Here as in the Philebus he 
bids us disregard them, and proceed on the assumption of ideas to find the one idea 

239 Parmen., 134. Sophist, only because pedants were obstructing the way of 
240 Soph., 244, 245; Parmen., 142A; Tim., 37E, 38 A, raed denying it. Similarly the τρίτος ἄνθρωπος is dis- 
241 Parmen., 131; Phileb., 15 Β. tinct y implied in Republic, 597 C, and Tim., 31 A, as the 

difficulty of giving a precise meaning to παρουσία is in 

242 Parmen., 131 A, 182 Ὁ. 243 132 A, 132 E, Euthydemus, 301A, and Phedo, 100 Ὁ. 
at Hep., AGA, αὐτὸ μὲν ἐν ἕκαστον εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων 245 Philed.,15DE. In Sophist 251 BC, the reference is 
Kat σωμάτων Kai ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ, πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἕκαστον. 

to the one and many in things, but the application to the 

Cf. Phileb., 15B; Parmen., 144 Ἐ, Some ignore this pas- ¢gmmunion of ideas immediately follows. 

sage. Others wantonly emend it, as BADHAM, who reads 

ἄλλῃ ἄλλων, and BYwATER, who reads ἀλλ᾽ ἄλλων (Journal 248 Parmen., 135 AB. 

of Phil., Vol. V, p. 122). Rircure (Plato, 96) takes itin a 247 Tim., 52BC, 34C; Phileb., 15D, τῶν λόγων, . 
Pickwickian sense in order to avoid “anticipating the πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν, The Sophist does not really contradict Tim., 
Sophist.” PFLEIDERER uses it to prove that the fifth bookof 38AB. Absolutely ὃν and μὴ ὅν remain a mystery (251A, 
the Republic is laterthan thetenth. Anythingratherthan 2561 Ὁ, 254C). The Sophist merely fixes the practically 
admit the obvious fact that Plato always recognized the necessary conventions of logical discourse about them — 
“communion” of ideas, and argued it at length in the τὸν λόγον, ἐν τοῖς wap’ ἡμῖν λόγοις, etc., 251 A, 251 Ὁ, 


and enumerate all its species.” 

The text of the Parmenides does not bear out the assertion that the objections 
apply to any special form of the theory or can be met by a change of terminology. 
The suggestion that there may be some classes of concepts to which no idea corre- 
sponds is repudiated for good Platonic reasons.” The interpretation that the ideas 
are to be henceforth merely concepts is distinctly rejected, was-a priori impossible for 
Plato, and is refuted by the positive affirmation of their objectivity in the Timeus.™ 
Socrates’s explanation that the ideas are παραδείγματα, patterns of which phenomena 
are likenesses, is nothing new. The terminology of pattern, copy, and artist looking 
off to his model is familiar throughout the “early” dialogues, whether used of the 
definition or the idea. There is no hint in the corresponding passages of the Philebus 
that such a variation of terminology could in any way affect the problem. It is not 
proposed in the Parmenides as a new doctrine, but merely as a different metaphor to 
evade the difficulty found in the literal interpretation of peréyerw—it is a mere gloss 
upon the meaning of μετέχειν. But equally formidable difficulties confront this way 
of putting it’ And there is no systematic change of terminology in the “later” 
dialogues, which, like the earlier, employ in a purely natural and non-technical way the 

The hypothesis must be judged by its total con- 

various synonyms and metaphors which Plato used to express the inexpressible.™ 
The challenge to find the ideas in dialogues ‘“‘later” than the Parmenides is easily 


Nothing can be more explicit than the Timeus.™ 

The alternative is distinctly 

proposed: are the objects of sense the only realities and is the supposition of ideas 
mere talk?** And it is affirmed that their reality is as certain as the distinction between 

opinion and science. 

248135BC, Phileb.,16D. Cf. Pheedr., 270 D, ἐὰν δὲ πλείω 
εἴδη ἔχῃ ταῦτα ἀριθμησαμένους, Laws, 894A, ἐν εἴδεσι λαβεῖν 
μετ᾽ ἀριθμοῦ. 

249 Parmen., 136; Phedo, 101 Ὁ. 

250130D. See ZELLER, 700, 701, for lists of ideas. But, 
as we have seen, to admit that there is any conceptual 
unity not referable to an idea is to make the theory a mere 
play of fancy, and deprive it of all psychological and onto- 
logical meaning. 

2151C. Cf. supra, τι. 188. 

252The τρίτος ἄνθρωπος is repeated in 132DE, Other 
difficulties follow, and the final summing up, 135A, is 
couched in the most general terminology: εἰ εἰσὶν αὗται ai 
ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὁριεῖταί τις αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἶδος, There is 
no suggestion that a new form or terminology makes any 
difference. The much misunderstood passage, 1330 D, is 
merely a special application of the general difficulty to 
relative terms. Ideal slavery is related only to ideal 
ownership, the slavery in us only to the ownership in us. 
There is no discrimination here of a class of αὐτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ 
εἴδη. (Cf. A. J. P., Vol. TX, p. 287). Nor are there, as JowETT 
and CAMPBELL affirm (Republic, Vol. II, p. 313, u. 1) two 
stages (1) ὁμοίωσις and (2) μέθεξις τοῦ ὁμοιώματος in the 
descent from the ideas to the individuals. ὁμοιώματα and 
μετέχοντες are merely twosides of the same fact—the par- 
ticipation somehow (cite ὅπῃ δή τις αὐτὰ τίθεται) of the particu- 

They are νοούμενα and exist καθ᾽ aitd. 

, 256 

There is no hint that 

lar in the idea. The ὁμοιώματα are no more separable as 
an intermediate stage than are τὰ εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα τῶν 
ὄντων ἀεὶ μιμήματα of Timeus, 50C. In both cases we have 
only the idea and the particular and the metaphorical 
expression of their relation. 

253 See my note in A. J. P., Vol. X, No.1, p. 66. ZELLER, 
Sitzungsber. ἃ. Berl. Akad., 1887, No. 13. 

25451, 52. 

25551, τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν dp’ ἦν πλὴν λόγος, For the impossi- 
bility of taking λόγος as ‘Socratic concept” see my note in 
A. J. P., Vol. X, p. 65. 

256 ΜῈ. ARCHER-HIND’s attempt (Jour. of Phil., Vol. 
XXIV, pp. 49 ff.) to ‘circumvent ”’ this passage is based on a 
misinterpretation of 39E. Since an idea of fire is not men- 
tioned in the exhaustive enumeration there given of the 
ideas contained in the supreme idea, an idea of fire he 
argues, cannot be meant seriously here. But 39E does not 
speak of the ‘‘supreme idea,’’ which is a figment of modern 
Platonists. The ¢#ov is simply the universal of animal or 
living thing, and as such the paradigm of the world which 
is aliving thing. (Cf. A.J. P., Vol. IX, p. 294.) It includes 
all subordinate νοητὰ gga. There is no reason to look for 
other ideas in it. J. Horowrtz (Das Platonische νοητὸν 
ζῶον und der Philonische κοσμός νοητός, Marburg, 1900) fails 
to prove his assertion that the νοητὸν ζῷον is ‘die Welt- 
Idee.” Mr. Archer-Hind’s further arguments merely pre- 

88 Tue Unity or Prato’s ΤΗΟΘΗΤ 

they are mere concepts, or thoughts of God. On the contrary, God uses them as pat- 
terns, and as elements in the creation of the βου]. They are characterized in 
terms applicable only to pure absolute Being, and the familiar terminology is freely 
employed.** Three things, Plato repeats, must have existed from all eternity: the 
pure Being of the ideas, the generated copies, and space, the medium or receptacle.™ 
The attempts of modern scholars to eliminate these elements or identify them with 
other categories found in other dialogues contradict Plato’s explicit statements. We 
are often told that space is the θάτερον or μὴ dv. For this there is not a scintilla 
of evidence.” Plato even says of space: ταὐτὸν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ προσρητέον (50 B), and calls 
it a τρίτον αὖ γένος ὃν τὸ τῆς χώρας ἀεί, The “same” and the “other” appear in a 
wholly different connection in the creation of the soul, and are obviously the categories 
of the Sophist attributed to the soul to explain its cognition of sameness and differ- 
ence.” The occurrence of these categories in a dialogue that reaffirms the transcen- 
dental idea proves that to Plato’s mind the two points of view were not incompatible, 
which, for the rest, is obvious enough from the Phedrus. We must interpret the 
Sophist, Politicus, and Philebus in the light of this presumption, and treat the termi- 
nology of the ideas as prima facie evidence of the doctrine. The Republic (476) 
‘already ” states that the transcendental unity of the ideas is somehow compatible 
with their communion. The Sophist formulates all the concessions which a “‘ working 
logic ” must demand from all philosophies of the absolute, be it absolute relativity, 
absolute Being, or absolute Platonic ideas. Plato minimized the inevitable inconsist- 
ency, and a sound interpretation will not exaggerate it. A working logic does not 
emphasize the transcendental character of the idea. But the language of 248 A, 
247 A B, distinctly implies it.”* The statement that δικαιοσύνη and φρόνησις are engen- 
dered in the soul (ἐγγίγνεται) obviously does not mean that they are per se concepts 
of the mind. Nor can we infer that the ideas are mere concepts from passages in 

sent the usual objections of common-sense conceptualism— 
which are not competent to anyone who himself believes in 
any metaphysics or attributes metaphysics to Plato. 

25728A, 29A, 30BC, 35A. ZELLER, p. 665, n. 2, adds 
Pheedr., 247, which is irrelevant, and Rep., 596A ff., where 
God is the maker of the ideas. Lutoslawski’s argument 
from νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν (27H, 29A, pp. 474, 477) in- 
terpreted as ‘‘included in thought” is a simple mistransla- 

25852 A, 27D, 28AB, 29B, 30C. Cf. 30E, ὃ ἔστι; 81 Β, τὰ 
κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντα ἀεί; 48H, παραδείγματος, to which cor- 
respond 50 Ὁ, μιμήματα, and 52A, ὁμώνυμον ὅμοιον ; 81 A, the 
τρίτος ἄνθρωπος. 

25952 Ὁ. 
260 E. g., by RITCHIE, Ρ. 116. 

261 ZELLER, pp. 719 ff., 733, produces none. Aristotle’s 
obscure allusions prove nothing. The identification of the 
ἄπειρον of the Philebus with μὴ ὃν and matter breaks down. 
There remains the argument that, since in the Repyblic the 
ideas are ὃν and phenomena are μεταξὺ ---ὄντος and μὴ ὄντος, 
matter must be μὴ ὃν apprehended neither by νοῦς nor 

αἴσθησις, but λογισμῷ τινὶ νόθῳ (52 B). But Plato’s terminology 
cannot be used out of its context in this way. The μὴ ὃν 
problem belongs to logic. Phanomena are intermediate be- 
tween ὃν and μὴ ὃν because they change, and are and are 
not the same predicates, not because they are the offspring 
of ideas and matter. In physics Plato was forced, how- 
ever reluctantly, to assign a kind of eternity to matter or 
space. (Cf. BERKELEY, Principles, sec. 117: ‘either that 
real space is God, or that there is something beside God 
which is eternal, uncreated.”) So far is it from being true 
that space or matter imparts μὴ ὃν to phenomena that, on 
the contrary, Plato explicitly says that phenomena, being 
unreal images, cling to essence (οὐσίας) somehow through 
their existence in space. Tim., 52C. 

26237 ABC is plainly a psychological myth or allegory 
expressing the results of the analysis of the Sophist. Cf. 
also Thecetet., 1948. 

263 διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν, ἣν ἀεὶ κατὰ 
ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν φατέ... .. οὔσης οὖν δικαιοσύνης καὶ φρο- 
vijgews . . «. πότερον ὁρατὸν καὶ ἁπτὸν (cf, Tim., 28 Β) εἶναί φασι 
τι αὐτῶν ἢ πάντα ἀόρατα. 


which we are required to apprehend them in thought or in the βου]... ΤΆ 15 often said 
that souls take the place of ideas in Plato’s later period. This is a complete miscon- 
ception of Plato’s thought and style. It is quite true that he could not confine the 
predicates of true or absolute Being to the ideas. God is, of course, true Being, and 
in religious and metaphysical passages need not always be distinguished from the ideas 
taken collectively. Both are invisible, eternal, intelligible. In the Timawus space also 
is reluctantly treated as a kind of eternal being. The Sophist tries to show that 
“being” is amenable to human logic and cognizable by finite minds. This involves a 
contradiction for all except consistent relativists who renounce pure Being altogether. 
This Plato could not do, for, not only in the Parmenides, but in the late Timeeus, he 
retains absolute Being for metaphysics and religion. In the Sophist he shows that for 
human logic it is as impracticable as absolute not-Being. To be known and talked 
about it must come out of its isolation and enter into relations—act and be acted upon. 
Being is therefore temporarily defined against the extremists of all schools as the 
power and potentiality” of action or passion, and the contradiction is smoothed over 
by the equivocal use of ‘true being” to denote both the metaphysical and the reli- 
gious noumenon—the ideas and God. True Being as God obviously possesses life, 
thought, motion, soul, and true Being as the ideas borrows so much life and motion as 
will explain their intercommunion in finite thought.” But the definition, its purpose 
served, is never repeated, and pure transcendental being reappears in the Timeus. 
That the ideas still take precedence of souls appears distinctly from Polit., 809 C, 
where it is said that fixed opinions in souls are a divine thing in a demonic thing. 
The same follows from the creation of the soul in the Timeus, and the hierarchy of 
elements in the good (Phileb., 66) where pure ideas precede νοῦς. Ἶ Politicus, 269 D, pre- 
sumably implies the ideas;”* 285 E ff. unmistakably affirms them. What other possible 
interpretation can be put upon the statement ὅτι τοῖς μὲν τῶν ὄντων ῥαδίοις καταμαθεῖν 
αἰσθηταί τινες ὁμοιότητες πεφύκασινῦ These ὄντα are plainly ideas of material things, 

of which material things are likenesses. 

264 Sophist, 250 B, τρίτον dpa τι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὃν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ 
τιθείς, Of. 2430, οὐχ ἧττον κατὰ τὸ ὃν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πάθος εἰλη- 
pores ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. Cf. ὁμολογήματα ... . ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ, 
Theeetet., 155 A, from which LUTOSLAWSEI, p. 383, infers that 
the ideas are subjective notions! 

265 247 E, δύναμις probably includes both. 

266 The entire passage betraysembarrassment, To adapt 
“Being” to the necessities of logic, Plato is obliged to 
deny of it (248 DE) what in Tim., 38 AB, his feelings require 
him to affirm. He treats γιγνώσκεσθαι as a πάσχειν which 
ZELLER (p. 652), as a true Aristotelian, thinks a verbal fal- 
lacy. In the crucial passage, 249A, he uses αὐτὸ (μηδὲ ζῆν 
αὐτὸ) which draws our attention away from the ideas. 
And having attributed soul and mind to ‘‘it,” he merely 
infers that, since these involve κίνησις, κίνησις must be in- 
cluded among ὄντα (which Campbell, ad loc., regards as a 
formal fallacy). Plainly, whatever implications we force 
upon Plato’s words, his purpose here is not to attribute 
soul to the ideas, but to remove from the path of logic the 

But τὰ τιμιώτατα (justice, good, etc., Phedr., 

ἕν éorés of Parmenides (or his followers at Megara or in 
the school —ovdév yap ταύτῃ διαφέρει) as well as the πάντα ῥεῖ 
of Heraclitus for which he felt less sympathy. Cf. Thee- 
tet., 180, 181, 183 Ἐς, 184A. 

267 See ZELLER, pp. 689, 690, who seems to deny the con- 
tradiction altogether, and pp. 696-8, where he argues that 
the Sophist is early because life and causality are never 
again attributed to the ideas, and do not belong to them 
in Aristotle’s representation. Space fails to enumerate all 
points of agreement with or difference from APELT’S subtle 
study of the Sophist (Beitrdge). He points out that the 
definition of ὃν is directed mainly against the materialists, 
and calls attention to ἴσως εἰς ὕστερον ἕτερον av φανείη, Heis 
right in denying that Plato’s views changed, and in mini- 
mizing the significance of the apparent attribution of life 
to the ideas. But he errs when he seeks an explicit state- 
ment of it in other dialogues and for this purpose presses 
ἄνπνον φύσιν͵ Tim., 52B. 

268 τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν, Etc. 

40 Tue Unity or ΡΙΑτΤΟῖΒ THovucHt 

250 B, ὅσα ἄλλα τίμια ψυχαῖς), have no copies in the world of sense, and must be appre- 
hended by reason. This is precisely the doctrine of Phadrus, 250 Β Ο Ὁ and 263 A B, 
and ought to end controversy.” We have already seen that the Philebus bids us 
assume ideas and disregard the difficulties of the Parmenides.”” There is no hint 
that they are only concepts.” We may assume, then, that the language of 58 A, 59C, 
and 61 E implies the ideas.” 


Supposed variations in Plato’s psychology have been used to determine the evolu- 
tion of his thought and the relative dates of the dialogues. The chief topics are: 
(1) the immortality of the soul; (2) the unity of the soul, or its subdivision into 
faculties; (3) the general argument that the psychology of the “later” dialogues is 
richer and more precise than that of the earlier. 

1. The immortality of the individual soul is for Plato a pious hope,” and an ethical 
postulate,”* rather than a demonstrable certainty.”” He essays various demonstrations, 
but nearly always in connection with a myth, and of all the proofs attempted but one is 
repeated. In the Apology Socrates, addressing his judges, affects to leave the question 
open.” But we cannot infer from this that the Apology antedates Plato’s belief in 
immortality. For, to say nothing of Pythagorean sources of inspiration, he had pre- 
sumably read Pindar’s second Olympian with approval; and Socrates’s language in 
Crito, 54 B, is precisely in the tone of the Gorgias and the Phedo.™ The Meno™ 
assumes the immortality and the prior existence of the soul to account for a priori 
knowledge. The Phedo presents a complicated proof or series of proofs. The Sympo- 
sium seems to recognize only the subjective immortality of fame, and the racial immor- 
tality of offspring.” The “early” Phedrus and the late Laws alone agree in a proof 
based on the conception of the soul as the self-moving.” It is easy to foresee the 
hypotheses which an ingenious philology will construct from these facts. Krohn, Pflei- 
derer, and Rohde gravely argue that Book I of the Republic must be very early because 
the aged Cephalus neglects the opportunity to supplement his citation from Pindar with 
a scientific proof of immortality. Horn tells us that the Phedrus represents the first 

269 For ἀνάμνησις in the Politicus cf. infra, Ὁ. 44. 

270 See A. J. P., Vol. IX, p. 279. 

271 LUTOSLAWSEI, p. 467, mistranslates, or, if he prefers, 
misinterprets, 15D: ‘‘the nature of thought requires the 
union of notions into higher units, and this constitutes an 
eternal necessity of the human mind.” Cf. supra, p. 36. 

212 τὴν yap περὶ τὸ ὃν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ 
πεφυκὸς... . μακρῷ ἀληθεστάτην εἶναι γνῶσιν .--- περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ 
τὰ αὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἀμικτότατα ἔχοντα.---ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ μήτε γιγνόμενα 
μήτε ἀπολλύμενα, κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ ὡσαύτως ὄντα ἀεί, Cf. 62 Α, 
αὐτῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης ὅ τι ἔστι, GEA, τὴν ἀΐδιον... φύσιν, 

For the ideas in relation to the method κατ᾽ εἴδη τέμνειν, 
and a fuller discussion of the μὴ ὃν fallacy, see infra, 
Part II. 

273 Pheedo, 114 D, χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπάδειν ἑαυτῷ, 

214 Rep., 608 Ο ff.; Laws, 881A, 961 Ὁ Ἐς, 9594 Β; with 

τὸν δὲ ὄντα ἡμῶν ἕκαστον ὄντως ἀθάνατον [civar] ψυχήν, cf. 

Phedo, 115DE; and with the idea, 959 Β, that the only 
βοήθεια at the bar of Hades is a just life in this world, cf. 
Gorg., 522 C D, 526 E; Crito, 54B. 

275 Pheedo, 85 C, τὸ μὲν cages εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ viv βίῳ ἣ advva- 
tov εἶναι ἢ mayxaderov τι. Οἵ. 101A B; Tim., 12D; Meno, 
864 Β; Pheedr., 265 C. 

27840C. Cf. also Phedo, 91 Β. 

271 Cratylus, 403 DE, implies the doctrine of Phedo, 
67, 68. 

278 81 C. 

279 207 Ὁ, 208 B. Too much is made of this, for the same 
inference could be drawn from Laws, 721 and 118 ΒΚ. The 
popular belief in Hades is implied, 192 E, and there is even 
a hint, 212 A, that the philosopher may be immortal: εἴπερ 
Tw ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ Kai ἐκείνῳ, 

280 Pheedr,, 245C; Laws, 894, 895. 


youthful enthusiastic apprehension of immortality, the Symposium expresses the mood 
of sober manhood content with this life, while in the Phedo old age, waiting for death, 
craves a real immortality. According to Thompson, the Meno reserves the proof of 
what it merely asserts; the Phedrus outlines a general proof, the Republic later 
attempts another; the Symposium, dissatisfied with all so far achieved, ignores the sub- 
ject; and finally the problem is taken up seriously in the Phedo. Zeller, on the other 
hand, while holding that all the proofs are substantially identical, thinks, as we have 
seen, that the Republic refers to the Pheedo, and is also later than the Phedrus. But 
to Lutoslawski it is evident that the proof given in the Phedrus and repeated in the 
Laws is the latest. And he also can discern that the Symposium, in the first flush of 
idealism, could dispense with the personal immortality of the Gorgias, but that later, 
when the theory of ideas had grown familiar, Plato undertook in the Phedo to affiliate 
upon it the old doctrine of immortality. 

Hardly more profitable than these arbitrary speculations is the analysis of the 
separate arguments. Broadly speaking, Zeller is right in saying that they all amount 
to this, that it is the nature or essence of the soul to live. But this general truth 
becomes a fallacy when employed to identify absolutely the distinct arguments of the 
Phedo, the Republic, and the Phedrus. The gist of the argument in the tenth book 
of the Republic is a fallacy employed also in the first book (353 Ὁ E), the equivocal 
use of the ἀρετή or specific excellence of the soul in relation to its ἔργον, its function 
and essence. In both cases the ἔργον is defined in terms of mere life-vitality, while 
the ἀρετή is referred to the moral life. But in so far as the ἔργον or essence of the 
soul is mere life, its ἀρετή is intensity and persistency of life—not justice.” Simi- 
larly the Phedrus and Laws, identifying life with self-movement, prove the eternity 
of the principle of motion, and assume it to include moral and intellectual qualities.” 
But there is a certain pedantry in thus scrutinizing these arguments. Plato’s belief 
in immortality was a conviction of the psychological and moral impossibility of sheer 
materialism,” and a broad faith in the unseen, the spiritual, the ideal. The logical 
obstacles to a positive demonstration of personal immortality were as obvious to him 
as they are to his critics. If we must analyze the arguments of the Phedo, the 
analysis of Bonitz is, on the whole, the most plausible. They prove, at the most, 

281 Cf, the equivocal use of ἁρμονία in Pheedo, 93,94, to 
denote the composition of physical elements that. on the 
hypothesis under examination, is life, and the harmony of 
spiritual qualities that is virtue. 

282 Laws, 896 C D. 

283 Laws, 891 C, κινδυνεύει yap ὁ λέγων ταῦτα πῦρ Kai ὕδωρ 
καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα πρῶτα ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν πάντων εἶναι, Cf. Philebd., 
804; Theetet., 155 Ἐπ 184 Ὁ; Sophist, 246A; Tim., 51C, 
ἣ ταῦτα, ἅπερ καὶ βλέπομεν . . .. μόνα ἐστὶ τοιαύτην ἔχοντα 

2841, 6,. the argument ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία, 10E ff., 
proves merely that the state of the soul after death is the 
same as that before birth. The argument from ἀνάμνησις, 
13 ff., supplements this by the proof that before birth the 
soul possessed intelligence. The final argument meets all 

objections by establishing the inherent immortality of the 
soul as a form that always involves the idea of life. I may 
add that the fallacy in this ingenious argument may be 
analyzed in various ways. In 103B it is said that αὐτὸ τὸ 
ἐναντίον, as distinguished from τὰ ἔχοντα τὰ ἐναντία could 
never admit its opposite. Αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον is then sub- 
divided into τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν and τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει, This seems to 
yield three things: the idea per se, the idea in the particular, 
and the particular as affected by the idea. (Cf. supra, τι. 252.) 
But there are really only two things: the idea, and the 
particular affected by the ‘‘ presence” of or “ participa- 
tion” in the idea. How the idea can be at once in itself 
and in the particular may be, as we have seen, a mystery. 
But it does not justify the duplication of the idea, which is 
a device employed here only, and presumably with full 
consciousness, for the purpose of the argument. For by its 

42 Tue Unity ΟΕ Puato’s ΤΗΟΘΗΤ 

the immortality of soul, not of the individual. This Plato presumably knew, but 
we cannot expect him to say so by the death-bed of Socrates or in the ethical myths, 
which obviously assume individual immortality.” But neither this unavoidable funda- 
mental ambiguity nor the fanciful variations of the eschatological myths convict Plato 
of serious inconsistency, or supply any evidence for the dating of the dialogues. 

2. In the Republic Plato bases the definitions of the virtues and the three classes 
of the population on a tripartite division of the soul, which he warns us is not demon- 
strated absolutely, but sufficiently for the purpose in hand.” A poetical passage of 
the tenth book hints that in its true nature the soul is one and simple, but that we 
cannot perceive this so long as, like the sea-god Glaucus, it is disguised by the accre- 
tions of its earthly life.*’ The tripartite division is embodied in the myth of the 
Pheedrus, which, if we pedantically press the poetical imagery,” implies the pre- 
existence even of the appetites.” In the Timaus the immortal soul is created by the 
Demiurgus, the mortal, which falls into two parts, spirit and appetite, by his minis- 
ters.” Here the tripartite division is subordinated to a bipartite, as Aristotle would 
have it.” But we are explicitly warned that the revelation of a god would be required 
to affirm the absolute scientific truth of this division, and to distinguish precisely the 
mortal from the immortal part.” In the Laws the question whether the θυμός is an 
affection or a distinct part of the soul is left open.” As Aristotle says, it makes no 
difference for ethical and political theory.™* The Phedo, attempting to prove immor- 
tality, naturally dwells rather upon the unity of the soul, as does the tenth book of the 
Republic. But it distinguishes, quite in the manner of the Republic, the three types 
of character, the φιλόσοφος or φιλομαθής, the φίλαρχος or φιλότιμος, and the φιλοσώ- 
ματος or φιλοχρήματος. Phoedo, 79 BCE, does not affirm that the soul is absolutely 
simple and uncompounded, but that the body is more akin to the composite, and the 
soul to the simple and unchanging. The contradictions found by Krohn and Pfleiderer 
in the psychology of the Republic, or between the Republic and Phedo, on this point, 
are sufficiently explained by Hirmer.™* From all this it appears (1) that Plato 
affirmed nothing dogmatically with regard to the ultimate psychological problem. 
(2) That his primary classification was the distinction between the pure reason and the 
lower faculties subordinate to reason and dependent on the body. (3) That for ethical 
and political theory he found most helpful the tripartite classification—reason, spirit, 

aid the life in the individual is posited as an intermediate 
entity between life per se and the living individual, and 
pronounced immortal because, like life per se, it will not 
admit its opposite. Another way of putting it is to say that, 
in 106E ff., ἀθάνατον is equivocally used for (1) that which 
does not admit death (while life is present), (2) that which 
does not admit death at all. 

285 Gorg., 524 ff.; Rep., 614 ff. Cf. Laws, 94BC; Tim., 
41D, ψυχὰς ἰσαρίθμους τοῖς ἄστροις, etc. 

280 455 C Ὁ ff. 287611 C- 612 A. 288 246 A ff. 

289 NATORP, Hermes, Vol. XXXV, p. 430, objects that the 
souls of the gods are tripartite and that the horses, though 
in the procession, do not see the ideas! SusEMIHL, Neue 

Plat, Forsch., Ὁ. 88, says that Rep., X, must be later than 
Phedrus, for in the Phedrus immortality belongs to all 
three parts of the soul! 

20034 BC, 69C ff. 

291 Eth. Nic., 1, 18, 9, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ 
λόγον ἔχον, 

29212 D; cf. Pheedr., 246 A, 

293 863 B, etre re πάθος εἴτε τι μέρος ὧν ὁ θυμός. 

294 Eth, Nic., 1, 18,10, οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν, 
295 68 C, 82 Ὁ. 

3296 “ Entstehung und Komposition der Plat. Politeia,” 
Jahrbicher fir Phil., Suppl., N. F,. Vol. XXIII, pp. 642, 643, 


appetite—which he also embodied in the myths of the Phedrus and the Timeus. 
(4) That, while this classification may be profitably compared with the modern intelli- 
gence, feeling, will, it is beside the mark to criticise it as if it were meant to be 
psychologically exact and exhaustive.” We cannot establish any fixed relation 
between the tripartite soul and the hierarchy of the cognitive faculties—vods (νόησις, 
ἐπιστήμη), διάνοια, δόξα, πίστις, εἰκασία, etc. Plato sometimes treats the inerrant 
reason as a distinct part of the soul from the fallible faculties of sense and opinion.” 
He sometimes associates sense-perception with sensuous appetite in common antithesis 
to the reason.” But he also, when it suits his purpose, virtually identifies (true) 
opinion with reason, in opposition to the impulses of instinct and appetite.” The 
θυμός, though associated with opinion,” cannot be assigned with it to a distinct part 
of the soul.” Nor can it be identified with the ‘‘feeling” of the modern psychologist. 
The will as a faculty distinct from the impulses of appetite and the judgments of the 
reason has no place in Plato’s system. (5) That we cannot fix the time at which the 
notion of the tripartite soul first occurred to Plato, nor may we use apparent variations 
in the mythological dress of the doctrine in order to date the Phedo and Phedrus 
relatively to each other or to the Republic. 

3. The chief changes alleged in Plato’s “later”? psychology are: (a) the abandon- 
ment of ἀνάμνησις; (b) a different conception of the relation of mind and body, more 
particularly as concerns the nature and seat of pleasure and pain; (c) a fuller and 
more precise terminology of the cognitive faculties and the degrees of knowledge. 
This later psychology must be sought chiefly in the Philebus. It is not enough to 
point out that the Philebus is especially rich in psychological detail. The subject 
called for it, and we cannot expect all the dialogues to be equally full in every topic. 
What is required is contradictions of earlier dialogues, or new thoughts not hinted at 
in them. And these are not to be found. 

a) The explanation of the ordinary psychological meaning of ἀνάμνησις in Philebus, 
34 B, no more proves the abandonment of the peculiar Platonic doctrine than does the 
occurrence of the word in that sense in the Republic, 6041). The Phedo itself treats 
the ἀνάμνησις of the ideas as a special case of recollection and association of ideas gen- 
erally, and employs the consecrated phrase τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις of an example that 
fits the definition of the Philebus. Plainly all recollection of the ideas is ἀνάμνησις, 
but all ἀνάμνησις need not be recollection of the ideas. Moreover, as the word occurs 
without the doctrine in the Philebus, so we find the doctrine without the word in the 
Politicus. As the point has been overlooked, it is worth while to dwell upon it. Every 

297See JowETT, Vol. I, p. 410; ZELLER, p. 846; LuTos- 
LAWSEI, p. 278. 

298 The imagery and terminology of Rep., 511 D, 534A, 
belong to the literary machinery of the Republic, and are 
not to be pressed. 

299 Rep., 478 A B, 602 E-608A, τὸ mapa τὰ μέτρα ἄρα δοξάζον 
τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ κατὰ τὰ μέτρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταὐτόν. 

800 Pheedo, 65, 66. 

301 Phileb., 60D; Pheedr., 231 Ὁ ; infra, Ὁ. 48, u. 357. 

302 This is probably the meaning of ἀληθινῆς δόξης ἑταῖρος, 
Phedr., 253D, despite the antithesis ἀλαζονείας ἑταῖρος. 
ἀληθινὴ is used of δόξα = opinion in Theeetet., 1817 C; Phileb., 

303In Tim., 31 BC, δόξαι and πίστεις belong to the circle 
of the θάτερον in the immortal soul. 

30473 Ὁ), 

44 ΤῊΝ Unity or Puato’s THOUGHT 

man, we are told, knows all things as in a dream, though he fails of waking knowl- 
edge.” This at once recalls the μεμαθηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα of the locus classicus 
on ἀνάμνησις, Meno, 81D. In the Meno, too, it is said that this knowledge is at first 
dreamlike, but is converted by the elenchus into true science.” The Politicus goes on 
to show, by the use of Plato’s favorite illustration of letters or “elements,” how it is 
that, despite this antecedent knowledge, we go astray, and how in the study of complex 
and difficult things the right use of example and comparison will enable us to recognize 
the identity of the same form or idea everywhere, so that we shall have a waking and 
not a dreamlike knowledge. Children, knowing their letters in some sort, distinguish 
them rightly in easy combinations, but blunder in long hard syllables, until by compari- 
son with the easy they learn to recognize the same letter everywhere. So our soul, 
similarly affected by nature toward the elements of all things (the ideas), sometimes and 
in some things is settled and fixed by truth concerning each one, but at other times and 
in other things is driven to and fro among them all, and of some it somehow forms 
right opinions among the combinations, but fails to apprehend these same things when 
transferred to the long and difficult syllables of facts. Not only the general drift, but 
the language and imagery of this passage must be understood of the recollections of 
the ideas. The phrase ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ φύσει περὶ TA τῶν πάντων στοιχεῖα 
πεπονθυῖα does not refer mainly or solely to our liability to error, as might be sup- 
posed from Campbell’s ‘‘is naturally liable to the same infirmity,” or from Jowett’s 
‘thas the same uncertainty.” It refers to the whole preceding comparison of which the 
starting-point is that the soul knows all things in a sense, even as the children know 
all their letters imperfectly. That this is the meaning of φύσει... . πεπονθυῖα appears 
further by comparison with Phedrus, 249 E, πᾶσα μὲν ἀνθρώπου ψυχή φύσει τεθέαται 
τὰ ὄντα. The doctrine of ἀνάμνησις, then, repeated in the Politicus, is not abandoned 
in the Philebus. This conclusion might have been affirmed a priori. For “recollec- 
tion,” once indissolubly associated with the ideas and the pre-existence of the soul, 
would not be given up while they were retained. But pre-existence is assumed in the 
Laws,” and the ideas, as we have seen, occur in the Politicus* and are reaffirmed in 
the Timeus, which also implies the soul’s prior knowledge of all things, in language 
recalling the Phedrus and Politicus.™ 

b) The general problem of the relation of mind and body is involved in that of 
immortality and the parts of the soul. As we have seen, the Timeus, though it assigns 
separate seats to the mortal and immortal soul, declines to dogmatize without the assur- 

805 277 D, κινδυνεύει yap ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οἷον ὄναρ εἰδὼς ἅπαντα 
αὖ πάλιν ὥσπερ ὕπαρ ἀγνοεῖν, RITCHIE, p. 148, misapprehends 
this passage when he associates it with the “119 of approxi- 
mation.’”> We must use examples, not because in difficult 
matters it is permissible to fall back upon “picture- 
thinking and symbolism,” but because only by beginning 
with easy examples can we learn how to convert our dream- 
like knowledge into real knowledge. The yép introduces 
the whole parallel, of which the dreamlike knowledge of 
all things is only the first point. 

306 Meno, 85 C, ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἄρτι κεκίνηνται ai δόξαι αὗται, 

307 Repub., 402A Β; cf Soph., 253A; Phileb., 1856; Thee- 
tet., 201 E; Tim., 48 B, etc. 

308 278 E, τέχνῃ γνωρίζειν, iva ὕπαρ ἀντ᾽ ὀνείρατος ἡμῖν 

809 904, 905. 

310 Supra, p. 39. 

31141 E, τὴν τοῦ παντὸς φύσιν ἔδειξε. 


ance of a god, and the Laws leaves it an open question whether the parts of the soul 
are real parts or functions."” Of the dependence of our cognitive faculties on bodily 
organs Plato knew as much or as little as we know.”® In the images of the wax tablet 
and aviary he anticipates all psychologies that explain memory, association, and recol- 
lection, and the distinction between latent and actual knowledge, by material analogies.” 
But sheer materialism and sensationalism he rejects, for many other reasons” and 
because it fails to account for the synthetic unity of thought."° The senses are the organs 
through which, not the faculties by which, we know.” Sometimes and for some purposes 
he exalts pure thought freed from all contaminations of sense."* In other moods, he 
recognizes that human thought takes its start from αἴσθησις or immediate perception.” 
He points out that the contradictions of sense give the first awakening stimulus to the 
generalizing activities of mind.” He admits that our minds are too weak to attain to 
knowledge without experience,” and require the aid of concrete examples in order to 
apprehend difficult abstractions.” We can recover the prenatal vision of the ideas only 
by association with their sensuous “copies,” or by strenuous logical discipline.” And, 
though knowledge is not sense-perception, sense-perception is the best evidence that 
we have of some things.** Only a very literal-minded criticism will treat these con- 
cessions as a contradiction of the apotheosis of pure thought in the Phedo. 

Slightly more plausible is the claim that Plato contradicts himself in regard to the 
nature and seat of desire, pleasure, and pain.” The “early” Gorgias and the “late” 
Philebus explicitly affirm that the soul, not the body, is the seat of desire.”” The Philebus 
adds the psychological reason that desire is dependent on memory.™’ The Philebus 
further explains pleasure and pain as mental states arising from changes in the body 
sudden enough or violent enough to affect the mind and pass the threshold of con- 
sciousness, in modern phrase.” Pain results from movements unfavorable to the 
“natural” condition of the body, pleasure from those that preserve or restore the natural 

312 Supra, o. 293; cf. also Rep., 612A, εἴτε πολυειδὴς εἴτε 
μονοειδής, Pheedr., 271A. 

313 Phedo, 9% BC, πότερον τὸ αἷμά ἐστιν ᾧ φρονοῦμεν, ἢ ὃ 
ἀὴρ ἣ τὸ πῦρ, etc. Note the irony of the whole passage. 

314 Thecetet., 191 Ὁ ff. (cf. Pheedr., 275A, τύπων), 197 Ὁ, 
197 B-200 B. 

315 Phoedo, 80B, 96; Phileb., 30; Tim., 51C; Laws, 889. 

316 Thecetet., 184 Ὁ). 

317 Theeetet., 184C; Phoedo, 65D, 196; Tim., 67B. 

318 Pheedo, 65C (cf. Thecetet., 187A), 66A, εἱλικρινεῖ τῇ 
διανοίᾳ; 67C, τὸ χωρίζειν ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν 

319 Thecetet., 119 C, τὸ παρὸν ἑκάστῳ πάθος ἐξ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις 
καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι. Charm., 159 Α, αἴσθησίν τινα παρέχειν, 
ἐξ ἧς δόξα ἂν τίς σοι περὶ αὐτῆς εἴη. Phileb., 249 Β, ἐκ πολλῶν 
ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἕν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον. 

320 Rep., 524 BC; Theeetet., 186A B. 

321 Theeetet., 149C, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ 
λαβεῖν τέχνην ὧν ἂν ἢ ἄπειρος. 

822 Polit., 211 Ὁ. Cf. Pheedr., 262C, ψιλῶς πὼς λέγομεν 

οὐκ ἔχοντες ἱκανὰ παραδείγματα. 

323 Pheedo, 715A; Polit., 286A; Rep., 533A, καὶ ὅτι ἡ τοῦ 
διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις μόνη ἂν φήνειεν ἐμπείρῳ ὄντι ὧν νῦν δὴ 
διήλθομεν. Tim., 41 A, τῶν νῦν λόγων περὶ τοῦ παντὸς λεγομένων 
οὐδεὶς ἄν ποτε ἐρρήθη μήτε ἄστρα μήτε ἥλιον μήτε οὐρανὸν ἰδόντων. 

824 Thecetet., 301 B, ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι ἄλλως δὲ 
μὴ. Sophist, 234), καὶ διὰ παθημάτων ἀναγκαζομένους ἐναργῶς 
ἐφάπτεσθαι τῶν ὄντων. The whole passage is in seeming con- 
tradiction with the thought of Pheedo, 100A, and Rep., 473A, 
that words (thought) come nearer to truth than deeds. See 
also Meno, $7B. 

825Grote, Jowett, Mr. Henry Jackson, and others. 
Horn, who rejects the Philebus, says (p. 380) that it assigns 
desire to the soul, but pain and pleasure to the body, 

326 Gorg., 493A, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσί, So 
Tim., 6906. 

327 35, 

328 33, 34,43 BC. Of. Rep., 462C, 584C, at ye διὰ τοῦ σώμα- 
τος ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνουσαι καὶ λεγόμεναι ἡδοναὶ. Cf, Laws, 
673 A, μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς ; Tim., 45 D (of sensations). 

46 Tue Unity oF PLaAto’s THovuGuat 

state.“ This is also the doctrine of the Timeus, and it is not contradicted anywhere. 
In ethical and religious discussion, however, it is natural to identify the “soul” with the 
higher intelligence, νοῦς or immortal soul, and to speak of the pleasures of the mortal 
soul which come through the body and are necessitated by the body as pleasures of 
the body. And Plato, though usually scrupulously precise,” occasionally permits 
himself this inexact way of speaking. The Philebus enumerates three kinds of mixed 
pleasures and pains: (1) merely mental, as in the pleasurable-painful emotions; (2) 
merely bodily; (3) those that arise when pleasure of mind accompanies pain of body, 
or the reverse.” In a few cases the “bodily” pleasures are spoken of as if they were 
literally in or of the body.*” But Plato was justified in assuming that only a careless 
or captious reader would misunderstand him. For hardly three pages back he had 
explained that bodily states produce pleasure and pain only when they cross the 
threshold of consciousness.“ There are also two or three cases in the Phedo. In 
the first the phrase “appetites of the body” is used in a highly wrought, ethical pas- 
sage precisely as it might be employed by a modern preacher, with no implication of 
psychological doctrine.“ The second occurs in the refutation of the hypothesis that 
the soul may be a “harmony” of material states or elements. To refute this objection 
Socrates employs the very argument used in the Republic to distinguish νοῦς from 
ἐπιθυμία and θυμός. 5 The soul cannot be identical with that which it rebukes and 
controls as a superior. The soul, instead of being controlled, ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος 
παθῶν, is master of them. Therefore it cannot be a “harmony” composed of them. 
The appetites are treated as material παθήματα in order to refute, in its own termi- 
nology, the hypothesis that the soul is a composition of material παθήματα. The 
argument would lose its force if stated in the terminology of the Republic. If the 
tripartite soul were explicitly recognized, it would be necessary, first, to decide which 
parts are to be immortal; secondly, to prove directly, and not by the equivocal substi- 
tution of “bodily” appetites for states of matter, that the νοῦς or soul cannot be a 
harmony of material elements. For these reasons, in the Pheedo, soul, tacitly identified 
with νοῦς, is opposed to body as a whole, including the appetites. But the literary 
and esthetic necessity of this way of speaking having once been perceived, we cannot 
treat it as a contradiction of the psychological truth clearly stated in the “earlier” 

329 Phileb., 31D ff., 42D; Tim., 64 CD, 666, 68A. Im- 
plied perhaps “already” in Cratyl., 419C, ἥ τε λύπη ἀπὸ τῆς 
διαλύσεως τοῦ σώματος. Aristotle, Eth. Nic., 10, 3,6, contro- 
verting the doctrine that pleasure is a γένεσις, says: εἰ 

ἐν τῷ κοινῷ... γένει is merely preparatory to the explana- 
tion that they are the psychic correlates of beneficial or 
harmful changes in the body. It is obviously no contra- 
diction of the reference of ἡδονή to the ἄπειρον in 31B. Cf. 

δή ἐστι τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἀναπλήρωσις ἡδονὴ, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀναπλήρωσις, 
τοῦτ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἥδοιτο" οὐ δοκεῖ δέ, where οὐ δοκεῖ 
expresses as often Plato’s opinion. 

330 Phileb., 39D, τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἡδονῶν, So 45B, 
Phedo, 65A; Tim., 64A; Rep., 584C, 485 D; Phileb., 454, 
ai περὶ τὸ σῶμα. So Pheedr.,258E. Cf., Cratyl., 404A; Rep., 
442A; Tim., 64A; Phileb., 41C, τὸ σῶμα ἣν τὸ παρεχόμενον; 
Rep., 584A, τό ye ἡδὺ ἐν ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον; 442 A, 

331 47 E-50D, 46 C, 47C Ὁ. 

33246BC, 50D. So Prodicus in Protag., 337C. The 
statement, Phileb., 31B, that pleasure and pain originate 

τὸ σῶμα ἄρα" 

A, J P., Vol. IX, No. 3, p. 284. 

33343 BC. Cf. 33D, θὲς τῶν περὶ τὸ copa... . παθημάτων 
τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβεννύμενα πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελθεῖν. 
This is the doctrine of Τίπι., 64A BC, and it is “" already” 
implied in Thecetet., 186C, ὅσα διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ 
τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει, Philed., 55 B, explicitly affirms that pleas- 
ure is in the soul only: πῶς οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστι μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι 
+ oes πλὴν ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡδονὴν μόνον. 

334 66 Ο,, καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο 
παρέχει ἣ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτον ἐπιθυμίαι. 

335 Pheedo, 948 ff.; Rep., 441 B, 390 D. 


Gorgias and ‘later’ Philebus. One might as well argue that the tenth book of the 
Republic antedates or abandons the tripartite soul because the doctrine is ignored in 
the proof of immortality attempted there. 

c) Lastly it is sometimes affirmed that the later dialogues show an increased preci- 
sion in the use of psychological terminology. In fact, however, Plato’s psychological 
vocabulary is nowhere technical. He is content to make his meaning plain by the 
context. Nor can we find in Spinoza or Kant or in any modern text-book the consist- 
ent precision that is sometimes demanded of Plato. There is no modern terminology 
which sharply discriminates mental states that are or are not supposed to involve the 
element of judgment and belief. There is none that shows independently of the 
context the precise line intended to be drawn between sensation and perception, 
or distinguishes revived and compounded “images” from “images” regarded as 
immediate impressions. We cannot, then, expect Plato to emphasize distinctions not 
needed for his immediate purpose, but if we bear this in mind, we shall find no serious 
inconsistencies or significant variations in his use of such terms as αἴσθησις δόξα and 

Αἴσθησις is any immediate sensation or perception or consciousness including 
pleasure and pain and Locke’s inner sense.“ As sense-perception it is rightly said to 
involve judgment,™ and so issues in δόξα, opinion or belief. The word δόξα may 
be used in this neutral, psychological sense; it may be taken unfavorably to denote 
mere opinion as opposed to knowledge, or favorably when true opinions and beliefs are 
set in antithesis to the appetites and instincts. These shades of meaning arise 
naturally out of Greek usage, and would call for no comment if they had not been cited 
to convict Plato of inconsistency or change. The mental process that terminates in 
the affirmation or negation that constitutes δόξα may be expressed in words, λόγος, Ὁ 
or take place in silent thought. In the second case it is ddvova—a discourse in the 
soul." Διάνοια, then, mere or silent thought, may be opposed to speech™ or to 
thought accompanied or interrupted by sensation. It is thus often a synonym of 
pure thought.“* But the Republic, in default of a better term,” employs it to denote 

336 Thecetet., 156 B, 186 DE, 152BC; Phileb., 34A; Charm., 340 Phileb., 38H, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὕτως ὃ τότε δόξαν 


337 Rep., 528 Β, ὡς ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κρινόμενα, 
Phileb., 38 Ὁ, πολλάκις ἰδόντι... .. βούλεσθαι κρίνειν φαίης ἂν 
ταῦθ’ ἅπερ ὁρᾷ. This is not quite the modern psychologist’s 
recognition of the judgment involved in perception, but it 
leads up to Aristotle’s characterization of sensation as 
δύναμιν σύμφυτον κριτικήν. Analyt. Post., in fine. 

338 Phileb., 38 B, ἐκ μνήμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως δόξα, Phoedo, 
ἐκ τούτων (sc. the senses) δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη καὶ δόξα. Charm., 
1594, αἴσθησιν... ἐξ ἧς δόξα. In Theetet., 170B, ἀληθῇ 
διάνοιαν... ψευδῇ δόξαν, διάνοια and δόξα are virtually 

339 Phileb., 60D, μνήμην καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἀληθῆ δόξαν τῆς 
αὐτῆς ἰδέας τιθέμενος, Pheedr., 281 Ὁ, ἔμφντος ἐπιθυμία... .. 
ἐπίκτητος δόξα. Tim., 71B. In Theeetet., 187A, δοξάζειν is 
almost the pure thought of Phedo, 65C. 


341 Phileb., 38D; Thecetet., 189 ἘΠ 190A. Soph., 268 Ἐ, 
διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταὐτόν πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὑτὴν 
διάλογος, etc, 

342 Soph., 238 B, 264A. 

343 Thecetet., 195C D; Rep., 511 C, διανοίᾳ μὲν... ἀλλὰ μὴ 
αἰσθήσεσιν. In Phedo, 73D, it is the (memory) imagination 
of modern psychology: καὶ ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔλαβον τὸ εἶδος τοῦ 
παιδός; in Rep., 603C, it is the mind, including higher and 
lower faculties. 

344 Phoedo, 66A, εἱλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ; 65H, αὐτὸ ἕκαστον 
διανοηθῆναι. In Thecetet., 195 Ὁ Ἐς, we pass from an image 
of a man, ὃν διανοούμεθα μόνον, ὁρῶμεν δ' οὔ, to abstractions as 
τὰ ἕνδεκα ἃ μηδὲν ἄλλοϊῇ διανοεϊταίτις ; of. Rep., 526 A, ὧν διανοη- 
θῆναι μόνον ἐγχωρεῖ, 

315 533 D, οὐ περὶ ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις. 

48 THE Unity ΟΡ Puato’s THOUGHT 

the processes of mathematics and the sciences, which are inferior to the pure thought, 
νοῦς, of dialectic, in that they depend on sensuous imagery and hypotheses.” 

Plato describes memory images,’ and images of “imagination.” But he has 
no term for imagination as a faculty intermediate between abstract or verbal thought, 
on the one hand, and sense-perception, on the other. For φαντασία takes its color 
from φαίνεται and φαντάξεται, which include all forms of opinion and illusion, and it is 
often merely a disparaging synonym of δόξα. But φαίνεται, though applicable to 
any notion that appears true, is most naturally used of the appearances of sense, and 
so φαντασία is preferably the form of δόξα that accompanies sense-perception,” and 
may be defined as σύμμιξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξας δ Pure infallible knowledge as an 
ideal must be sharply distinguished even from true opinion.” Strictly speaking, it 
cannot be defined,® and is unattainable in this life. Poetically it may be described 
as the vision of the ideas, and we may be said to approximate to it in proportion as we 
“recollect” the ideas by severe dialectic.” Practically knowledge is true opinion, 
sifted and tested by dialectic, and fixed by causal reasoning.’ ‘True opinion”? may 
be disparaged in contrast with the ideal, or praised as a necessary stage toward its 
attainment.*’ It is a very mechanical criticism that finds contradiction or inconsist- 
ency here. 

There is no limit to the contradictions or developments that a false subtlety can 
discover in Plato’s psychology. Most of them are by implication explained away in 
the foregoing summary. I will close with two or three further examples which must 
stand for all. 

Susemihl* argues that the Thewtetus marks an advance on the psychology of the 
Phedrus because it includes Wahrnehmungsurtheile in δοκεῖν or δόξα. But the 
Theetetus itself elsewhere attributes them to αἴσθησις, for only so could it identify 
Protagoras’s theory with the definition αἴσθησις = ἐπιστήμη. As we have seen, the 
distinction is futile, for αἴσθησις may at any time be the modern sense-perception, 

846 Rep., 511.D, 534A. See Idea of Good, pp. 230 ff. 
347 Phileb., 39C; Pheedo, 73D; Theeetet., 191 Ὁ, ἕως ἂν 

ἐνῇ τὸ εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ, atc. 

848 Phileb., 890, περι... .. τῶν μελλόντων; 40AB, and 
the fantastic account of the functions of the liver, Tim., 
71AB. Grote, expecting the modern atomistic order: sen- 
sation, image, idea, judgment, is surprised that in Phileb., 
39, memory and sensation first write λόγοι in the soul, and 
that, secondly, a painter supervenes who paints images of 
these λόγοι and the corresponding δόξαι, But it is charac- 
teristic of Plato to put the image after the idea, the word, 
and the judgment everywhere. Moreover, the images here 
are not the primary images of perception, which are in- 
cluded in Plato’s αἴσθησις, but imaginative visualizations 
of beliefs and hopes. In the mature human mind this is 
probably the real order: (1) sensation (perception), (2) 
faint verbal judgments, (3) vivifying of specially interest- 
ing judgments by imaginative visualization. 

349 Thecetet., 161 E, ἐλέγχειν τὰς ἀλλήλων φαντασίας τε καὶ 

350 Thecetet., 152 C, φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὸν ἔν τε 
θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις, Soph., 264 A, ὅταν μὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν 
ἁλλὰ δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως παρῇ τινὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον αὖ πάθος; i.e. it is here 
not ἃ memory image, but a percept accompanied by belief, 

351 Soph., 264B. Hence here 263 Ὁ, φαντασία, and Phileb., 
40 A, φαντάσματα (—imaginations or imaged expectations) 
are said to admit truth and falsehood. Modern atomistic 
psychology sometimes conceives “Δ images’’ as mere pictures 
involving no affirmation or belief. Aristotle seems to ex- 
press this view in De Anima, 432a, 10, ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ φαντασία 
ἕτερον φάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως, But in 428a, 12, thinking of 
Philebus, 40A B, he says, ai δὲ φαντασίαι γίνονται ai πλείους 

352 Tim., 51 DE. 353 Thecetetus, infra; supra, p. 43. 

354 Pheedo, 66, 67; Laws, 897 D, ὡς νοῦν ποτὲ θνητοῖς ὄμμασιν 

355 Supra, n. 823, 
851 Supra, n. 301. 
358 Neue Plat. Forsch., p. 52. 

356 Infra, on the Theetet. 

39 200 fF. 


including judgment, and δόξα may always be used either of the belief that accompa- 
nies αἴσθησις, or of the operation of the mind as opposed to sensation. 

Campbell thinks the rejection in Politicus, 281 Ο Ὁ, of καλλίστην καὶ μεγίστην 
πασῶν as a satisfactory definition is an advance on Theetet., 207 D, where the sun is 
defined as the brightest luminary, etc. But the point is simply that made “already” 
against Gorgias’s μέγιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων as a definition of the matter of 
rhetoric.” Again, Campbell thinks the mention of δόξαν and φαντασίαν in Sophist, 
260 E, as distinct faculties implies an advance on the Theetetus. But the Thectetus 
does not identify the words by using them once or twice as virtual synonyms. The 
Sophist, 264 A, temporarily distinguishes φαντασία as a judgment present to the mind, 
δι’ aicOjcews,” while δόξα is a judgment, ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ διάνοιαν... μετὰ σιγῆς. 
But to press this would prove too much by distinguishing the Sophist from the late 
Philebus also. 

Lastly, Lutoslawski argues” that the Phedrus and Theetetus are later than the 
Republic, because they familiarly employ δύναμις in a sense first explained in Republic, 
477C. He overlooks Protag., 330A, and the five occurrences of the word in Char- 
mides, 168, in a passage fully as metaphysical and abstract as that cited from the 
Republic. Indeed, the case cited from the Phedrus, 246 D, πτεροῦ δύναμις, is a mere 
periphrasis like ἥ τε τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις, 248 C, and of the two cases from the Thectetus, 
158 E closely resembles the Charmides, using the word in the vague general sense of 
power or potentiality, and 1850, ἥ ye διὰ τῆς γλώττης δύναμις, uses it of the senses, as 
do the Charmides, 168 Ὁ (ἀκοή, ὄψις), the Republic, 477 C (ὄψιν καὶ ἀκοήν), and the 
Protagoras, 330A (ὀφθαλμός ὦτα). Of equal value are the developments which 
Lutoslawski finds in the use of διαλεκτική, φιλοσοφία μέθοδος, ἡ τῶν λόγων τέχνη, etc.™ 


The dialogues were composed in some order, and a study of their parallels, coinci- 
dences, or variations in thought will often seem to indicate the plausible, ‘possibly the 
real, historic sequence. That is not the purpose of this paper. I wish to show (1) 
that our conception of Plato’s philosophy is not appreciably affected by placing the 
dialectical dialogues—the Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, and possibly the Parmenides 
and Thecetetus—after, rather than before, the Republic; (2) that the evidence is at 
present insufficient to date the dialogues of the “earlier” and “middle” Platonism, 
and that, again, from the point of view of the interpretation of the content, it does not 
greatly matter. The chief value of such negative results is that the way to them lies 
through a further positive interpretation of Plato’s true meanings. 

There are certain perennial puzzles of language or thought that present them- 

360 Gorg., 451 Ὁ E. “In earlier works Plato used the term soul as free from 
361 Cf, 158 C; γα, p. 48, τιν 850, every ambiguity. Here we see already a trace of doubts 

Cf. Thecetet., 1580 ; supra, p. 48, u about the existence of the 500]. He might as well say 
362 Pp, 331, 396. that the existence of the soul is called in question by Crito, 

363 Cf, the statement, p. 373, ἃ propos of the innocent 48 A, ἐκεῖνο ὃ τι ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ, etc., or by Symp., 218A, τὴν καρδίαν 
phrase, Thecetet., 184 0, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε 6 τι δεῖ καλεῖν that: ἣ ψυχὴν γὰρ ἢ ὅ τι δεῖ ὀνομάσαι. 

50 THE Unity oF Puato’s THouGHT 

selves to Plato in three forms: as mere eristic sophisms; as hindrances to a sound 
logical method; as serious problems of epistemology and metaphysics. They may be 
roughly enumerated as the problem of Being and not-Being, or the true nature of 
predication and negation; the antithesis in thought and things of the one and the 
many, the whole and the part, permanency and change, rest and motion; the nature 
and possibility of real knowledge, and the meaning of consciousness of self. They are 
all directly or indirectly involved in the theory of ideas, but we may also study them 
in the group of dialogues in which they are most prominent. 

The Huthydemus presents a broad burlesque of all the chief sophisms of eristic. 
The Parmenides systematically exposes all the antinomies concerning the one and the 
many, the whole and the part, rest and motion, that can be deduced from the abuse of 
the ambiguity of the copula. The Thectetus covers with persiflage the forms of 
eristic associated with one-sided theories of knowledge, especially materialism and 
extreme Heracliteanism, and makes a serious effort to solve the epistemological prob- 
lem. Here perhaps, and here only, does the Socratic avowal of perplexity express 
Plato’s own state of mind. The Sophist makes explicit the lessons implied in the 
Parmenides and Thecetetus, and finally disposes of fourth-century eristic so far as it 
affects the presuppositions of practical logic and sound method. The Politicus applies 
the method of the Sophist to the definition of the true statesman, reaffirming from a 
different point of view, and perhaps with less confidence in the ideal, the chief doc- 
trines of the Republic. The Philebus restates the true logical method that emerges 
from eristic or metaphysical debate and applies it to the ethical problem of the 
summum bonum. 

We will begin with the Sophist, which contains the fullest exposition of method 
and the most explicit analysis of the fundamental eristic sophism. For our purpose 
there are three topics; (1) the method of definition by dichotomy; (2) the problem of 
Being and not-Being; (3) the logical and grammatical analysis of the sentence. 

1. The formal dichotomies of the Sophist and Politicus lend these dialogues a 
very un-Platonic aspect. They may be said to be characteristic of Plato’s “later” 
style, so far as this can be true of a feature that is less prominent in the Laws than it 
is in the Gorgias or Phedrus. Their significance for Plato’s later thought is very 
slight. To understand this we must distinguish the elaboration of a definition by 
successive dichotomies from the more general logical use of distinction, division, and 
classification. Aristotle is at great pains to prove that the method of dichotomy 
assumes and does not establish the definition.“ His criticism may have been needed 
against literal-minded pupils of the Academy. Plato obviously is amusing himself 
by playing with the method.” He clearly recognizes that formally correct dichoto- 
mies may lead to half-a-dozen definitions of the same object.’ All depends upon the 
tact with which the original ‘‘one,” the concept to be divided, is chosen,* and the 

364 Anal. Pr., 31; Anal. Post., ΤΙ, 5; Part. An.,1, 2 ff. 367 Ibid., 232 Β, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναλάβωμεν ἕν πρῶτον τῶν περὶ τὸν 
365 See BONITZ, pp. 180 ff. σοφιστὴν εἰρημένων, ἕν γάρ τί μοι μάλιστα κατεφάνη αὐτὸν 
366 Soph., 381. HEU ON: 


insight that selects at each turn™ the most significant principle of subdivision. The 
process of dichotomy is only a mechanical aid to exhaustive search and the discovery 
of all relevant distinctions.’ The elaboration of it as a method of definition in the 
Sophist and Politicus is a mere episode. It is not followed up in the Philebus, 
Timceus, or Laws, and is therefore of no importance for Plato’s “later” thought. 

A very different thing is the broader use of the method for the avoidance of 
eristic equivocation and the correction of hasty generalization or inarticulate empiri- 
cism. To distinguish and divide for these purposes is still the only way of clear 
thought and accurate speech, and Plato’s insistence upon it as the one principle of 
logical salvation is worthy of the keenest dialectician that ever lived. But in this 
larger use the method κατ᾽ εἴδη τέμνειν is by no means confined to the Sophist and 
Politicus. There are hints of it in the Symposium.” The Gorgias employs it with 
some ostentation.” It is found in the Phedo,™” the Cratylus,” and the Thectetus.™ 
Its terminology and use are familiar to the Republic.” Most explicit is the Phedrus, 
which not only makes an ostentatious display of divisions and subdivisions,” but 
describes the entire procedure of true method in language that closely resembles the 
summing up of the whole matter found in the Philebus.” But side by side with 

368 Note κατιδεῖν, Soph., 232A; Polit., 266 E, etc. 

369The imagery of the Sophist and Politicus implies 
this throughout. Cy. Soph., 235C; Polit., 258 C, 260 E, 262 A, 
τὸ ζητούμενον ἐν διπλασίοισι τὰ viv ἐν τοῖς ἡμίσεσιν εἰς τότε 
ποιήσει ζητεῖσθαι; Soph., 229 Ὁ, εἰ ἄτομον ἤδη ἐστὶ πᾶν, ἢ τινα 
ἔχον διαίρεσιν ἀξίαν ἐπωνυμίας; Pheedr., 227B, κατ᾽ εἴδη μέχρι 
τοῦ ἀτμήτου τέμνειν; Phileb., 18, 14 Β, τὴν τοίνυν διαφορότητα; 
etc. ᾿ 

810 Symp., Ὧ05 ΒΟ), ἀφελόντες... .. τι εἶδος... ἕν 
μόριον ἀφορισθὲν τὸ περὶ... .. οἱ μὲν ἄλλῃ τρεπόμενοι... . . οἱ 
δὲ κατὰ ἕν τι εἶδος ἰόντες, Cf. Polit., 262 Ὁ, τὸ μὲν... .. 

. ἀφαιροῦντες... καὶ γένος ἕν αὐτὸ εἶναι, Soph., 222A, 
ἐκτρέπεσθον; Polit.,258C; Tim., 60, γένος ἐκ πάντων ἀφορισθέν; 
Soph., 229 C, 251 Ο, 268 Ὁ. 

371 454 Ἐ;, δύο εἴδη θῶμεν. The two εἴδη are denoted, as in 
the Sophist, by adjectives in -κός, 455A, frequent also in 
pp. 464, 465. Socrates’s humorous definition of rhetoric, 
pp. 462 ff., is in the vein of the Sophist. It starts from the 
alternative art (science) or not-art, 462BC, like Soph., 
219A; Polit., 258 B. It is found to be a branch of the 
pseudo-art κολακευτική, which is divided τέτραχα, corre- 
sponding to a four-fold division of art obtained by two 
successive sub-divisions. Similarly Sophistic is finally 
found to be a part, μόριον, Soph., 268 D, of the quadripartite 

37219 A, θῶμεν... .. δυό εἴδη, etc.; 90B, ἄνεν τῆς περὶ τοὺς 
λόγους τέχνης; 15 D, οἷς ἐπισφραγιζόμεθα τοῦτο ὃ ἔστι. Cf. Phileb., 
26D; Polit., 258 C. 

373In 424C D, the division of letters xara εἴδη and the 
subdivision of these εἴδη is the method of Philebus, 18 BC. 
Weare further required to examine the things to be named 
by letters and see εἰ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔνεστιν εἴδη, and then apply one 
set of εἴδη to the other, precisely as in Phaedrus, 277B. 

ws εν 

374147 D, ἐπειδὴ ἄπειροι τὸ πλῆθος, ... ξυλλαβεῖν εἰς ἐν 
(cf. Phileb., 18 B, ὅταν τις τὸ ἄπειρον ἀναγκασθῇ πρῶτον λαμβά- 
νειν, etc.); 147 E, τὸν ἀριθμὸν παντα δίχα διελάβομεν, etc. 

375 397 B, τὰ δύο εἴδη; 440 E, 445. In 454 Α, eristic arises 
διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ᾽ εἴδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, 
precisely as in Polit., 285A. Cf. Phileb.,17A; Soph., 253 Ὁ. 
Again, cf. Rep., 470B, δύο ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα... ὄντα ἐπὶ 
δνοῖν τινοῖν διαφοραῖν; 582 BE, κατὰ ποῖα δὴ εἴδη διέστηκεν; with 
which cf. 504A; Phileb., 23D, and Polit., 2600, τὴν... .. 
τέχνην... θεατέον εἴ πῃ διέστηκεν with context. Compare 
further 544 Ὁ Ὁ, ἥ τις καὶ ἐν εἴδει διαφανεῖ τινὶ κεῖται with 
Polit., 285 B, διαφορὰς... . ὁπόσαιπερ ἐν εἴδεσι κεῖνται; 580 Ὦ, 
διήρηται κατὰ τρία εἴδη, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴ . . . . τριχῇ. 

376 244 EK, 253C, 210 B, 271 Ὁ. 

8111 is often affirmed (Jowett, Natorp, Jackson, Bury, 
etc.) that the method of the Philebus, Politicus, and Sophist 
is more advanced than that of the Phedrus, in which “ the 
complementary methods of generalization and division are 
applied merely to the discovery of Socratic definitions 
with a view to consistency in the use of debatable terms.” 
Well, the subject of the Phedrus being the necessity of 
basing rhetoric upon definitions and dialectic, that point 
is naturally emphasized there (265 D, iv’ ἕκαστον ὁριζόμενος 
δῆλον ποιῇ, περὶ οὗ ἂν ἀεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλῃ). But all tbeories 
of a sharp distinction between the method of the Phadrus 
and that of the “later” dialogues will only injure the 
scholarship of their propounders. The Phedrus requires 
τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῶν ὄντων διειδέναι (262A; cf. Soph., 281 A, δεῖ 
πάντων μάλιστα περὶ τὰς ὁμοιότητας ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακήν; 
Phileb., 13AB). To do this we must know ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον 
τῶν ὄντων (262B). The method is twice described (265, 266, 
and 270D). We must first reduce to unity τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσ- 
παρμένα (265D; cf. Phileb., 16D, ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς 
ἑκάστοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν; cf. 26D). This unity we are to 
divide κατ᾽ ἄρθρα ἡ πέφυκε (265E; cf. Polit., 262, and with 
xatayvivat of. Polit., 287 C, 265 Ὁ, καταθραύειν) and subdivide 
(266 A, τέμνων οὐκ ἐπανῆκε), distinguishing and following up 
separately the right- and left-hand paths (266A, δεξιὰ. . . 
ἀριστερὰ; cf. Soph., 264 E, πορεύεσθαι κατὰ τοὐπὶ δεξιὰ ἀεὶ μέρος 
τοῦ τμηθέντος), till the object of our search and of our praise 

δ2 Tue ὈΝΙΤΥ oF Puato’s THouGHT 

what seems to us the purely logical treatment of the ideas as conceptual genera and 
species, the Phedrus pictures the prenatal vision of them; the Republic announces 
the most naive realism with regard to any and every universal; and the Timeus sol- 
emnly reaffirms their objectivity.” In the face of these facts, it is impossible to 
maintain that the dichotomies of the Sophist are evidence of a later doctrine in which 
the transcendental or naively realistic idea is discarded for the genera and species of 
conceptual logic. The emphasis and center of interest may shift from dialogue to 
dialogue—the doctrine remains the same. 

But the opposition between the two points of view cannot be denied or en cate 
The noumenal idea is one. But not only as reflected in things, but as sub 
logic, it is many. By a natural and inevitable metaphor both “Plato and ela 
‘speak of particulars and lower species as parts of the higher conceptual whole to which 
they are subordinated. By the theory of ideas, as we have said, each of these parts, 
every subordinate concept, is an idea, not only the swmmum genus and the lowest 
species, as animal and dog, but the intermediate groups, mammal and quadruped, etc. 
The Aristotelian objection that the one dog will thus embody a whole series of ideas 
we have dismissed with the metaphysics of the subject. The relation of the particular 
to the idea is a mystery. And once we have accepted the metaphors “presence,” 
“participation,” ‘“pattern,’’ a number of ideas can be reflected by or present in one 
thing as easily as can one idea. 

But the elaboration of logical and scientific classification brings up the difficulty 
in a new and more specific form less easily evaded. For the theory of ideas any and 
every subordinate group apprehended as a conceptual unit by the mind is an idea.™ 
For sound logical and scientific classification only true genera and species are ideas— 
not necessarily “true species” in the sense of the modern naturalist, but in the sense 
of the Platonic logic; that is, classes and groups based on significant and relevant 
distinctions. From the one point of view we expect every part to be an idea; from the 
other, Plato explicitly warns us against mistaking for true ideas what are mere frag- 

ments or parts.” 

and blame is found (266A; cf. Soph., 285C, ξννακολουθεῖν 
. ἕωσπερ ἂν ληφθῇ). He who can thus 
look εἰς ἐν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ is a dialectician (266 ΒΟ; cf. Par- 
men., 182 A, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι; Soph., 
235 C, τὴν τῶν οὕτω δυναμένων μετιέναι καθ᾽ ἕκαστά τε καὶ ἐπὶ 
πάντα μέθοδον), Again, looking at it from the point of view 
of science rather than of rhetoric and dialectic (270), the 
object of investigation is either simple or manifold. If 
it has many εἴδη, we must enumerate them (270 D, ταῦτα ἀριθ- 
μησαμένους; cf. Phileb., 16D, πρὶν dv τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ 
πάντα κατίδῃ τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἑνός), and treat 

αὐτῷ διαιροῦντας... 

each subordinate ἕν (cf. Phileb., 16D, και τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων ἕκα-- 

στον πάλιν ὡσαύτως) as we do the original unity—i. e., study 
its potentialities (δύναμις, active or passive; cf. Soph., 
247D ἘΠ in relation to other things. Rhetoric is a special 
psychological application of this general scientific method. 
It is one method which is described in Pheedr., 265, 266, 
2170D; Phileb., 16-18; Cratyl., 424C; Soph., 226C, 285 Ο, 253, 

His embarrassment shows that he felt the difficulty. Sound 

etc.; Polit., 285 A, etc.; Laws, 894A A, 968, 965. Each 
dialogue brings out some aspect of it less emphasized in 
the others. We cannot expect Plato to repeat himself 
verbatim. But these variations have little or no signifi- 
cance for the evolution of his thought. 

378 Supra, Ὁ. 35, u. 238; p. 87, u. 256, 
819 Rep., 596 A., 479 D; Soph., 225 C, ταῦτα θετέον μὲν εἶδος, 

ἐπεῖπερ αὐτὸ διέγνωκεν ὡς ἕτερον ὃν ὁ λόγος, ἀτὰρ ἐπωνυμίας. 

οὔτε νῦν ὑφ᾽ ἡμῶν τυχεῖν ἄξιον, Phileb.,18C D, the δεσμός. δὲ 
association in our minds makes a unity, and hence an idea 
of γραμματική. 

380 Polit., 287C, implied ‘‘ already” in Pheedr., 265 E; 
cf. Polit., 262 B, ἀλλὰ τὸ μέρος ἅμα εἶδος ἐχέτω, We are more 
likely to ‘meet with ideas’’ if we bisect the universal 
(μεσοτομεῖν) and proceed by successive dichotomies, than if 
we attempt to separate the ultimate species at once. Cf. 
the insistence on τὰ μέσα in Phileb., 17 A. 

Pau SHOREY 53 

method required him to emphasize the distinction. But he was quite unable to define 
its nature.™ The nominalistic logic of the modern “flowing philosophy” of evolution 
would meet the problem by making both “true species,” and the tentative species of 
imperfect or erroneous generalization alike relative to the purposes of man—working 
hypotheses, instruments of greater or less precision and range, employed by thought in 
the effort to shape in its own image or check for its own ends the ever-flowing stream 
of change. 

Plato would have preferred mystery and self-contradiction to this as an ultimate 
philosophy. But his logical practice approaches nearer to it than does any interme- 
diate compromise of common-sense from Aristotle to the nineteenth century. Psycho- 
logically and ontologically all universals, as opposed to sensations and images, are 
equally noumenal ideas, whether language provides a name for them or not.” In 
logical and scientific practice the only ideas worth recognizing, whether named or not, 
are those that embody significant distinctions relevant to the purpose in hand.” The 
recognition that words are mere counters™ and do not always stand for (relevant) 
ideas® is an apparent, but not real, contradiction of the abbreviated formula of the 
Republic that we assume an idea for every word.’ Similarly, as we have already 
seen, the occasional and inevitable use of conceptual language is no derogation from 
Plato’s philosophic realism.’ Practical logic and psychology must treat ideas as con- 
cepts, whatever else or more they may be. 

2. The puzzle that false speech and erring opinion are impossible because we 
cannot say or opine that which is not, is nothing, must be translated into Greek to 
win even a semblance of seriousness. To appreciate Plato’s achievement in disposing 
of it forever we must have studied it in the poem of Parmenides and in the eristic 
of the fourth century. Our problem here is the seeming contradiction between 
the Republic and the Sophist. The Republic distinctly avers that it is impossible 
even to opine that which is not—thus apparently yielding to the fallacy." The 
admirable analysis of the Parmenides and the Sophist explains it by pointing out 
that is, in its double function of copula and substantive verb, is ambiguous,” and 
that this ambiguity extends to the convenient Greek idiomatical use of the parti- 

381 Polit., 263 AB, to distinguish genus (or species) and 
part would require a long discussion. He can only say 
that, while every species is a part, every part is not a 
species (εἶδος). 

382 Supra, p. 37, n. 250. 

383 Rep., 445 C, 544A Ὁ, ἣ τίνα ἄλλην ἔχεις ἰδέαν πολιτείας, 
ἥτις καὶ ἐν εἴδει διαφανεῖ τινὶ κεῖται; Tim., 83C, εἰς πολλὰ μὲν 
καὶ ἀνόμοια βλέπειν, ὁρᾶν δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἕν γένος ἐνὸν ἄξιον ἐπωνυ- 
μίας; Soph., 229D, ἤ τινα ἔχον διαίρεσιν ἀξίαν ἐπωνυμίας; 223 A, 
225 C, 261 D, names for ideas often fail because the ancients 
were neglectful of τῆς τῶν γενῶν κατ᾽ εἴδη διαιρέσεως. Polit., 
260 E, ἀνώνυμον... .. ὄνομα ἕτερον αὑτοῖς παραχωρήσαντες θέσθαι 
τινά; 261 Ἐ, τὸ μὴ σπουδάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, 263 C. 

a84‘*Already,” Charm., 168 Ὁ; Polit., 261 ἘΠ; Theetet., 
168 B, 186; Soph., 218 C; Laws, 627 D, and passim. 

385 Soph., 217A; Polit., 263C, ὅτι πᾶσι ταὐτὸν ἐπονομάζειν 
ἔσχες ὄνομα; Rep., 454A. 

386596 A, The common name of πολλά does imply a con- 
ceptual ἕν, which implies an idea, though it may not be 
relevant or worth while (ἄξιον ἐπωνυμίας) for the classifica- 
tion or purpose in hand. 

387 EB. g., Pheedr., 263 Ὁ Ἐς, ἠνάγκασεν ἡμᾶς ὑπολαβεῖν... 
ἕν τι τῶν ὄντων, etc.; Polit., 258C, δύο εἴδη διανοηθῆναι τὴν 
ψυχὴν ἡμῶν ποιῆσαι; Phileb., 18 Ο D, 23E, νοῆσαι, πῇ ποτὲ ἦν 
αὐτῶν ἕν καὶ πολλὰ ἑκάτερον, See supra, p. 39, n. 264. 

388 566. A.J. P., Vol. XII, pp. 849 ff., and Vol. XXI, pp. 
205 fF. 

389478 B. Cf. Parmen., 182 ΒΟ, 142A, 164A, 166A; 
Theeetet., 167 A, 188 Ὁ. 

390 Parmen., 142 Ὁ, viv δὲ οὐκ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἕν 
é&y.... ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἕν ἔστιν ; 168 Ὁ,, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν... .. dpa μή τι AAO 
σημαίνει ἣ οὐσίας ἀπονσίαν; 162 Α Β, with my interpretation, 
A.J. P., Vol. XII, pp. 349 ff.; Sophist., 256 Ὁ E ff.; Tim., 88 Β. 

54 Tue Unity or Puato’s ΤΗΟΘΗΤ 

ciple—dv and μὴ dv, ὄντα and μὴ ὄντα; that μὴ ὄν is not nonentity, but otherness; 
not nothing, but some other thing.” If we can show that other dialogues, pre- 
sumably earlier than, or contemporary with, the Republic, ridicule the fallacy, or imply 
the answer to it given in the Sophist, we have established a prima facie presumption 
for an interpretation of the Republic that will remove the contradiction.” This is 

the case. In the Huthydemus the μὴ ὄν puzzle is one of the stock fallacies of the 
eristics. To desire to make Kleinias wise is to wish to make him other than he is, 

what he is not—not to be. 

μὴ ὀνόματι διαφέρεσθαι. 

The suggestion enrages Ctesippus, but Socrates bids him 
And when the quibble is further invoked in support of the 
paradox that ψευδῆ λέγειν and ψευδὴς δόξα are impossible, since we cannot opine or 
say what is not, Socrates observes that this opinion refutes itself as well as all others, 
and declines to take it seriously.™* In the Cratylus Cratylus argues by a fallacy, else- 
where exemplified in Plato,” that a bad law is no law, an unapt name is no name, and 
a false statement is no statement, because it is τὸ μὴ τὰ ὄντα λέγειν. ὁ Socrates dryly 
observes that this thesis, though it has many supporters, is too subtle for him,” and 
then proceeds to offer a perfectly sufficient practical explanation of the difficulty by 
means of an illustration analogous to the image employed in the Theetetus™ to 
account for certain forms of mental confusion. As you may wrongly assign A’s pic- 
ture to B and B’s to A, so in the use of terms it is possible to apply X to Aand Y to B 
when the opposite distribution would be correct, and, in the case of words, true.™ 
This explanation Cratylus is urged to accept in order to avoid (eristic) debate, ἵνα μὴ 
μαχώμεθα ἐν τοῖς ddyou.“° And when he yields, Socrates commends him on the 
ground that this is not the place to argue the question.” There is a further anticipation 
of the Sophist in the suggestion that those who insist on the quibble are oyuadeis.” 

391It is true that Plato nowhere states the ambiguity 
of the copula with the explicitness of Aristotle and John 
Stuart Mill. But the passages cited in the preceding note 
prove that he understood it perfectly. Grote, in his criti- 
cism of the Sophist, objects (1) that Plato fails to distin- 
guish ἔστιν in its function of pure and simple copula; (2) 
that the (absolute) other of Being is just as meaningless 
as absolute not-Being; (3) that negation is something dif- 
ferent from otherness, and that to define it as otherness is 
to confuse the distinction between contrary and contra- 
dictory. These criticisms ignore the difference between 
Greek and English idiom, the necessity that Plato felt of 
meeting the μὴ ὄν fallacy in its own terminology, and the 
religious or ontological associations which half playfully, 
half seriously, he was resolved to preserve for εἶναι, τὸ μὴ 
év, besides its ontological meaning, can be naturally used 
in Greek idiom as a mere category embracing all particular 
cases of (a) negative predication, (Ὁ) misstatement. Any 
particular μὴ ὄν is something other than the corresponding 
ὄν; and, generalizing, Plato may say that μὴ ὄν is the other 
of the ὅν without implying that it is the other of absolute 
Being. For the same reason, in explaining the nature of 
errorand misstatement, he is justified in substituting for 
the general category μὴ ὅν a concrete (affirmative) mis- 
statement, ‘‘Thestetus flies.” It all sounds crude enough, 
if we think it only through English idiom. But it was the 

most effective analysis of the fallacy in the form in which 
Greek usage presented it. Plato is, for the rest, aware of 
the distinction between contradictory and contrary op- 
position (Symp., 201 E; Parmen., 160BC; Soph., 257 B, οὐκ 
Gp’, ἐναντίον ὅταν ἀπόφασις λέγηται σημαίνειν συγχωρησόμεθα), 
and he understands the use of εἶναι as a copula, though the 
religious and metaphysical associations of ‘‘ Being ” cause 
him to stigmatize it as “inexact” (Tim., 38 B). 

392 My task would be much simplified if I could accept 
NATORP’s view (Hermes, Vol. XXXV, p. 425), that the rela- 
tive Being of the Sophist is distinctly anticipated in 
Pheedo, 79 A, δύο εἴδη τῶν ὄντων τὸ μὲν ὁρατόν, τὸ δὲ ἀειδές, But 
ὄντων is not to be pressed here. 

393 Buthyd., 283, 285 A. 

394 286 C, where, as in the Theeetet., it is attributed to 
Protagoras with a malicious allusion to ἀλήθεια, 

395 429 B; cf. Hipp. major, 284 E; Minos, 814 Ὁ) ff. 

396 429 Ὁ, 

397 κομψότερος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἣ Kar’ ἐμὲ, otc.; of. Soph., 239 B. 

398 194 Β, 

399 480 D, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασι πρὸς τῷ ὀρθὴν Kai ἀληθῆ. 

400 480 Ὁ. 401 431 A. 

402 433 A, δόξωμεν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτω πως ἐληλυθέναι ὀψιαί- 
τερον τοῦ δέοντος, Cf. Soph., 251 Β, 259 Ὁ, 


It is obvious (1) that the fallacy is none to Plato; (2) that he feels himself able to 
carry the analysis farther; (3) that he does not do so because he wishes to write the 
Cratylus, not the Sophist. 

In the Thecetetus the matter is somewhat more complicated. As we shall show 
more fully below, the object of the Theceetetus is not to refute or analyze the logical 
fallacy that false opinion is impossible, but to explain the psychological nature of 
error, and with it of cognition: τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον 
ἐγγιγνόμενον. For this the μὴ ὄν quibble would have been wholly unfruitful. But it 
could not be altogether ignored. Hence it is perfunctorily dismissed in a page with 
the admission that the method of εἶναι and μὴ εἶναι offers no explanation of error, since 
ὁ δοξάξων ἕν τι δοξάζει, and ὁ μηδὲν δοξάξων τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει.“ We are thus left 
free to pursue the psychological analysis κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μή. But it is absurd to 
suppose that Socrates is really baffled in the Thewtetus by a fallacy at which he 
laughs in the Huthydemus and Cratylus. And his real opinion of it is sufficiently 
indicated by his attribution of it to Protagoras in this very dialogue.“® 

The final analysis of the fallacy in the Sophist is introduced and accompanied by 
persiflage in the manner of the Huthydemus and Cratylus, and by hints that it is a 
mere eristic puzzle.** The final common-sense formula that true speech and opinion 
represent τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔχει or ὡς ἔστι is not new.” It evades the psychological prob- 
lems of the Thecetetus, and it is reached by arguments purely logical and practical. 
If we do not admit that μὴ ὄν normally means otherness rather than non-existence, we 
shall make all rational speech and thought impossible.’ The absolute ὄν (and μὴ ὄν) 
of the Parmenides to which no intelligible predicates attach is reserved for ontology 
and mysticism.“ But ἐν τοῖς παρ ἡμῖν λόγοις (261 Ὠ) we must accept a doctrine of 
mixed and relative Being and not-Being.”” 

The result of the inquiry is that, if Plato in the Republic falls into this fallacy, 
the Republic must be earlier and less mature, not only than the Sophist, but than the 
Huthydemus and the Cratylus. But Plato does not yield to the fallacy in the Repub- 
lic. He merely varies his terminology to suit his theme. He needs the transcendental 
absolute Being for the world of ideas as opposed to the world of sense, for the sym- 
bolism of the idea of Good, the image of the sun, the cave, and the conversion from 
the shadows to the realities. It would have been singularly tactless to preface these 
passages with an explanation that ὄν, like μὴ ὄν, is a relative term, and that all ὄντα 
with which human logic can deal are likewise μὴ ὄντα. There is no occasion for the 

ὄντα and μὴ ὄντα of practical logic here. 

403 187 D. 

405 In Socrates’s ironical defense of ultra-Protagorean- 
ism, 167 A, οὔτε yap τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ᾽ 
ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ. Cf. Cratyl., 2860. 

406 236 E, ἐναντιολογίᾳ μὴ συνέχεσθαι, etc.; 281 ΒΟ; 239B, 
ἐμέ... . πάλαι καὶ τὰ νῦν ἡττημένον ἂν εὕροι περὶ τὸν τοῦ μὴ 
ὄντος ἔλεγχον, etc.; of. 242 A, 2484 Β, 252. Note also the 
close parallelism of this part of the Sophist with the inten- 
tional fallacies of the Parmenides, infra, pp. 58, 59. 

404 188, 189 A. 

Absolute not-Being is consigned to total 
Cf. Cratyl., 385 B, ὃς ἂν τὰ ὄντα λέγῃ ws ἔστιν ἀληθής; Huthydem., 
284 6, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα μὲν τρόπον τινὰ λέγει, οὐ μέντοι ὥς γε ἔχει. 

408 238 C, 239 B, 249 B C, 259 Ο,, 259 A, ὃ δὲ νῦν εἰρήκαμεν εἶναι 
τὸ μὴ Ov, ἣ πεισάτω τις ὡς οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν ἐλέγξας ἣ μέχρι περ 
ἄν ἀδυνατῇ, λεκτέον καὶ ἐκείνῳ καθάπερ ἡμεῖς, etc., 260 A. 

409 258 E; cf. supra, p. 89. 

410 251 A, 254 Ο D, 259A B. 

56 THe Unity or Puato’s THoucHaT 

ignorance as it is in the Sophist."" Pure Being is reserved for the ideas, as it is in 
the Timeus, which was written at a time when the results of the Sophist were cer- 
tainly familiar to Plato. Its antithesis, the world of phenomena, is described as tum- 
bling about between Being and not-Being—as a mixture of the two; the things of 
sense are always changing—they are and are not.” It is not necessary to dash the 
spirit of mystic contemplation and enthusiasm by the reminder that the ideas them- 
selves, when drawn down into the process of human thought, move to and fro and 
partake of both Being and not-Being.*® We are concerned here only with the broad 
contrast between the two worlds. To say that the objects of sense and the notions of 
the vulgar tumble about between Being and not-Being, is merely another way of saying 
that they belong to the domain of the mixed or relative Being and not-Being described 
in the Sophist.™* Only a deplorably matter-of-fact criticism can find in this adapta- 
tion of the terminology to the immediate literary purpose a concession to a fallacy 
ridiculed throughout the dialogues. And the arguments that would prove the results of 
the Sophist unknown to the author of the Republic would apply almost equally to the 
Timeus,; for there, too, Plato calmly reinstates the absolute ὄν which the Sophist 
banishes from human speech as no less contradictory than the absolute μὴ ὄν, and 
treats as an inaccuracy the expression τὸ μὴ: ὃν μὴ ὃν εἶναι, the practical necessity of 
which the Sophist demonstrates.“* Yet the treatment of the “same” and the “other” 
in the puxoyovia (35) proves that the analysis of the Sophist was familiar to the 
author of the Timeus. 

3. The explicit discrimination of ὀνόματα as names of agents and of ῥήματα as 
names of actions is peculiar to Sophist, 262. So the special definition of διάνοια is 
confined to the Republic,"® and nearly every dialogue employs some definition or 
distinction which Plato does not happen to need again. Even if we concede that this 
greater explicitness of grammatical and logical analysis marks the Sophist as late, its 
significance for the development of Plato’s thought is slight. It is not repeated in 
the Politicus or Laws, and it is virtually anticipated in the Cratylus, where it is 
twice said that λόγος is composed of ῥήματα and ὀνόματα." It is barely possible, but 
not necessary, to take ῥήματα here in the sense of “expression” or “phrase.” Even 
then it must include the verb. For ὄνομα is plainly used in the sense of “name” or 
“noun.”  Lutoslawski’s argument’ that “it would be unjustifiable to apply to the 
Cratylus a definition given only in the Sophist,” obviously begs the question. The 
expression (425 A), καὶ συλλαβὰς αὖ συντιθέντες ἐξ ὧν τά τε ὀνόματα Kal τὰ ῥήματα 
συντίθενται, seems to put ὀνόματα and ῥήματα on the same plane and is unfavorable to 

411477 A, μὴ ὃν μηδαμῇ ; 418 Ὁ Εἰ, τοῦ πάντως μὴ ὄντος, Not 414 Of, A. J. P., Vol. ΙΧ, p. 801. 
foreseeing modern philology, Plato did not think it neces- 415 Tim., 38 A B. 416 Supra, h, 846. 
sary to add πάντως or μηδαμῇ a third time in 478 B, when he 411 Lutoslawski is mistaken in saying that ῥῆμα is used 
asks ἤ ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τὸ μὴ ὄν, which LUTOSLAWSKI, in the distinctive sense of predicate in Polit., 303C, and 
p. 429, thinks would be unaccountable coming after the faws, 888 Β. In both places it means “saying,” “state- 
inquiry of the Sophist. Similarly APELT (Beitrdge). ment.” 
412479 BC D. 418 425 A, 481 C, λόγοι γάρ που ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἡ τούτων ξύνθεσίς 
413 Though it is hinted in the ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ of 476A; ἐστιν. 
cf. supra, p. 36, πι. 244. 419 P, 431, 


the notion of a progression from syllables to words, and from words to phrases and 
sentences. In 431 B, if ῥήματα means “verbs” or “predicates,” we understand the 
statement that they as well as ὀνόματα may be falsely applied. But what is a false 
application of phrases? And if we evade this difficulty by taking ῥήματα as “sentences,” 
then λόγοι must mean, not “sentences,” but “discourses,” and what is a false attribu- 
tion of discourses? In fact, it would be easy to argue that the Cratylus takes for 
granted the results of the Sophist and is therefore later. Our concern is not with 
such ‘‘arguments,” but merely to show that, conceding the utmost that the texts will 
bear, the difference very slightly affects the relative maturity of the thought in the 
two dialogues.” 

A great deal of ink has been spilled over the Parmenides, and the profoundest 
mystical meanings have been discovered in its symmetrical antinomies.“ To rational 
criticism nothing can be more certain than that they are in the main a logical exer- 
citation more nearly akin to the Huthydemus and the Sophist than to the Timeus, 
and that they are not meant to be taken seriously except in so far as they teach by 
indirection precisely the logic of common-sense expounded in the Sophist.” In 
style, however, the Parmenides presents few, if any, traces of the elaborate “late” 
manner of the Sophist,™ and this fact makes the identity of doctrine the more signifi- 


Both the Thecetetus and the Sophist allude to a meeting between Socrates and 

Parmenides.“* The method of argumentation employed is characterized in the Phedrus 

as a kind of rhetoric, and in the Sophist as mere eristic. 


Many passages closely 

resemble arguments and expressions which are ridiculed in the Theetetus and Sophist, 

and which are presumably not serious here.” 

420 Cf. supra, p. 33, ἢ. 218. The further points made by 
Lutoslawski are nearly all misapprehensions. He says 
that the admission that philosophic teaching may be 
given by continuous lecture, as well as by the method of 
question and answer, is first found in 211 Ο, But Theetet., 
167 Ὁ, recognizes the same choice. The meaning of μέθοδος 
in Soph., 227 A, is not more definite than that in Phedr., 
270 D, and Rep., 533 C ff., except in so far as the method of 
the Sophist and Politicus lays more stress on the mere mech- 
anism of definition by dichotomy. Cf. supra, n. 377. The 
notion of logical exercise is not new here, but is found in 
Meno, 75 A, ἵνα καὶ γένηταί σοι μελέτη, ete., and is implied in 
Thecetet., 147 Aff. Dialectic in the Republic is as clearly 
the science of the division of notions as it is in the Pheedrus 
and Sophist. See 454 A, 535 B, supra, τι. 365. See also on 
δύναμις, supra, p. 49; and on the ideas as souls, supra, p. 39. 

421Bury on “Later Platonism,” Jour. of Phil., Vol. 
XXIII, pp. 161 ff., gives a useful summary of recent discus- 

422 Of. supra, p.54. De Plat. idearum doctrina, pp. 41 ff; 
A, J. P., Vol. TX, pp. 185, 290 ff. 

423 NATORP, Archiv, Vol. XII. 

424 Thecetet., 183 ἘΠ; Soph., 211 Ο. Either allusion might 
precede or follow the actual composition of the Parme- 
nides. NATORP, Archiv, Vol. XII, pp. 291, 163, supposes that 


The dialogue itself abounds in hints 

Plato at the time of Thectet., 188 E, intended to discuss 
rest and motion, but, writing the Parmenides much later, 
changed his mind and devoted Part I to objections to the 
ideas, and Part II to metaphysical problems still debated. 

425 Phoedr., 261 Ὁ, τον οὖν ᾿Ελεατικὸν Παλαμήδην (Zeno?) 
λέγοντα οὐκ ἴσμεν τέχνῃ ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι τὰ αὐτὰ 
ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια, καὶ ἕν καὶ πολλά, etc. Soph., 259. It is 
equally foolish to deny or to take seriously the antinomies 
(ἐναντιώσεσιν) that arise from the communion of ideas and 
the relativity of ὄν, μὴ ὄν, and θάτερον. Cf. 259 D, τὸ δὲ ταὐτὸν 
ἕτερον ἀποφαίνειν ἁμῇ γέ πῃ . . . . καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρὸν καὶ τὸ 
ὅμοιον ἀνόμοιον. . . . οὔτε τις ἔλεγχος οὗτος ἀληθινός, etc. 
Such contradictions are nothing difficult when one knows 
the trick. 259(, etre ὥς τι χαλεπὸν κατανενοηκώς, Cf. Parmen., 
159A, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πάθη οὐκέτι χαλεπῶς εὑρήσομεν, and 
Socrates’s congratulations to the Sophists in the Εἰ μίμψαε- 
mus on the ease with which Ctesippus picked up their 
method (303 E). 

426 F. g., the quibble, Purmen., 147 D ff. (of which Alice’s 
‘‘jam every other day’’ is the only English analogue), that 
the “other” is the ‘‘same” because the word ἕτερον in 
Greek idiom applies to both, and the word must refer to 
the same essence. This is parodied by Socrates in Euthy- 
dem., 301 B, and explained in Theeetet., 190 H, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα 
ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα ταὐτόν ἐστιν, The extension of this 
reasoning to the ἀνομοιότατον is deprecated as eristic in 

58 THE Unity oF Puato’s THouGHT 

to that effect. It is recited by one whose light has gone out more completely than 
that of Heraclitus’s sun, and who now is devoted to horsemanship.“” Parmenides 
himself characterizes it as a kind of intellectual gymnastics which it would be unseemly 
to practice in the presence of the uninitiated, and explicitly terms it a πραγματειώδη 
παιδιάν. 5 He chooses as his respondent the youngest interlocutor, on the ground that 
he will be least likely roAvmpayyovety — that is, to interrupt the flow of plausible ratio- 
cination by distinctions like those with which Socrates checked the stream of fallacy 
in the Euthydemus.™ 

These are probabilities. The proof is that the fallacies are symmetrically 
deduced by a systematic abuse of the ambiguity of the copula, and that Plato gives us 
clear warning of this at each turn in the argument. The symmetry is of course not 
perfect, and there are various minor fallacies that arise from other equivocations, An 
analysis full enough to show this in detail would defeat its own object by wearying 
the reader and obscuring the main design, which is not open to debate.” The 
groups of contradictory conclusions deduced from the hypothesis that the One is and 
that the One is not derive almost wholly from the equivocal meaning of ‘‘is”—from 
taking “is” or ‘‘is not” to signify now the absolute uncommunicating Being or not- 
Being which the Sophist dismisses as impracticable, and now the relative Being and 
not-Being, or otherness, which the “Sophist establishes as the only tenable use of the 
terms in human logic. And near the beginning of each hypothesis we are distinctly 
warned of the sense in which “is” and “is not” must be taken.” This is perhaps 
sufficient; but another way of putting it will bring out the parallelism with the Sophist 
still more clearly. The eristic combated in the Sophist may be resumed in two fallacies: 
(1) The noumenal unity of the idea is incompatible with any suggestion of change, rela- 
tion, or multiplicity. The ideas will not communicate or mix. Predication is impossible. 
You cannot say, ‘‘Man is good,” but only, “Man is man” and ‘‘Good is good.” 

Phileb., 13D. The Parmen., 148 A, infers that κατ᾽ αὐτὸ 
τοῦτο ἅπαν ἅπασι ὅμοιον av εἴη. Now, it is precisely the func- 
tion of deceptive rhetoric πᾶν παντὶ ὁμοιοῦν, Phoedr., 261 ἘΠ; 
and it is precisely this that the Sophist, 259D, and the 
Philebus, 13 A, stigmatize as eristic. Similarly the antino- 
mies of whole and part in 137 C D, 144 E, 145 E, 157 E, 159C Ὁ, 
recall Thecetet., 204, 205, and Soph., 245. On rest and motion 
cf. 139B with Soph., 250 Ο, 146 A, 156 E, 162 E, with 255 E; 
Thecetet., 181-3. In Theetet., 180D, the words iva καὶ οἱ 
σκυτοτόμοι. . .. παύσωνται ἠλιθίως οἰόμενοι τὰ μὲν ἑστάναι, τὰ 
δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων, show Plato’s real opinion of these 
absolute antinomies; cf. Soph., 2490 D. For the negation 
of all intelligible predicates cf. 142A, 164B; Soph., 248C; 
Theetet., 157B. In general the Parmenides exemplifies 
what the Sophist terms, 245 E, rovs . . . . διακριβολογουμένους 
ὄντος Te περὶ καὶ μή. 

427 128 C. 

428135 D, 136 DE. The Luthydemus hints that listening 
to eristic may be a useful discipline. This is the meaning 
of the intervention of the δαιμόνιον, 272 E, and of 305 D, often 

429 137 B. 

430 LUTOSLAWSEI, p. 418, miisunderstands this, saying: 
“Tt is only in the Parmenides that discussion (πολυπραγ- 
μονεῖν) is declared useless.” 

431 See APELT, Beitrdge. 

432 (1) 137 D, εἰ ἐν ἔσται τὸ ἕν; (2) 142C, νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη 
ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις εἰ ἕν ἕν... ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἐν ἔστιν... 3 (4) 1510, 
οὐδὲ μὴν στέρεταί γε παντάπασι τοῦ ἑνὸς τἄλλα, ἀλλὰ μετέχει πῃ 
+. 5 contra (5), 159B,’Ap’ οὖν οὐ χωρὶς μὲν τὸ ἕν τῶν ἄλλων, 
χωρὶς δὲ τἄλλα τοῦ ἑνὸς εἶναι; (6) 160C, ὅτι ἕτερόν τι λέγοι τὸ 
μὴ ὅν, ὅταν εἴπῃ ἕν εἰ μὴ ἔστι, καὶ ἴσμεν ὃ λέγει (cf. Soph., 
281 Β) 160 Εἰ, εἶναι μὲν δὴ τῷ ἑνὶ οὐχ οἷόν Te... μετέχειν δὲ 
πολλῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει, From this οὐσίας μετέχειν and then 
εἶναι μὴ ὃν are deduced; contra (7) 163C, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν, ,.. 
ἄρα μή τι ἄλλο σημαίνει ἣ οὐσίας ἀπουσίαν; (cf. AR., Met., 
1004α, 15). 

433251 E, 259 Εἰ, 251C; Thecetet., 201E-202A. The εἰδῶν 
φίλοι, 248 A (cf, 246 B, 248E), represent not so much a par- 
ticular school as a generalized tendency of thought. They 
are literal-minded Platonists or Eleatics who introduce 
into logic Plato’s (and Parmenides’s) poetical absolutism. 
Plato’s criticism is not a recantation of “earlier” Plato- 
nism, for their dogma in Soph., 248 C, is precisely what Plato 
himself says in Tim., 38 A; cf. supra, p. 39. 

Ῥαῦι, SHOREY 59 

(2) The negative “is not” denotes absolute non-existence, which is unutterable and 
unthinkable.“ Plato answers in substance: (1) We must admit the mixture of 
ideas, the seeming multiplication of one idea by communion with others, as a condi- 
tion of intelligible speech. Without it we cannot even predicate existence, identity, 
and diversity.” (2) Absolute not-Being is no more nor less a problem than absolute 
Being.“* The only not-Being that finds a place in intelligible speech is otherness— 
that which is not this, but is some other thing.” Now, in the eight or nine“ 
hypotheses of the Parmenides these two principles are alternately and systematically 
violated and recognized—the consequences in each case being drawn out in exact 
parallelism to those indicated in the Sophist. In the absolute theses the ideas are 
taken in self-identity, in isolation, χωρίς. Ὁ The one has no parts, and the exclusion 
of parts is found to shut out all predicates that imply multiplicity, space, time, or 
number.“ And since these are the forms in which Being appears,“ we cannot even 
say that it 15." There is neither knowledge nor speech of it.’ In the absolute 
negative theses μὴ ὄν is taken to exclude every sense of εἶναι, with a similar result.“ 
In the hypotheses concerned with relative Being and not-Being the reasoning is 
reversed. If we speak of unum and alia, we imply existence in some sense. The 
existent one is two (unity and existence), has parts, and so by necessary implications 
is clothed in all the predicates of space, time, and relation.“* Instead of abiding in 
isolation, the one everywhere united with essence, οὐσία, is divided up among the 
indefinite multiplicity of ὄντα... And it is explicitly affirmed that this is true of the 
most abstract and ideal unity that we can conceive.“ Similarly, starting from the 
assumption that μὴ ὄν (or μή ἕν) means something, and something different,“ we 
deduce first ‘‘participation” in various predicates,” and finally the defiant paradox of 
the Sophist that μὴ ὄν ἐστι. The doctrine of these relative hypotheses is that of the 
Sophist. The reasoning of the absolute hypotheses is that of the preliminary ἀπορίαι 

434 238 C - 241 A, etc. 

435 252 C, 256 A B, 259 Εἰ, ete. 
436 250 Ὁ E, 258 E. 

437257 ff. 

438 The third ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον λέγωμεν, 155 E, stands by 
itself. It is in some sort a reconciliation of the contradic- 

442141 E, οὐδ᾽ dpa οὕτως ἔστιν ὥστε ἕν εἶναι, Damascius 
says that Plato does not negate ἕν οὗ ἕν, but SIMPLICIUs, 
Phys., 88, 32, contradicts him. 

443142 A; cf. Soph., 2480 ff. 

444 168 C, 164 B, οὕτω δὴ ἕν οὐκ ὃν οὐκ ἔχει πως οὐδαμῇ. 

44514206, ὡς ἄλλο τι σημαίνον τὸ ἔστι τοῦ EV... τοιοῦτον 

tions of the first two, and, by implication, of all. 

439137C, 139, τοῦ δέ ye ἑνὸς χωρὶς ἐφάνη τὴν φύσιν τὸ 
ταὐτόν, 140A, 159 Β, ἾΑρ οὖν οὐ χωρὶς μὲν τὸ ἐν τῶν ἄλλων, etc. 
Cf. Euthyd., 284A, ἕν μὴν κἀκεῖνό γ᾽ ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων, ὃ λέγει 
χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, Theeetet., 205 Ο,, διότι αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον 
εἴη ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἔχοι προσφέροντα 
εἰπεῖν. Another form of this fallacy, πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς χωρίζειν, 
appears in the Protagorean doctrine: Cratyl., 385 E, ἰδίᾳ 
αὐτῶν ἡ οὐσία εἶναι ἐκάστῳ; Thecetet., 166C, ἴδιαι αἰσθήσεις 
ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν γίγνονται, Absolutism, whether sensational or 
verbal and ideal, destroys rational thought, and is refuted 
by pushing it to the extreme where this is apparent. 

4401387C-142A. Similar results follow for τἄλλα from 
taking ἕν χωρὶς and without parts 159 B-160 A. 

441 Tim., 52 B. 

ὄν τὸ ἕν σημαίνειν οἷον μέρη ἔχειν, etc.; cf. Soph., 244 Ὁ ff. 

446144 B, ἐπὶ πάντα ἄρα πολλὰ ὄντα ἡ οὐσία νενέμηται, etc. ; 
1446, πρὸς ἅπαντι ἄρα ἑκάστῳ τῷ τῆς οὐσίας μέρει πρόσεστι τὸ 
ἕν. Of. Soph., 245, 256 Ὁ E, 258 Ὁ E. 

447144 EK, οὐ μόνον ἄρα τὸ ὄν ἕν πολλά ἐστιν ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ 
ἕν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντος διανενεμημένον ; cf. 148A. Republic, 525 ἘΠ, 
however, points out that thought must restore the abstract 
unity as fast as analysis divides it: ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ov κερματίζῃς 
αὐτὸ, ἐκεῖνοι πολλαπλασιοῦσιν, εὐλαβούμενοι μή ποτε φανῇ τὸ ἕν 
μὴ ἕν ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μόρια. For the use οὗ κερματίζω here and in 
the Parmenides, cf. Soph., 258 Ὁ. 

448 160C, ὅτι ἕτερον λέγει τὸ μὴ ὃν... 

449161 A, 158 A, Soph., 255 A B. 

450162 A, δεῖ apa αὐτὸ δεσμὸν ἔχειν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸ εἶναι μὴ ὄν. 
For the indispensable emendation of what follows, see my 
note in A. J. P., Vol. XII, pp. 349 ff. 

. καὶ ἴσμεν ὃ λέγει, 

60 THe UNITY oF Puato’s THouGcHT 

in Sophist, 237-46, and it is well described in Thestetus’s language there (246 E): 
συνάπτεται yap ἕτερον ἐξ ἄλλου, μείζω καὶ χαλεπωτέραν φέρον περὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἀεὶ 
ῥηθέντων πλάνην. 

In view of these facts, it is idle to attempt to date the Parmenides and the 
Sophist by their philosophical content. The substantial identity of doctrine does not, 
of course, exclude many minor differences in the literary form and the secondary pur- 
poses of the two dialogues. One object of the Parmenides, for example, is to illus- 
trate exhaustively the “‘ both and neither ” of the eristic caricatured in the Euthydemus. 
The absolute hypotheses issue in blank negation. In order to make the “both and 
neither” plausible, some reasoning from the absolute point of view is introduced into 
the relative hypotheses.“' Again, it is not easy to say how much importance Plato 
attached to the third division of the argument in which the contradictions of the first 
two hypotheses, and, by implication, of all the others, are resolved. Contradictory predi- 
cates (the ‘“both”’) can be true simultaneously —they belong to different times. The 
‘“‘neither” belongs to the instantaneous moment of transition, the ‘‘sudden” which is 
outside of time altogether.’ It would be possible to read a plausible psychological 
meaning into this ingenious solution of the Zenonian problem of change.“’ But it 
cannot easily be translated into the terminology of the theory of ideas. Pure Being 
admits of neither of the contradictory predicates, and the ideas as nowmena are out- 
_ side of space and time. But the ‘‘one” which is here spoken of as out of time, and 
without predicates at the moment of transition, is apparently not the idea, but any one 
thing which may participate in the ideas. This consideration, and the fact that the 
ἐξαίφνης is never mentioned again, seem to indicate that it was only a passing fancy. 

Lastly, though the main object of the dialogue is the illustration of the ambi- 
guity of the copula, and the fallacy of isolating the ideas, the one is in some passages 
a representative of the Platonic idea, and in others of the absolute Being which 
ontology and mysticism recognize even after its banishment from logic. This explains 
and partly justifies the interpretations of the neo-Platonists and that of Zeller already 
considered; but does not necessitate any serious qualification of that here proposed.“ 


The Politicus quotes the Sophist,’ and is closely related to the Timaus and the 
Laws. Its style and its tone of ‘‘mixed pathos and satire”*’ in the reluctant aban- 
donment of impracticable ideals’ mark it as probably late. But there is nothing in 
the thought to necessitate or strongly confirm this view.“* It cannot be shown that 
Zeller, Grote, or, more recently, Pohlman“ are led into error in the interpretation of 
the thought by their assumption that it precedes the Republic, and the attempts of 

451 EZ. g., in 149 E-150 the denial of communion between 454 Supra, p. 34. 455 257 A, 266 D, 284 B, 286 B. 
the ideas: οὐδέ τι ἔσται σμικρὸν πλὴν αὐτῆς σμικρότητος. 456.263 D, 266 ΒΟ. 457 272.C, 301, 302. 

452156 D, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις ἄτοπός τις ἐγκάθηται 458 For the theory of ideas and ἀνάμνησις, cf. supra, 
μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεως Kai στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὖσα. p. 44, 

453 See De Plat. idearum doc., pp. 44-6. 459 Geschichte des antiken Kommunismus. 


Lutoslawski and others to show that the doctrine must be late are either fallacious“ 
or prove at the most that it is genuinely Platonic.’ Much of the dialogue is devoted 
to the illustration and perfection of the method of dichotomy set forth in the Sophist. 
In form it is an attempt to define by this method the true statesman —to discriminate 
him sharply from other rulers and caretakers, and in particular from the politicians, 
sophists, rhetoricians, and generals, who usurp the name at Athens.“® 

This logical process is illustrated and its tedium relieved by a myth” and by 
elaborate analogies from the art of weaving which also separates, purifies, and 
re-combines.“* Remarks are made on the necessity of thus mingling jest with earnest, 
and of employing concrete imagery or patterns to illustrate abstract thought.“ The 
charge of undue prolixity is anticipated.“’ Our object is the elucidation of sound 
method and for that no briefer treatment of the theme would suffice.“* In general, 
Plato tells us, the clever men who proclaim that all things are subject to number and 
measure have neglected to observe that there are two distinct types or ideas of meas- 
urement :“* the purely relative mathematical measurement of one thing against 
another,” and the measurement in reference to fixed, absolute standards of the suit- 
able, the just mean or measure in every art and procedure. Long and short as terms 
of censure applied to a philosophical discussion have no meaning except in the latter 


That such absolute standards exist Plato cannot delay to prove except by a 

summary form of argument employed in the same way to cut short discussion in the 

Phedo and Timeus.™ 

another proposition which the opponent can hardly reject. 

The proposition to be proved is indissolubly bound up with 

In this case, as surely as 

the various arts and sciences exist, so surely is the μέτριον or absolute measure of fit- 

ness a reality. For all arts and sciences postulate it. 

460 309 C, ἀληϑῆ δόξαν... . θείαν φημί ἐν δαιμονίῳ γίγνεσθαι 
γένει does not mean that truth, etc., is ‘‘to be seen only 
in divine souls,” cf. supra, p. 89. In 272C, συναγυρμὸν 
φρονήσεως does not mean ‘an ideal totality of individual 
endeavors .... transmitted from generation to genera- 
tion.’ The word is used here not only for the first but for 
the last time. CAMPBELL’s citation of Sophist, 259D, is 
irrelevant; cf. supra, n. 439. The use of δύναμις proves 
nothing; cf. supra,p.49. 808 Ο has nothing to do with the 
modern notion of building up a science by selection, 
‘“while useless observations and notions are rejected ;᾽ nor 
with Cratyl., 438E. The statement, 308E, that the royal 
art puts to death, τοὺς μὴ δυναμένους κοινωνεῖν, is not an 
admission of the “impossibility of proof in moral ques- 
tions,” and in any case is virtually identical with Protag., 
822 D, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν, ‘The 
unity of universal science” is not affirmed in 258E, or 
Sophist, 257 C, except as the concept or idea (like any other 
concept) is one “already” in Rep., 438CD. The question 
is merely: Shall our dichotomies start from the concept 
“science” or from some other concept as, 6. g., ἐμπειρίαῖϊ 
Cf. Soph., 219A, with Gorg., 462B C, 

461 The employment of a periphrasis in Phedo, 99 B, for 
the technical term συναίτιον used in the Politicus, 281 D, 
287C, 281C E, etc., and in the Timeeus, 46C, and nowhere 
else, proves nothing. A periphrasis is used for the idea in 

This simple thought has often 

the “late” Philebus, 27 A, τὸ δουλεῦον εἰς γένεσιν aitia, The 
word in an allied sense occurs in Gorgias, 519B. It is pos- 
sible that it did not occur to Plato’s mind in writing 
Phedo, 99B, but more probable that he deliberately pre- 
ferred the periphrasis which is far more impressive in the 
context: ἄλλο μέν τί ἐστι τὸ αἴτιον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δ᾽ ἐκεῖνο avev οὗ 
τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἄν ποτ᾽ εἴη αἴτιον, 

462 See CAMPBELL on 268 Ὁ. 

463 In 267 successive dichotomies have distinguished the 
statesman only as the caretaker of the biped human flock. 
It remains to define his specific service to this flock, 287 B, 
291 B, 808 fF. 

464 269 fF. 

465For the characteristic Platonic generalization of 
διακριτική cf. 282BC with Soph., 226D, and “already” 
Cratyl., 388 BC. Cf. Phileb., 23D. 

466 268 D, 277 ff. 

468 285 D, 286. 

469283-5. The κομψοί are apparently the Pythagoreans. 

470 πρὸς ἄλληλα, 284B,. The parallel with Rep., 531A, 
ἀλλήλοις ἀναμετροῦντες, Seems to have been overlooked. 

471284. D, ὡς dpa ἡγητέον ὁμοίως, etc. Phaedo, 717A, εἰς τὸ 
ὁμοίως εἶναι, etc. Tim., 51D. 

467 283 fF. 

62 THe UNITY oF Puato’s THOUGHT 

been misunderstood.” It is implied in the doctrine of ideas,’ in Plato’s polemic 

against mere relativity,“ and even in the remark attributed to Prodicus in Phedrus, 
267B, αὐτὸς... ὧν δεῖ λόγων τέχνην" δεῖν δὲ οὔτε μακρῶν οὔτε βραχέων, ἀλλά 
μετρίων. The fact that it is explicitly stated “for the first time” in the Politicus 
proves no more than does the fact that it is never stated again. Plato happened to 
formulate it only once, but it is clearly involved in Republic, 531 A, ἀλλήλοις 
ἀναμετροῦντες, etc. 

The myth may be profitably compared with the Timaus, Philebus, and Laws, 
but cannot be pressed to yield developments or contradictions of doctrine. Its service 
to the argument is merely to distinguish the mythical ideal of a shepherd of the people, 
who plays providence to his flock, from the modern ruler who leaves other specialists 
to feed, clothe, and house them, and confines himself to his specific task of govern- 
ment.” In other words, it emphasizes the demand often repeated in Plato for a 
precise definition of the specific function and service of the royal or kingly art; and, 
as Zeller says, rejects with a touch of irony ideals drawn from a supposed state of 
nature. This ruler is further discriminated, as in the Euthydemus and Gorgias,” 
from the pretenders or subordinate ministers who usurp his name, the rhetorician,” 
the general,” the dicast.“” Lastly, his special task is defined. As implied in the 
Meno and Euthydemus, and stated in the Republic, he is to teach virtue and incul- 
cate right opinion.” And that his teaching may be effective and the seed fall in good 
ground, he is, like the rulers of the Republic and the Laws, to control marriages and 
the propagation of the race—especially with a view to harmonizing and blending the 
oppositions of the energetic and sedate temperaments." 

The accompanying classification and criticism of forms of government imply no 
change of opinion unless we assume that Plato was bound to repeat himself verbatim. 
The classification of the Republic is first the ideal state governed by philosophic wis- 
dom, whether βασιλεία or ἀριστοκρατία," and then in progressive decadence timarchy, 
oligarchy, democracy, tyranny. The Politicus apparently recognizes seven states: 
one, the right state (802 C), the only Polity deserving the name (293 C), in which the 
rulers are ἐπιστήμονες. Six others are obtained by distinguishing the good and bad 
forms of the three types recognized in ordinary Greek usage.“ We thus get monarchy 

or royalty, and tyranny, aristocracy, and oligarchy, and democracy, lawful and law- 


412 Ε. σ.. by SIEBECK, Untersuchungen zur Phil. d. 
Griechen, pp. 92 ff., who over-emphasizes the analogies with 
the πέρας of the Philebus. 

473The μετρίον γένεσις, 284A B, to which every artist 
looks, is virtually the idea which he tries to realize, 
Gorg., 503 E. 

414 Cf, πρὸς ἄλληλα four times in 283, 284 with Theeetet., 
160 B, 182 B, Parmen., 1646. 

475 274, 215. 478 Gorg., 517 B, 521 Ὁ. 
477 304 Ὁ, Euthydem., 289 Ὁ E. Cf. Gorg., 464-6, 502 E. 
478 304 E, Luthydem., 290 B. 

The differences are due mainly to the necessity of presenting a continuous 

479 305 B. 
480309 C Ὁ. 
᾿ 481309, 310. The Republic recognizes the contro) of mar- 
riage, 460, and the importance and difficulty of recon- 
ciling the two temperaments. 503C. It does not happen 
to bring the two ideas together. The Laws, 773A B, does. 
482445 D. It cannot be a democracy, because φιλόσοφον 
. πλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι = Polit., 292 E, μῶν οὖν δοκεῖ 
πλῆθός γε ἐν πόλει ταυτὴν τὴν ἐπιστήμην δυνατὸν εἶναι κτήσασθαι, 
488 Rep., 838 Ὁ, Pindar., Pyth., 11, 87. 
484 Polit., 291, 301, 802 Ο ff. 


descending scale in the Republic. This leaves no place for a good form of democracy 
or a good monarchy apart from the ideal kingdom.“* The fundamental distinction of 
the scientific state once noted, Plato plays freely with the conventional terminology, 
and no inferences can be drawn from his “contradictions.” There are countless forms 
of government if one cares to look beyond the conspicuous ¢67.“° In the Republic 
the good oligarchy, the aristocracy of the Politicus, isatimarchy. In the Menexenus 
the good democracy of Athens is an aristocracy governed by kings!’ In the 
Laws, from the historical point of view, all governments are regarded as variations 
of the two mother types, the Persian absolutism and the Athenian democracy. But 
in respect of the ease with which reform may be effected the tyranny ranks first, the 
kingdom second, a certain type of democracy third, and oligarchy last.“’ I have 
already discussed the significance of the opposition of the two temperaments for the 
definition of the virtues and the antinomies of the minor dialogues.“ Grote strangely 
ignores this when he affirms that these difficulties are not touched in the Politicus. 


The Philebus was selected by Dionysius of Halicarnassus as a type of Plato’s 
simpler Socratic style. The majority of recent critics more plausibly see signs of 
Plato’s later manner in the poverty of the dramatic setting, and the curious elabora- 
tion of phrasing and logical framework. The introduction presents again the objections 
to the theory of ideas advanced in the Parmenides, and, like the Parmenides, but 
more explicitly, hints that these puzzles are due to the limitations of human reason.“ 
It bids us disregard them and, assuming ideas, to deal with them and our subject 
according to the true dialectical method set forth in the Phadrus.™ It does not 
state that these metaphysical problems must be solved before we can so proceed.“ It 
merely says that we must come to such an understanding about them as will prevent 
the puzzle of the one and many from confusing our inquiry.“ We have no reason to 
look for a solution of them in the subsequent course of the argument. None is given. 
There was, as we have seen, none to offer.“ The attempts of modern scholars to find 
one are very ingenious.“ But they are not supported by Plato’s words, and they 
proceed on the erroneous assumption that he thought it possible to give any other than 
a poetical and mythical account of the absolute, or to say more of the nowmenon than 

485 The Politicus does not describe the development of 
one form from the other but merely states the order of 
preference among the lawful and lawless forms of the 
three types. CAMPBELL, Intr., p, xliv, overlooks all this 
when he treats as proofs of lateness the addition of 
βασιλεία as one of the lower forms, and the depression of 
ὀλιγαρχία below δημοκρατία. 

486 Rep., 544 Ὁ. 487 238 Ὁ. 488 693 D. 

489710E. The paradox, τυραννουμένην μοι δότε τὴν πόλιν, 
ἼΟΘΕ, is literally incompatible with the associations of 
τύραννος in the Republic, but the notion of a revolution 
accomplished by arbitrary power is found in 501 A, 540 ΕἸ, 

490 Supra, pp. 11, 13,15, n. 59. 491 Supra, pp. 36, 37. 

492 Supra, u. 70. 49315C, 16 AB. 

494 Cf. on this point my criticism of JACKSON, A. J. P., 
Vol. IX, pp. 279, 280. Even SCHNEIDER (Plat. Metaphysik, 
p. 53), whose interpretation of this part of the Philebus is 
excellent, does not make it clear that the metaphysical 
problem is merely evaded by the assumption of ideas and 
the method κατ᾽ εἴδη. 

495 Supra, p. 36. 

496 As types of all may be cited: SCHNEIDER, Platonische 
Metaphysik; SIrBECK, Untersuch zur Philosophie der 
Griechen, II; Plato's Lehre von der Materie; HENRY 
Jackson, Plato’s Later Theory of Ideas. See A. J. Py 
Vol. IX, p. 282. 

θά Tur Unity oF Puato’s THoucat 

that it exists.“’ The elaborate apparatus of classifications and categories employed to 
decide whether pleasure or intelligence is more nearly akin to the good is due, apart 
from Plato’s interest in dialectical exercise, to his unwillingness to treat the problem 
of the good in isolation. His imagination and religious feeling require him to associate 
the ethical good of man with the principles of order, harmony, measure, beauty, and 
good in the universe. We thus get many interesting analogies with the Timceus, but 
no solution of the problem of ideas. The direct classification and estimate of the 
different species of pleasure and intelligence, which was all the ethical problem 
required,“ is subordinated to a larger classification of all things which, however, 
deepens and enriches our conception of the psychological and ontological relations of 
the elements of merely human good and happiness.” 

The terms of this classification are the πέρας, the ἄπειρον, the μικτόν or mixture of 
the two, and the αἰτία or its cause. These terms represent, for the purposes of the 
argument, characteristic Platonic generalizations” of the ideas naturally associated 
with these words. Whatever else they may mean is at the most suggestion and 
analogy. Πέρας is a generalization of the idea of limit—whether it be the limitation 
of matter by form, of chaos by the principle of order and measure, of appetite by 
reason, or of the indeterminate genus by a definite number of species and sub-species. 
It is the idea of the Timaus, so far as that is conceived as a principle of limit and 
form stamped upon chaos. But it is not the Platonic idea—the hypostatization of the 
concept—for the purposes of metaphysical theory.” 

The ἄπειρον denotes among other things (1) the indefinite multiplicity of particu- 
lars as opposed to the unity of the idea—a conception found elsewhere in Plato.” 
Plato generalizes the term σῶμα for “matter” in29D. (2) Indeterminate matter as 
opposed to the form or limit that shapes it. In this sense it may be “equated” with 
the space, matter, or mother of all generation in the Timeus, 50 D.™ (3) Indeterminate 

497 Cf, EMERSON, Representative Men, “Plato,” ‘No 
power of genius has ever yet had the smallest success in 
explaining existence. The perfect enigma remains. But 
there is an injustice in assuming this ambition for Plato.” 

498The net result of the introduction is (19B) εἴδη 
γάρ μοι δοκεῖ viv ἐρωτᾷν ἡδονῆς ἡμᾶς Σωκράτης, etc. 

499 286 ff. 

500 So Plato generalizes μάχη, Euthyd., 271, 272: κήλησις 
(ἐπῳδῶν τέχνη), ibid., 289E; θηρεντική, idid., 290 ; Laws, 
823B; Polit., 299 Ὁ; Rep., 313B; Soph, 221, 222; πλεονεξία, 
Laws, 906C, cf. Symp., 186C, Gorg., 508A; κιβδηλεία, 
Laws,-916D; ποίησις, Symp., 205B; ἔρως, ibid., 205 Ὁ, and 
passim; γένεσις, Polit., 261B, etc.; διακριτική, Soph., 226C; 
πιθανουργική, ibid., 222C; κολακεία, Gorg., 463B ff.; the 
comparative degree, τὸ μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον, Phileb., 24; and 
many minor examples, Polit., 279, 280, 289. 

501 SCHNEIDER, p. 133, and SIEBECE, p. 73, make it a 
mediating principle between the idea and phenomena. 
But Plato never speaks of the ‘‘ idea,” but only of the ideas 
or the idea of something. Πέρας is itself an idea and is the 
cause of limit, in any given case, precisely as the idea of 
whiteness is the cause of white, or the idea of dog the 
cause of a dog. 

502 Thecetet., 147 D, ἐπειδὴ ἄπειροι τὸ πλῆθος, . . . ξυλλαβεῖν 
eis ν implies the method of Phileb., 15,16. Cf. Rep., 525A; 
Polit., 262D; Soph., 256E; Parmen., 158C. SCHNEIDER, 
p. 4, n. 1, notes this meaning, but still insists that the 
ἄπειρον of the Philebus primarily means indeterminate 
matter, which he rightly shows is not = μὴ ov, p. 5 (ef. 
supra, n. 261), but wrongly denies to be virtually identical 
with space. See SIEBECK, p. 84. The Timceus does not 
explicitly identify “matter” and “space” merely because 
it does not distinctly separate the two ideas. See A. J. P., 
Vol. IX, p. 416. But whether we call it matter or space, the 
χώρα, the πανδεχές, the mother of generation is one. 

603 SIEBECK compares it as the antithesis of the idea to 
the μὴ ὄν, the ἕτερον of the Sophist, the matter or space of 
the Timeus, the principle of necessity or evil, and the 
μέγα καὶ μικρόν, More precisely (p. 89), the ἄπειρον is the 
mediating link between the θάτερον of the Sophist and the 
χώρα of the Timaeus. Now these terms undoubtedly have 
this in common, that they are variously opposed to the 
ideas, but Plato employs them in different connections and 
we cannot equate them. SIEBECK argues (pp. 58 ff.) that 
the absolute μὴ ὃν abandoned in the Sophist (258 E) must 
mean something. He finds it in the absolute hypothesis of 

Paul SHOREY 65 

physical and chemical “process,” as opposed to ideally or mathematically defined 
“states.” (4) The insatiate, limitless character of undisciplined desire and appetite— 
a conception which we have met in the Gorgias.” 

The μικτὸν is the mixture or union of πέρας and ἄπειρον in any or all of these 
senses giving rise to various γενέσεις, both in the world of matter and in souls.” As 
the union of matter and form it may be “equated” with the “offspring” of the idea 
and the “mother” in the Timeus.” As the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence it 
obviously may not.” 

Airéa is the principle of cause in general, and in particular the cause of the due 
mixture of pleasure and intelligence in the happy life. In the one sense it may be 
identified with the Demiurgus who embodies the principle of cause in the Timaus.” 
The ultimate cause is conceived by Plato as beneficial intelligence which is virtually 
synonymous with the good. He intentionally confounds the good in human life with 
the good in the universe. It is possible, then, to say that God, or the good, or 
beneficent intelligence is the cause alike of the cosmos or ordered world and of the 
well ordered life." We may identify the supreme mind (νοῦς) with the Demiurgus of 
the Timeus and the Idea of Good in the Republic. We may conceive the ideas as 
thoughts of God, identify God with the sum of his thoughts (νόησις νοήσεως) and so 
bring the ideas under the principle of αἰτία as not only formal but efficient causes.” 
But in all this we are mechanically “equating” the terminology and imagery—the 
literary machinery, so to speak, of three distinct lines of thought in three different 
dialogues, for the sake of attributing to Plato a rigid and ingenious metaphysical 

system wholly foreign to his spirit. 

We have already discussed the psychology and the main ethical argument of the 

the Parmenides as the antithesis of the ἔν regarded as the 
symbol of the principle of the ideas. From this it is an 
easy step to identifying it with matter which is also the 
antithesis of the idea. But it is not true that the absolute 
μὴ ὅν must mean something. Plato’s rejection of it in the 
Sophist is sincere, and is confirmed by the Parmenides 
which makes it unspeakable and unthinkable. The abso- 
lute ὄν, as we have seen, was reinstated for religious and 
metaphysical purposes, as it is by many philosophers of 
every age. There was no such motive for forcing a meap- 
ing upon the absolute my ὅν, and the identification of it 
with matter is, as we have seen, quite impossible. (Supra, 
u. 261.) 

SreBECE then proceeds to associate the logical ἄπειρον 
and the θάτερον with space and to attribute to Plato an 
“intelligible ᾽ as well as a phenomenal space by pressing 
all passages in which the logical relations of concepts are 
expressed in spatial terms (p. 90). As the human mind 
naturally thinks logical determinations in spatial im- 
agery, he has no difficulty in finding such passages. But 
plainly the method is vicious. We cannot infer an intel- 
ligible “space” or the identity of θάτερον and space 
because the ideas are spoken of as ‘living apart,’’ or 
“included” in a larger idea, or because the method of 
dichotomy proceeds to the right and leaves on the left the 
other of the particular idea pursued. Still less can we 
infer it from the νοητὸς τόπος, or from the fact that move- 

ment and measure are spoken of in connection with the 
ideas, and movement and measure imply space! 

504 Phileb., 24 Β, 25C, 26A. 

605 27 E, 31 A, Gorg., 492-4, supra, p. 24. 

506 27 D, 25 E, 26 B, καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς αὖ πάμπολλα, which alone 
refutes the equation, ἄπειρον = matter. 

50750 Ὁ), 

508 There is a slight equivocation in the assumption 
(27D) that the “ mixed” life of pleasure and intelligence 
belongs to the μικτόν of πέρας and ἄπειρον. 

509 26 EB, 23 Ὁ, 64C. 

510In 30D the βασιλικὴν ψυχήν, etc., =the soul of the 
world, and the αἰτίας δύναμιν = the Demiurgus. 

511 Cf. Idea of Good, pp. 188, 189, n. 2. 

512 SCHNEIDER identifies God not with the Idea of Good, 
but with the ideas. The ideas, he argues, must be real and 
they must be thoughts. They are, therefore, thoughts of 
God. We have already considered this theory, supra, p. 38. 
It is for the modern systematic philosopher the most 
plausible escape from the difficulty of positing two dis- 
tinct noumena, God and the Ideas. Perhaps Plato would 
have accepted it, if it had been presented to him. Unlike 
the majority of its advocates, SCHNEIDER does not misin- 
terpret particular passages in order to support it. He 
merely combines and equates lines of thought which Plato 
left unfinished and distinct. 

66 THE UNITY oF Puato’s THovuGHT 

Philebus, and seen that neither contradicts or appreciably modifies the doctrine of the 
earlier dialogues.”* There remains only the question whether the demonstration of 
the unreality of pleasure presupposes, or, as Zeller still maintains, is presupposed by, 
the shorter proof of the Republic. Believing that the Philebus is probably late, I am 
logically committed to the first branch of the alternative. But this opinion is entirely 
compatible with the view that the differences between the two treatments of the theme 
are not in themselves sufficient to show which must be the earlier. It is impossible 
to determine ὦ priori whether the slighter treatment is an anticipation or a résumé of 
the fuller discussion. The main doctrine was always a part of Plato’s thought, as 
appears from the Gorgias, the Phedo, and the Phedrus."* The differences between 
the Republic and the Philebus have been much exaggerated. The abbreviation of 
the argument in the Republic is sufficiently explained by the subordinate place which 
it occupies in the scheme of the entire work. It affords no proof of the date, and no 
presumption even of a change of doctrine.” 


The date of the Thectetus has been much debated on external grounds.” Its 
wealth of thought and dramatic vivacity of style make it one of the most difficult 
dialogues to classify. In psychological depth and dialectical acuteness it ranks with 
the Sophist, Philebus, and Parmenides, many of the thoughts of which it anticipates 
or suggests."’ But it has nothing of their dogmatic finality of manner. Socrates is 
still the midwife delivering ingenuous youth of opinions which fail to stand the test 
of the elenchus. And the conclusion is an avowal of Socratic ignorance.” 

Before losing ourselves in details we must recall why this isso. There are two 
reasons: (1) The formal quest for an absolute definition always fails in Plato.” (2) 
It is not possible to define knowledge or explain error. We can only describe and 
classify different stages of cognition and various forms of error. All seemingly intel- 
ligible explanation rests on material images, like Plato’s figure of the wax tablets and 
the aviary. But these analogies either commit us to sheer materialism and the flowing 
philosophy, or they explain nothing. No spatial image can represent the synthetic 

513 Supra, pp. 24, 43, 45 fF. 

514 Supra, p. 24. 

515See ZELLER, p. 548. The question whether pleasure 
or φρόνησις is the good (Rep., 505 B) need not be a specific 
reference to the Philebus. It is virtually raised in the 
Protagoras and Gorgias. Zeller’s table of agreements be- 

that the Republic is not yet acquainted with the thought 
that the neutral state implies not absolute quiet in the 
body, but slight motions which do not cross the threshold 
of consciousness. But the thought isimplied in Rep. Cf. 
supra, D. 328. 

516 See ZELLER, Ὁ. 406, n. 1; CAMPBELL’S Introduction; 

tween the Rep. and Phileb. merely proves the unity of 
Plato’s thought. Rep., 584 D-585A-E, 586A-C, which he 
cites, present, at the most, different imagery. The thoughts 
are in the Philebus. That the Philebus does not refer spe- 
cifically to the Idea of Good is no stranger than is the fact 
that no other dialogue does. On the other hand LurTos- 
LAWSKI’S objection (p. 470) that the difficulty, Rep., 505 B, 
that the sought-for φρόνησις is φρόνησις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ is disposed 
of by our observation that the reference, if reference there 
must be, is to the Charmides, supra, π. 61. JACKSON argues 

LuToOsLAWSEI, p. 385. It is on the whole more probable 
that the battle in which Thesstetus was wounded belongs 
to the Corinthian war, 394-387, than to the year 368. 

517 Cf. supra, pp. 33, 34, 55, nn. 179, 182, 389, 
518 149 ff., 161 AB, 209 E, 2106. 

519 Cf. supra, p. 13, p. 16, n. 86. JOWETT says, Vol. V, 
p.119: ‘‘ We cannot suppose that Plato thought a defini- 
tion of knowledge to be impossible.” But it is impossible, 
and that for the very reasons suggested by Plato. 


unity of consciousness and memory. None can explain the comparison of past and 
present impressions in an unextended focal point of consciousness. None can repre- 
sent except in the vaguest poetic figure” a psychical mechanism that now operates 
correctly, yielding right opinion, and now incorrectly, resulting in error.” On the 
other hand, if we invoke the absolute unity of mind behind our imagined mechanism, 
we are merely moving in acircle. We reaffirm our faith in the immaterial soul, but 
we can offer no intelligible explanation of degrees in cognition or of the psychological 
process of error.” 

The quest for a definition, then, fails, as Plato expected it todo. But the analysis 
is carried far enough (1) to refute to Plato’s satisfaction all psychologies of pure mate- 
rialism or relativism ;™ (2) to justify a purely logical and practical treatment of the 
μὴ dv, ψευδὴς δόξα, and similar fallacies in the Sophist.* This and the immense 
wealth of psychological suggestion scattered by the way are the chief positive results 
of the dialogue.™ 

It has been repeatedly analyzed in detail.’ As in the Gorgias and Philebus,™ 
much of the argument is purely dramatic, directed only against the cruder forms of 
the theory combated.“* The ingenious attempts to reconstruct the doctrines of con- 
temporary thinkers from Plato’s polemic are more apt to confuse our understanding of 
Plato than to add to our knowledge of Protagoras, Aristippus, or Antisthenes.” As 
Professor Campbell says: ‘‘Whoever the contemporaries were to whom Plato refers as 
the disciples of Protagoras, he aims beyond them at the whole relative side of Greek 
thought of which Heraclitus was the most prominent exponent.” 

The identification of the ἄνθρωπος μέτρον, the πάντα pei, and the definition that 
knowledge is sensible perception, is a part of Plato’s literary machinery which we 
must accept untroubled by nice historic scruples. The ἄνθρωπος μέτρον is not a 
scientific or philosophic principle, but a rhetorical paradox or truism embodying a 

520 Cf, Tim., 81 AB, with Thecetet., 194 B. 

621 ZELLER, p. 590, thinks that the section on ψευδὴς δόξα 
is an indirect refutation of the definition that knowledge 
is ἀληθὴς δόξα. He says that the difficulty of explaining 
false opinion arises only from the assumption that knowl- 
edge is “right opinion.” That is not so, either absolutely 
or in Plato, The ultimate difficulty is: if the mind appre- 
hends as a psychic unit, how is mis-apprehension, as dis- 
tinguished from non-apprehension, possible? BoniTz is 

524 Cf, supra, Ὁ. 55. 

525 On its relation to the theory of ideas cf. supra, Ὁ. 33. 
527 Supra, u. 137. 

528 Supra, τ. 7. Note especially the tone of 163-6, 
where avowedly eristic arguments are employed against 
the literal identification of ἐπιστήμη and αἴσθησις. Observe 

undoubtedly right in affirming that the question for Plato 
is not so much the fact or possibility of error as the psycho- 
logical explanation. (Pp. 83, 89. Cf. my paper, De Pla- 
tonis idearum doctrina, pp. 11-19.) The length of the 
“ digression” is justified by the interest attached to the 
problem of ψευδὴς δόξα and the psychological analysis that 
it provokes. It is a ‘“‘digression” and a negative result 
only for those who naively assume that Plato himself ex- 
pected to reach a positive definition. 

822184 CD, 200 ΑΒ, 

523 Supra, Ὁ. 34, n. 283, Cf. Thecetet., 1840 ff. Up to 1886 
the identity of ἐπιστήμη and αἴσθησις is refuted only so far 
as it depends on extreme Protagorean relativity or Hera- 
cliteanism, which makes all thought and speech impossible. 
κατά ye τὴν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μέθοδον. 

the persiflage of 156, 157, 167 A, 179, 180. ΝΑΤΟΕΡ, Philol., Vol. 
L, p. 263, thinks 161 B-165 E a parody of Antisthenes’s attack 
on Protagoras, 166-8 C being Protagoras’s defense. Any allu- 
sion to eristic may be in a sense a parody of Antisthenes 
or of any other eristic contemporary. Protagoras himself is 
represented as employing the μὴ ὃν quibble, 167A. Cf. 
supra, n. 405, and Euthydem., 286 C. 

529See NATORP’s acute Forschungen zur Geschichte des 
Erkenntnissproblems im Alterthum, and his ‘‘Protagoras 
und sein Doppelganger,” Philologus, Vol. L, pp. 262 ff. 
ΝΑΤΟΕΡ Β analyses_retain their value, even if we doubt 
the possibility of reconstructing: Protagoras, For Antis- 
thenes and the Theetetus see the phantastic conjectures of 
JoEL, Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates, Vol. II, 
pp. 839 ff. 

68 Tue Unity oF Puato’s THOUGHT 

practical tendency of the age repugnant to Plato’s taste and feeling: This seems to 
be overlooked in the controversy between Natorp (Philologus, 50) and Gomperz, as to 
the meaning of the formula. Plato, as Natorp shows, explicitly affirms the thought to 
be: things are to (each and every) man as they appear to him. If sugar tastes bitter 
to the sick man, it is bitter to him—there is no other test. But there is no evidence 
and no probability that Protagoras had systematically drawn out the consequences of 
generalizing this proposition in its application to ethical and logical truths. He did 
not need to ask himself whether he meant by ἄνθρωπος this, that and the other 
man, or human cognitive faculties in general. He took ὄντα, as he found it in Greek 
idiom, without distinguishing things, qualities, and truths—though his simplest 
examples would naturally be qualities. By os he presumably meant ‘‘that,” but 
“that”? and “how” are closely associated in Greek idiom and are often confounded in 
popular not to say in Platonic usage. If he used φαίνεται and φαντασία he probably did 
not distinguish the ‘“‘it seems to me” of actual.sensation from the ‘‘it seems to me”’ of 
any opinion,” and Plato avails himself of the ambiguity for the half serious περιτροπὴ 
that since Protagoras’s “truth” does not seem true to the majority, it is admitted by 
Protagoras himself to be oftener false than true.™ 

Πάντα ῥεῖ Plato himself accepts for the phenomenal world.” As a metaphysical 
dogma it is tantamount to materialism in that all materialists are more or less con- 
sciously Heracliteans, though all Heracliteans need not be materialists.” As a neo- 
Heraclitean paradox it is the negation of the ideas, of the universal, of rational logic 
and speech.“ As a rhetorical formula it is the symbol of the restless spirit of innova- 
tion which Plato detested.” Before generalizing and restating for serious refutation 
what he conceives to be the common psychological presuppositions of these catchwords, 
Plato covers them with persiflage and assails them with arguments which he admits to 
be rhetorical and eristic. There is no probability that the representatives of these 
doctrines could have explained their meaning or defended themselves as well as Plato 
has done it for them. So far as we know, he is the first thinker who was capable of 
distinguishing, dividing, classifying, and generalizing ideas, of noting the affinities 
and differences of philosophic doctrines, and of translating them freely into different 
terminologies. All other early thinkers, like the majority of thinkers always, are the 
prisoners of their formulas and can only abound in their own sense. Plato, as 
Emerson says, “needs no barbarie war paint, for he can define and divide,” and he 
delights to prick with the keen point of his dialectic the bubbles of imagery, rhetoric, 
and antithesis blown by his predecessors. Heraclitus means well when he says that 
the one is united by disunion,™ or that the hands at once draw and repel the bow.” 
But the epigram vanishes under logical analysis. The pre-Socratics discourse, in a 

830 Cf. supra, p. 48. 534 Cratyl., 439, 440; Thecetet., 179, 180; Soph., 249 Ὁ). 
531170, 171. Cf. Euthyd., 286 C, καὶ τούς τε ἄλλους ἀνατρέπων 585 Parr, Plato and Platonism, pp. 16-20. 
καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτόν, 536 Symp., 187 A. 

532 Cratyl., 489D; Symp., 201 D; Timeus, passim. ἕ ἘΝ ὰ : 
81 Rep., 489B. The saying is Heraclitean in tone. 
593 Theoetet., 155 E, 156 A. met aa 


fine imaged style, about Being, but a plain man can not be sure of their meaning.™ 
Absolute formulas, like πάντα ῥεῖ, πᾶν ἕν, πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, have an imposing 
sound, but if we press for their interpretation, prove to be either truisms or paradoxes, 
destructive of intelligible speech.” 

It is an ingenious sport to construct for Protagoras some subtle and nicely 
guarded modern system of phenomenalism. But we must then pass over the purely 
dramatic parts of Plato’s discussion, and limit ourselves to his final and seriously meant 
arguments against the psychology of materialism and the logic of relativism. There 
are two such arguments which neither Plato nor his critics are careful to distinguish 
sharply: (1) The first is that the senses are organs of mind and that sense perception 
itself implies the “soul” or some central “synthetic unity.” This, if fully under- 
stood, is conclusive against the sensationist materialism of Condillac’s statue. But 
Plato’s chief interest is in the second argument derived from this. (2) The objects 
of each sense we can perceive only through the specific organ of that sense.“ But 
the general common categories of Being, not-Being, number, likeness, difference, the 
same, and the other, as also ethical universals, and the abstract definitions of sensuous 
qualities’ are apprehended without subsidiary organs solely through the action of the 
mind, and its reflections on the contradictions of sense. Availing himself of the 
double meaning of οὐσία (1) logical essence, (2) reality, truth, Plato argues, as in the 
Phedo,™ that truth and reality are attained only by the “pure” thought of the soul 
acting independently of the body. 

A modern Theetetus, of course, might deny that abstract thought has no bodily 
organ, or that its objects are more “real” than the perceptions of sense. But the 
absolute identification of αἴσθησις and ἐπιστήμη is sufficiently refuted, and the suggest- 
iveness of this definition having been exhausted, a fresh start is made with the 
definition “knowledge is true opinion.” But this implies that we understand erroneous 
opinion, and error proves to be inexplicable. The attempt to explain it calls forth 
many interesting analogies and distinctions.“ One large class of errors is accounted 
for as arising from the wrong reference of present sensations to stored up memory 
images.“ The distinction between latent or potential and actual knowledge postpones 
the final difficulty.“’ But in the end it must be faced: error as a matter of fact occurs 
in ‘“‘pure” thought. How can pure thought misapprehend its object? A bodiless 
intelligence either touches or does not touch the object of thought. We can understand 

5838 Soph., 242, 243, 

539 Cratyl., 439, 440; Theetet., 183A B, 1799DE; Soph., 
249C D. 

540184 D, δεινὸν γάρ πον, ὦ παῖ, εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ 
ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις, αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ 
ἰδέαν, cite ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅ τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ξυντείνει, etc. 

541185AC, LuTosLAWsKI, pp. 276, 372, fancies that this 
is an anticipation of the modern ‘law of specific energies 
of the senses,” ‘already glanced at in Rep., 352E, but 
showing progress in the formulation here. The modern 
law could not be anticipated without knowledge of the 

nerves, but Empedocles " already ” remarked of the senses, 
ov δύνασθαι τὰ ἀλλήλων κρίνειν, Theophr. sens., 7, Dox. 500. 

542185 C D. 543186 A Β. Cf. supra, nn. 221 and 222, 

544 Thecetet., 181A; Phaedo, 650. 

545 Of. supra, p. 55; n. 520 with text. 

546 198,194. The memory image is treated as knowledge, 

547197, This isthe distinction invoked in Euthyd., 277, 
278, to meet the eristic fallacy of the alternative εἰδέναι ἢ 
μὴ εἰδέναι. 

70 Tue Unity or Puato’s THOUGHT 

the confusion of one object with another, the misplacement of cognitions, only in 
terms of spatial imagery which, if accepted literally, is materialism again, and if taken 
as a symbol implies the synthetic unity of mind behind it, and so renews the puzzle in 
infinite regress.“* Modern metaphysicians evade the difficulty by assuming an infinite 
thought of which our erring thought is a part. Their task then is to preserve the 
individuality of a consciousness that is part of another mind. This problem disappears 
in a mist of theistic language enveloping pantheistic doctrine. Plato does not soar to 
these heights, but having carried the psychological analysis to the limit, he disposes 
of the equation, ἐπιστήμη = λόγος ἀληθής, by pointing out asharp practical distinction 
between knowledge and right opinion. True opinions may be imparted by persuasion 
and hearsay about things which we can know only if we have seen them.™ 

The third and final suggestion is that knowledge is right opinion coupled with 
λόγος. Ὁ This is for practical purposes substantially Plato’s own view.” Tran- 
scendentally knowledge is the apprehension of the idea. In human life it is the 
dialectician’s reasoned mastery of his opinions implying stability, consistency, and the 
power to render exact account of beliefs. Plato reserves the terms knowledge, 
intelligence, pure reason, for the man who co-ordinates his opinions, unifies them by 
systematic reference to higher principles, ideals, and ‘“ideas,” and who can defend 
them in fair argument against all comers.” This is not a definition, but it is quite as 
good a description as the most modern of his critics can produce. This view is set 
forth in the Republic in the context necessary to make it intelligible. It would not 
have suited Plato’s design to repeat or anticipate that description in the Thectetus 
which is cast in the form of a dialogue of search. Moreover, it is one thing to give a 
general definition of knowledge and another thing to describe the state of mind to 
which the term science or knowledge κατ᾽ ἐξοχὴν is applicable. Sensible perception 
is not a synonym or definition of knowledge, nor, according to Plato, knowledge in the 
highest sense. But it is the most certain and the only knowledge we possess of some 
kinds of objects. And the recognition of this fact in various passages of the Thecetetus 
would in itself make a satisfactory all-inclusive definition of knowledge impossible.™ 

Accordingly Plato brings the dialogue to a plausible conclusion by discussing 
(and rejecting) various possible meanings of λόγος, none of which yields a good defini- 

518200A B. The original ἀπορία arose from the unme- 
diated antithesis εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι -- a conscious fallacy, 
as the language of 188 A and Huthyd., 277, 278, shows. Psy- 
chology is enriched, and the practical fallacy is disposed 
of, by the distinction of grades and kinds of cognition, but in 
the end our analysis brings us to an indivisible act of 
psychic apprehension which either is or is not. 

549201 B; Grote triumphs in the admission that sense- 
perception is, after all, sometimes knowledge; cf. supra, 
n. 324. 

550201 C Ὁ. 

551 The Timceus (51D) sharply distinguishes νοῦς and 
ἀληθὴς δόξα, but adds τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ μετ᾽ ἀληθοῦς λόγου, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον, 
In the Meno, 98 Α, right opinions became knowledge when 
bound αἰτίας λογισμῷ. In Symp., 202 A, οῤθὰ δοξάζειν --- ἄνευ τοῦ 

ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι is opposed to ἐπιστήμη. In ethics fixed, 
stable, true opinion is virtually 2 synonym of φρόνησις: 
Laws, 653A, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἀληθεῖς δόξας βεβαίους. Strictly 
speaking, there are three grades: (1) casual right opinion; 
(2) right opinion fixed by judicious education from youth; 
(3) right opinion fixed and confirmed by the higher educa- 
tion and accompanied by the ability δοῦναι λόγον. But Plato 
is not careful to distinguish the last two. They are both 
μόνιμοι (Meno, 98A; Rep., 480 Β, reading μόνιμον). In Polit., 
809 C, ἀληθῆ δόξαν μετὰ βεβαιώσεως cannot be referred exclu- 
sively to the philosophic virtue with ZELLER (p. 596). [ὑ 
includes the virtues of fixed habit guided from above, as 
appears, e.g., from the reservation ὥς ye ἐν πολιτείᾳ, 309 E, 
which is precisely equivalent to πολιτικήν ye in Rep., 430E. 

552 Supra, p.17; n. 91 with text. 653 Supra, τι. 549. 



tion.* Socrates has heard a theory that the first elements of things are simple and 

not objects of knowledge.-_For knowledge implies giving and taking an account, and 
no account can be given of elements beyond naming them. They will not admit any 
other predicate.” In this paragraph we may discover allusions to Antisthenes’s paradox 
about predication and definition, to current philosophies of materialism, and to 
mechanical interpretations of Plato’s own formula δοῦναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον. But 
whatever Plato’s secondary literary intentions, his main purpose is to present a 
serious psychological and metaphysical problem. Is the whole the sum of its parts 
except in mathematics? Can the world be explained as a mechanical summation of 
elements? The problem presents itself to us in psychology and cosmogony.™ Plato 
treats it in dialectical abstraction, taking the syllable and its letters (‘elements,” 
στοιχεῖα) as representatives of elements and compounds. He decides (1) that the 
syllable is not the mere equivalent of its elements, but a new emergent form and dis- 
tinct idea; (2) that, whether this be so or not, the elements and the syllable are equally 
knowable and unknowable. For if the syllable is the sum of the elements it cannot 
be known if they are not. And if it is a new unity it is as elemental as they and can- 
not be explained by resolution into its parts. 

The second conclusion disposes of the proposed definition. The first, as we have 
already seen, is a suggestion of the doctrine of ideas as against philosophies of 
mechanical materialism.*” But we are not therefore justified in making this episode 
the chief purpose of the dialogue. Two other possible meanings of λόγος are shown to 
yield no result, and the dialogue closes with the Socratic moral that we are at least 
wiser for knowing that we do not know. 


The Phedrus, with its profusion of ideas, its rich technical and poetical vocabu- 
lary, and its singular coincidences with the Laws™ and Timeus,” makes the impres- 
sion of a mature work. This impression is confirmed by Sprach-Statistik, and by the 
fact that it directly parodies a sentence of Isocrates’s Panegyricus published in 380. 
It is possible to say that the thoughts are merely sketched in a “program” of future 
work; that the dithyrambic vocabulary is due to the theme; and that the phrase of 
Tsocrates is taken from an older, common source.” Anything may be said in debate. 

555 202, 
556 Κα, σ.,), WUNDT’s psychology differs from that of the 

554. LUTOSLAWSEI (p. 371) argues that the Theetetus re- 
jecting Adyos, etc., contradicts the opinion “provisionally” 

received in Meno, 98A, Symp., 202A, and Phedo,%B. He 
fails to note (1) that this “provisional” view recurs in the 
Timeus, (2) that Pheedo, 9.B, is an ironical summary of 
materialism and is irrelevant here, (3) that the omission of 
αἰτία which surprises him (p.878) is presumably intentional 
and minimizes the contradiction. Plato does not intend to 
“define” knowledge, but he is careful not to contradict the 
practical description of it given in the Republic. The 
phrase δοῦναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον is mentioned as ἃ conditio 
sine qua non of knowledge (202C), but only in connection 
with the rejected theory of elements, and its full dialecti- 
cal significance is not developed. 

pure associationists chiefly in that he insists that the whole 
is not the sum of its parts— ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἐκείνων ἕν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος 
ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἔχον, Thecetetus, 203 E. 

557 Supra, nn. 227, 228 with text. 

858 245 D, ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, etc. 

659 In the style of the myths. 

560267 A, τά τε αὖ σμικρὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα σμικρὰ .. .. 
καινά τε ἀρχαίως, etc. 1806. Pan., 8, καὶ τά τε μεγάλα ταπεινὰ 
ποιῆσαι καὶ τοῖς μικροῖς μέγεθος περιθεῖναι, καὶ τά τε παλαιὰ 
καινῶς διελθεῖν, etc. 

561 ΘΟΜΡΕΒΖ, Ueber neuere Plato-Forschung. 

12 Tue Unity or Puato’s THovucar 

But there is an end to all use of Isocratean parallels if we cannot infer that the Phedrus 
is later than a work which it explicitly parodies. 

If we assume Lysias, who died in 378, to be still living, the date may be still 
more precisely determined to about the year 379. The strongest confirmation of this 
date is the weakness of the arguments for an earlier date, which it is hard to take 
seriously. The politician who recently called Lysias a λογογράφος need not have been 
Archinos, and, if he was, Plato’s use of ἔναγχος may be merely dramatic.’ The 
patronizing commendation of Socrates at the end™ is not incompatible with a sly 
parody of his Gorgian style, nor even with the sharp rap on the knuckles administered 
to him (if it is Isocrates) at the close of the Huthydemus. Still less can we say that 
Plato and Isocrates could never have been friends after the declaration at the close of 
the tract against the Sophists that virtue cannot be taught, or, for that matter, after 
any other polemical innuendo in their works. Huxley, Matthew Arnold, Frederick 
Harrison, Herbert Spencer, and other knights of nineteenth-century polemics, com- 
bined much sharper thrusts than these with the interchange of courteous or slightly 
ironical compliments. 

Our chief concern, however, is with arguments drawn from the thought. We 
have already seen that the dialectical method of the Phedrus is not appreciably less 
mature than that of the Philebus or the Sophist,™ and that, on the other hand, there 
is nothing in the psychology or ethics of the Phedrus that necessarily fixes its rela- 
tion to the Republic, the Phedo, or the Symposium.” What can be said, then, of 
the attempts of distinguished scholars to show that the thought of the Phedrus dates it 
circa 892, or even ten years earlier? The only one that calls for serious consideration 
is Natorp’s argument™ that the immaturity of the Phedrus is proved by the absence 
of the notion of a supreme science, or of ultimate categories found in the Symposium, 
Republic, Sophist, and even in the Huthydemus. The answer is that such a notion 
never appears in Plato except in some special form adapted to a particular argument. 
Natorp includes very different things under this rubric. The supreme science of the 
Symposium is merely the knowledge of the idea—of the idea of beauty as distin- 
guished from particular beauties. That of the Republic is knowledge of the idea— 
of the idea of good as the σκοπός or aim of true statesmanship. That of the Huthyde- 
mus is in one place by implication dialectic (290C), in another the “political art” 
(291C). In other passages the unity of science is merely the unity of the concept or 
idea, ἐπιστήμη. The ontological categories of the Theetetus, Sophist, and Parmeni- 
des belong to a different line of thought and have a mainly logical significance. They 
are connected with the notion of a universal science only in so far as they are appre- 
hended and discriminated by dialectic. Now the subject of the Phedrus did not call 
for the explicit assumption either of supreme categories or a universal science. The 
chief point in the myth, ignored by Natorp and the majority of commentators, is that 

662257C. 564 Supra, u. 377. 565 Supra, pp. 19, 48; n. 152. 
663279 A, τοὺς λόγους ols νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖ may well be the 566 Hermes, Vol. XXXV, pp. 405 ff. 
Panegyricus, but might be anything. 567 Supra, n. 460, 


the ecstasy of love is due to a speciality of the idea of beauty. Unlike other ideas, it 
is represented in this world by a not wholly inadequate copy, the sight of which recalls 
the beatific vision of the original.“ The proof of immortality requires only the 
categories of the self-moved and that moved by another.’ The absence of other 
abstract logical categories proves no more here than it does in the Laws. The method 
of dialectic is described in its relation to rhetoric, which is regarded as an art of 
deceptive dialectic or almost eristic.°"° There is no occasion for going back to ultimate 
categories or hypothesis beyond hypothesis. The subject about which it is desired to 
effect persuasion is the starting-point.” The rhetorician’s art is to bring this under 
a definition or category from which there is a plausible transition to praise or blame.” 
So even in the Philebus the account of the true dialectical method starts from the 
concrete ἄπειρον to be investigated, or the idea, the ἕν, that it reveals to inspection, and 
says nothing there of ontological categories, ultimate hypothesis, or a supreme science.” 
The Philebus is not for that reason less mature than the Phedo.™ Plato cannot 
always delay to tabulate ultimate categories or to reaffirm the unity of science, whether 
it be (1) as dialectic, (2) as the vision of the idea, or (3) as the “political art.” 
Natorp’s other arguments merely confirm our main position by illustrating once 
more, and typically, the desperate straits to which an acute scholar is reduced in the 
attempt to date the dialogues by their thought. For example, there is obviously no 
connection between the remark that those who affirm that φρόνησις is the chief good 
are unable to define what φρόνησις (Rep., 505 B), and the enthusiastic declaration that 
if wisdom (φρόνησις) could be seen by mortal eyes (as beauty in some measure can) it 
would enkindle δεινοὺς... . ἔρωτας (Pheedr., 250D). Yet Natorp regards the first 
passage as a distinct criticism of and advance upon the latter. But the Phoedrus pas- 
sage merely says that φρόνησις, if we could only see it, would be still more lovable 
than beauty. It does not affirm it to be the chief of goods, and, if it did, need not 
for that reason precede the Republic, unless we are to say the same of Laws, 6310. 
Again, in 245 C the unctuous phrase δεινοῖς μὲν ἄπιστος, σοφοῖς δὲ πιστή is said to 
mark Plato’s early, unscientific mood, because mature Platonism ranks knowledge 
above πίστις. But plainly a religious thinker may affirm the superiority of knowledge 
to belief and yet indulge himself in the ironical declaration that the “clever” will 
disbelieve, but the wise believe, his proof of immortality. Similarly in 247C the 
statement that no poet has ever worthily sung the region above the heavens is taken 
to prove that the passage is Plato’s first exposition of the theory of ideas. But such 

in common with the five categories of the Sophist, the 
supreme science of the Symposium, or the ὑπόθεσις of the 

568 250 BC D. 569 245 C. 

570261 Ὁ with Sophist, 259D. Rhetoric is generalized to 
include dialectic and eristic, just as in Sophist, 222, 223, πιθα- 
νουργικὴ embraces all forms of rhetoric, the higgling of the 
market, the Lucianic art of the parasite, and the whole 
teaching and eristic of the Sophists. 

571263 DE. 672 265, 266 A. 573 16C DE. 

574The division of all things into πέρας, ἄπειρον, μικτόν, 
and αἰτία is given in a different connection, and has nothing 

Phedo and the Republic. 

515 Pheedr., 250D, seems destined to misinterpretation. 
LuTosLAwskI, p. 339, misses the meaning altogether, and 
Hokn, pp. 212, 213, actually takes δεινοὺς ἔρωτας (understand- 
ing δεινούς in a bad sense) as Plato’s reason why we have no 
vivid images of other ideas than beauty, and objects that 
the passionate love of justice would be a good, since it 
would not be exposed to sensual excess! 

74 THe Unity or Puato’s THOUGHT 

a prelude is a mere commonplace of rhetoric, as in Phedo, 108C; Meno, 239C; 
Polit., 269 C. 

The argument that dialectic is first introduced as a new term in 266C will not 
bear scrutiny. In Philebus, 53 E, ἕνεκά του is introduced still more circumstantially. 
The ideas are a dream in Cratyl., 439 C; dialectic is dramatically led up to in Cratyl., 
390; and in Sophist, 265, 266, an elaborate explanation has to be given of what is taken 
for granted in the phrase φαντάσματα θεῖα, Rep., 58320." Natorp says ‘‘der Begriff 
Dialektik ist im Gorgias noch nicht gepragt, sondern erst im Phedrus.” But 
διαλέγεσθαι is contrasted with ῥητορικὴ in the Gorgias, 448 D, and the term διαλεκτι- 
κός- ἡ, if I may trust my memory and Ast, does not happen to occur in the Symposium, 
Thecetetus, Timeus, Parmenides, Phedo, Philebus, or Laws. It is begging the 
question, then, to assume that διαλέγεσθαι in the Gorgias does not connote true Pla- 
tonic διαλεκτική, but only Socratic conversation. There is not a word about ‘‘damo- 
nischen διάλεκτος" in Symp., 202 Εἰ, 203 A, and the notion of philosophy as the seeking 
rather than the attainment of knowledge occurs not only in Symp., 203 Ὁ-- 204 Β, 
“after” the Phaedrus, but in Lysis, 218A. As for λόγων τέχνη, it is any ‘‘art of 
words,” whether actual or ideal rhetoric, dialectic, or even eristic.°” It is uncritical to 
press the various meanings which different contexts lend to such a general expression. 
Rhetoric is called the λόγων τέχνη in 260 D, but Socrates immediately adds that there 
is no true λέγειν τέχνη ἄνευ τοῦ ἀληθείας ἧφθαι; 1. 6., without dialectic. There is, then, 
no inconsistency between this and the use of τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης in Pheedo, 
90B; nor can it be said that the λόγων μέθοδος of Sophist, 227 A, differs appreciably 
from the μέθοδος of Phedr., 270 D. Lastly, Natorp’s argument (pp. 408-10) that 
the method of συναγωγὴ and διαίρεσις described in the Phewdrus does not go far 
beyond the suggestions of the Gorgias and Meno is, of course, merely a further con- 
firmation of our main thesis. But when he adds that ἐδέα is used vaguely in 237D, 
238A, 246A, 253 Β, etc., and not, as in the “later”? Republic and Phedo, in the 
strict sense of Platonic idea, the reply must be that this vague, untechnical use of 
εἶδος and ἰδέα is always possible in Plato.” Omitting Theetetus, 184 D, since Natorp 
thinks that also “early,” we find it in Rep., 507E; Philebus, 64E, and Cratylus, 
418 E, where ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα does not mean ‘‘idea of good.’’ Since the transcendental idea 
is established for the Phedrus, of what possible significance is the occasional use of 
the word ἐδέα in a less technical sense ὃ 

These illustrations might be multiplied indefinitely. They do not establish a 
universal negative, but they certainly create a presumption against all arguments of 
the type which careful scrutiny always shows to be fallacious. And the experience of 
the untrustworthiness of many such arguments creates in the minds of sober philolo- 
gians a more justifiable “misology” than that which Plato deprecates in the Pheedo. 

576 See ADAM, ad loc. 578 Cf, supra, τι. 377. 

577 Euthyd., 288A, ὑμετέρας τέχνης... οὐτωσὶ θαυμάστης 579See JOWETT AND CAMPBELL, Vol. II, pp. 294 ff. 
οὔσης εἰς ἀκρίβειαν λόγων. 

Ῥαῦ, SHOREY 75 


In vivacity and comic verve the Cratylus is “early,” ® in maturity and subtlety 
of thought “late.” Its most obvious feature, the playful allegorical use of etymol- 
ogizing, is anticipated or recalled in many other dialogues." Admirable is the art 
with which etymologies recognized to be little better than puns are made the vehicle 
of a true philosophy of language, and a profound discussion of the relations of lan- 
guage and thought. 

With this we are not concerned. We have already seen that the attempt to 
assign the dialogue an early place in the development of Plato’s own thought breaks 
down. Plato is “already” in full possession of the theory of ideas and of the essen- 
tial arguments of his polemic against the flowing philosophers.“’ His repudiation of 
eristic fallacies is as distinct and as clearly, if not as fully, expressed as it is in the 
Euthydemus and Sophist.™ 

It remains merely to enumerate, as a part of our cumulative argument, some of 
the minor resemblances that link the Cratylus to its predecessors or successors, and 
make it a sort of abbreviated repertory of Platonic thoughts and classifications. In 
386 D there is a reference to the doctrine of Euthydemus: πᾶσι πάντα ὁμοίως εἶναι 
ἅμα καὶ ἀεί. In 386 D, πράξεις are an εἶδος τῶν ὄντων; of. Theetet., 155 E. In 387B 
λέγειν is πράττειν, cf. Huthyd.,284C. In 388 C ὄνομα dpa διδασκαλικόν τι ἐστιν ὄργανον 
καὶ διακριτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας, coupled with the statement, 390 BC, that only the dialec- 
tician can use this tool, implies the imagery and doctrine of Sophist, 226-31 B, where 
the κάθαρσις of dialectic and Sophistic is a branch of διακριτικῆς. In 390 B the state- 
ment that the user is the best judge recalls Huthyd., 289 Ὁ; Rep., 601 D, and is implied 
in Phedr., 274E. In 890 Ο ἐρωτᾷν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον may be compared 
with Phedo, 75D. In 890 Ὁ the dialectician, as ἐπιστάτης, suggests Huthyd., 2900; 
Rep., 528 B. In 8920 the view of the capacity of women is that of Rep., 455 Ὁ. 
With 394 Ὁ cf. Rep., 415 B, on the probability that good men will breed true. With 
396 C, ὁρῶσα τὰ ἄνω, cof. Rep., 609 Ὁ. In 398 A-C the image of the golden race, and 
the identification of good men with dzmons recall Repub., 415A and 540C. In 
398E the rhetorician is akin to the dialectician (ἐρωτητικοί ἔρως, of. Symp.), which 
makes against Sidgwick’s view that in the earlier dialogues the Sophist is a rheto- 
rician, in the later an eristic. In 899 Ο man is distinguished from the brute by con- 
ceptual thought, as in Phedr., 249B. In 400B the conceit σῶμα σῆμα repeats 
Gorgias, 493 A. In 401 Β perewpordyor καὶ ἀδολέσχαι τινές is precisely in the tone 
of Pheedr., 270 A., ἀδολεσχίας καὶ μετεωρολογίας φύσεως πέρι. In 401 C οὐσία “Ἑστία 
recalls Phedr., 247A. In 403, 404 characteristic doctrines of the Phedo, Gorgias, 
and Symp. are implied concerning the naked soul, the invisible world, death, ἐπιθυμία 
as δεσμός, and the yearning of the soul for pure knowledge. Cf. Gorg., 523 0; Pheedo, 
88 Ο Ὁ, 67E-68 A. In 408 C the association of λόγος ἀληθής τε Kal ψευδής with the 

580 NAToRP, however, Archiv, Vol. XII, p. 163, thinks 582 Supra, pp. 54, 56, 51, n. 373, 
the lack of dramatic mise en scéne a mark of lateness. 583 Supra, p. 33, n. 218, n. 539. 
581 See JOWETT’S Index, s. v. “" Etymology.” 584 Supra, p. 54. 

76 Tae Unity oF Puato’s THOUGHT 

movements of the All recalls Tim., 37 BC. The quibble ἡμέρα, ἥμερα, 418 D, is 
repeated in Tim.,45B. In 418E ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα τὸ δέον is explained by Rep., 336 Ὁ. 
In 419 Ο λύπη ἀπὸ τῆς διαλύσεως implies the doctrine of Phileb., 31 D, and Tim., 64D. 
In 422 A στοιχεῖα is used for elements, as in Tim., 56 B; Theetet., 201 E. In 428 Ο Ὁ 
music is “already” μίμησις. In 428 Ο the ἐξαπατᾶσθαι αὐτὸν ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ is virtually the 
“voluntary lie” of Rep., 382 A. In 436 Ὁ the emphasis laid on the ἀρχὴ or hypothesis 
(ὑπόκειται) recalls Phedo, 101 Ὁ, 107 B. 


The Euthydemus in subtlety of logical analysis, and in its attitude toward eristic, 
is akin to the Sophist and Theetetus.™ The question, Can virtue be taught? the pro- 
treptic discourses, and the quest for the political art resume similar discussions in the 
Meno, Protagoras, Charmides, and Gorgias.’ To the partisans of development the 
dialogue offers a dilemma. Hither this mature logic must be assigned to an early 
work, or a late work may display comic verve of style and engage in a purely dramatic, 
apparently unsuccessful, Socratic search for the political art.” 

A systematic analysis would be superfluous after Bonitz, Grote, and Jowett. But 
the Huthydemus, like the Cratylus, is a repertory of Platonic thoughts that link it to 
“earlier”? and “later” dialogues. A few of these may be enumerated: 273C, αὐτὸν 
αὑτῷ βοηθεῖν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις; cf. Gorg., 509B; 275 D, the captious question, Are 
those who learn of σοφοὶ ἢ of ἀμαθεῖς Ὁ merely illustrates the doctrine of Lysis, 218 A; 
Symp., 203 E; Soph., 229 C, 276 Ὁ ff.; do they learn ἃ ἐπίστανται ἢ ἃ μή, recalls the 
method κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι of the Thecetetus,™ and the distinction between 
ἐπιστήμης ἕξις and κτῆσις; cf. 211 Ο and 278 A with Theetet., 197 B; in 276 E ἄφυκτα 
is used as in Thectet., 165B; 278 Β προσπαίζειν is used for eristic, as παίζειν in 
Theetet., 167 E; 280E, τὸ δὲ οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν; cf. Lysis, 216D; Gorg., 
467 E; 282, οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν. . . . δουλεύειν. . . . ἐραστῇ. . . . προθυμούμενον σοφὸν 
γενέσθαι, cf. Symp., 184C; 284 Β, λέγειν is πράττειν, ef. Cratyl., 3887B; 287A, if 
there is no error, τίνος διδάσκαλοι ἥκετε, cof. Thecetet., 161 E, 178 E; 287 D, πότερον οὖν 
ψυχὴν ἔχοντα νοεῖ τὰ νοοῦντα. The quibble suggests the metaphysical problem of 
Parmen., 182), cf. A. J. P., Vol. XXII, p. 161; 289 C, the art of the user and the 
art of the maker, cf. Rep., 601D, Cratyl., 390 B, 2904, ef. Gorg., 454; 290C D, ef. 
Polit., 805A, and supra, p. 62; 2900, the mathematician subordinated to the 
dialectician, cf. Rep., 628 Β; 291 Β, ὥσπερ τὰ παιδία τὰ τοὺς κορύδους διώκοντα, etc., is 
the germ of the image of the aviary in the Theetetus; 291 Ο, οἱ Polit., 2659 Ὁ; 292 Ὁ, 
of. Charm., 167C, Meno, 100A, Protag., 312D; 301A, cf supra, n. 199; 301 B, 
of. supra, n. 426. 

585 Supra, pp. 54, 58. verbreitet ist. Man sollte doch in Erw&gen ziehen, ob 
586 Of. Idea of Good, p. 204; supra, a. 97. denn jene Ruhé und Sicherheit der Discussion einer Frage 
887292; of. supra, τι. 71. ΒΟΝΊΤΖ, p. 125, protests against als Frage far jemand modglich ist, fur den sie eben nur 
the assumption that Plato is really baffled in 292 E, and noch Problem ist und eine Moglichkeit der Lésung sich 
sensibly adds: ‘Ich erwahne dies nur, weil diese Art der nicht dargeboten hat.” 
Folgerung und der Erklarung Platonischer Dialoge weit 588 Supra, nn. 547, 548. 


The significance of the closing conversation with Crito is often missed.“ Nothing, 
of course, can be inferred from the casual admission (307 A) that χρηματιστικὴ and 
ῥητορικὴ are ἀγαθόν; or from the “contradiction” of the Republic in the statement that 
philosophy and πολιτικὴ πρᾶξις are both ἀγαθόν, but πρὸς ἄλλο ἑκατέρα. Socrates is 
speaking to his worthy friend the business man Crito from the point of view of common- 
sense. We have also seen that the allusion to Isocrates (?) does not determine the 
date.” Plato is defending himself and Socrates against the criticism that such trivial 
eristic is unworthy of the attention of a man of sense. The dignified rhetorician to 
whom the criticism is attributed, like Isocrates, confounds eristic with philosophy and 
proclaims the futility of both.” Plato replies (1) that in philosophy as in other 
pursuits the majority are bad; (2) even eristic may be a useful logical discipline. 
The second thought is implied rather than expressed. It is implied by the interven- 
tion of the δαιμόνιον (272 ἘΠ) and by the statement that the gentlemen who in 
Prodicus’s phrase™ hold the borderland of philosophy and politics, and who think the 
philosophers their only rivals for the first place, are badly mauled in private conversa- 
tion when they fall into the hands of eristics like Euthydemus.™ Socrates, on the other 
hand, though ironically admitting defeat, has shown himself throughout able to do 
what is postulated of the true dialectician in the Sophist, 259 C: τοῖς λεγομένοις οἷόν τε 
εἶναι καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἐλέγχοντα ἐπακολουθεῖν. The multitude think such logical exercise 
unbecoming. But that is because, in the words of the Parmenides (136 D), ἀγνοοῦσι 
ὅτι ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε Kal πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ 
νοῦν ἔχειν. But Socrates, regardless of personal dignity, welcomes every occasion for 
intellectual exercise: οὕτω tis ἔρως δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας (Thecetet., 


The leading ideas of these dialogues have already been studied, and it is not 
necessary to analyze them in detail.“° We may acquiesce in the presumption that the 

ee ee 


Protagoras, Gorgias, and Meno are somewhat earlier in manner and style 

589 GROTH, 6. g., says: ‘In the epilogue Euthydemus is 
cited as the representative of true dialectic and philoso- 

590 Supra, p. 72. 

691305 A, καὶ οὗτοι (Dionysodorus and Euthydemus) ἐν 
τοῖς κρατίστοις εἰσι τῶν νῦν. 

892See JOEL, Der echte und der xenophontische Sokra- 
tes, Vol. ΤΙ, p. 634. ᾿ 

593305 D, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις ὅταν ἀπολειφθῶσιν. Cf. 
Thecetet., 111. ὅτι ἂν ἰδίᾳ λόγον δέη δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι. The 
rhetorician is helpless in the hands of either the philoso- 
pher or the eristic. 

59 Cf. supra, nn. 117, 426. 59% See Index. 

596 SupHAUS, Rhein. Mus., 44, p. 52, tries to assign the 

Gorgias to the year 376 between the To Nikokles and the 
Nikokles. He is refuted by Dtmmuur, Kleine Schriften, I, 
pp. 79 ff., who proposes other Isocratean parallels, which 
are courteously, but sensibly, minimized or rejected by 


ApAm (edition of Republic, index, 8. v. ‘“Isocrates’”). Ob- 
viously, barely conceivable references in Plato to an Iso- 
cratean type of thought or a Gorgian style prove nothing. 
Nor can anything be inferred from coincidence in common- 
places or in ideas that can be found in Euripides and 
Thucydides. It would be easy to ‘‘prove” by these methods 
that the Busiris follows the Republic and precedes the 
Symposium which contradicts it (cf. Busiris, 4, with Symp., 
198D). Strangely enough, the very critics who force a 
reference to the Helena upon Republic, 586C, are apt to 
reject, in the interest of their chronology, the two almost 
certain citations of Isocrates by Plato, that in Phedr., 
267 A (supra, p. 71), and that in Gorgias, 463A, where Isoc. 
x. cod, 17 καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς ἔργον εἶναι is wittily 
parodied by ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας, Doimmler 
calls this a “nicht einmal wortliche Uebereinstimmung in 
einem banalen Gemeinplatz.” But the very point of the 
jest lies in the substitution of the lower word, στοχαστικῆς, 
for the term δοξαστικῆς intentionally employed by Isocrates 
to mark the superiority of his δόξα to the pretended 

78 ΤῊΝ Unity oF Puato’s THovucat 

admitting that there is any traceable development of doctrine.” There is also, 85 
we have seen, no evidence in the thought sufficient to date the Symposium and 
Pheedo relatively to each other or to the Republic, the Phedrus, and the Theatetus.™ 
Pfleiderer thinks the Symposium the first dialogue of Plato’s ‘third phase,” which 
includes the Philebus, Timeus, Critias, and Laws. He sees in Symp., 209-12, a 
review of Plato’s previous career, with many allusions to the different “phases” 
of the Republic (p. 46). So also Dimmler, infra, n. 619. It suffices for our pur- 
pose that all these dialogues were written after Plato had attained maturity of years, 
and presumably of thought—the Meno after 395,” the Gorgias after Isocrates’s 
Against the Sophists, the Symposium after the year 385,” the Phedrus probably after 
Isocrates’s Panegyricus. That the Phedo cites the Meno is probable.” That the 
Republic alludes to the Pheedo is possible, but not necessary ;"” and, having other 
reasons for believing the Phedrus to be later than the Gorgias, we may assume that 
Phedrus, 260 D, 261A, alludes to Gorgias, 462 B, without, however, admitting the 

validity of such arguments as Siebeck’s suggestion (p. 116) that θρέμματα γενναῖα 

intentionally characterizes the λόγοι as “etwas Herangepflegtes, Ausgearbeitetes.” 
But it is idle to pursue this σκιαμαχία further. 
The chief witness to the unity of Plato’s thought is the Republic, the great work 
of his maturity and the most complete synthesis of his teaching. It is presumably 
later than most of the minor Socratic dialogues,”’ but it completes rather than contra- 

dicts them, and their methods imply its results. 

*4 It is earlier than the Laws and 

Timceus, and probably than all or most of the dialectical dialogues, but they do not 

contradict it, and they develop no important idea which it does not distinctly sugges 

t. 605 

It is generally dated somewhere between 380 and 370, and we may say, if we 
please, that it was published when Plato was about fifty-five years of age, but any date 

between his fortieth and sixtieth year will serve as wel 

ἐπιστήμη of the metaphysicians. On the other hand, though 
the in point of fact probably later, nothing can be 
inferred from its agreement with Isocrates (Phedr., 269D; 
Isoc. in Sophist, 17) in the commonplace that ἐπιστήμη, 
μελέτη and φύσις are indispensable to the complete rhetor. 
They are requisites of the ἱκανὸς ἀγωνιστὴς in any pursuit, 
as is distinctly stated in Rep., 814DE. Nor is anything to 
be learned by pressing too closely the various possible 
meanings of ἐπιστήμη --- knowledge of the Isocratean rules 
of rhetoric, knowledge of dialectic and psychology that 
might make rhetoric an art in Plato’s opinion, knowledge 
of the subject-matter of the discourse. 

597 ZELLER says, p. 527, that the Protagoras, which 
assumes the identity of the good and the pleasurable, 
“must” be later than Gorg., 495 ff., and all subsequent 
dialogues. But cf. supra, p. 20. Horn finds in Protag., 
Gorg., and Phedo the following Denkfortschritt: (1) Die 
Lust ist das Gute. (2) Die Lust ist nicht das Gute. (3) Die 
Lust ist das Bése! In Phedr., Symp., Phedo he sees a 
falling away in middle life from the youthful faith in 
immortality to which age returns! Lutoslawski thinks 
that the discussion about the identity of the tragic and 
comic poet at the end of the Symposium is an apology for 
the comic touches in that dialogue and an announcement 


of the Phedo, But PFLEIDERER (p. 92) finds that “das 
Allegro des Symposion .... auf die schwermfitigernsten 
Trauerklange des vorhergehenden Sterbedialogs nunmehr 
die verklarten Harmonien einer wiedergefundenen Lebens- 
stimmung folgen lasst.”” It’s a poor argument that will not 
work both ways! 

598 Supra, pp. 19, 40 ff., 43. 59990 A, 

600193A, It is, of course, just conceivable that, as WIL- 
AMOWITZ affirms (Hermes, Vol. XXXII, p. 102), the allusion 
is to the events of the year 418. But we are still waiting 
for his proof that Plato commits no intentional anachron- 

60173A; Meno, 82 ff. Itis not necessary, for Plato prob- 
ably often illustrated ἀνάμνησις by geometrical cross- 
examination in the school. 

602 Rep., 611 B, οἱ ἄλλοι (λόγοι) need not be the specific 
proofs of immortality given in the Phedo. 

603 SreBECK, however (p. 126), thinks that the Laches is 
the fuller discussion of courage “ promised” in Rep., 480, 
αὖθις δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἐὰν βούλῃ ἔτι κάλλιον δίιμεν, 

604 Cf, supra, pp. 14, 15. 

605 Supra, nn, 244, 375, pp. 34, 36, 42, 46, 55, 62. 

606 See ZELLER (pp. 551 ff.), who dates it in 375, The 
coincidences between the Republic and the Ecclesiazousae 


The relations already indicated between the Republic and other dialogues force 
extreme partisans of “development” to break it up into distinct sections which they 
assign to different periods.” Such hypotheses are beyond the scope of serious criti- 
cism, which in the total absence of evidence can neither affirm nor deny them. It can 
only point out the fallacy of the reasoning by which they are supported. The “argu- 
ments” of Krohn, Pfleiderer, and their followers have been refuted in more than suffi- 
cient detail by Hirmer, Campbell,* Grimmelt, and other defenders of the unity of the 
Republic. They may be reduced, broadly speaking, to a petitio principii and a few 
typical fallacies. The petitio principii is the assumption that the numerous connect- 
ing links and cross-references that bind together the “parts” of the Republic were 
inserted by Plato as an afterthought. The chief and fundamental fallacy is the appli- 
cation to a great and complex literary masterpiece of canons of consistency and unity 
drawn from the inner consciousness of professional philologians. The architectural 
unity of the Republic is superior to that of the Laws, the Philebus, the Phedrus, or 
to that of the parts into which the disintegrators resolve it, many of which plainly 
could not exist by themselves. Secondary intentions, a prelude, digressions, and a 
peroration, postlude, afterpiece, or appendix may be expected in so long a work. As 
Jowett sensibly says: ‘‘We may as well speak of many designs as one; nor need any- 
thing be excluded from the plan of a great work to which the mind is naturally led by 
the association of ideas and which does not interfere with the general purpose.” It is 
uncritical, then, to assume a central argument and prune off everything that is not 
indispensable to its development. The argument might conceivably have started from 
the restatement of the problem by Glaucon and Adeimantus at the beginning of the 
second book. Plato might have drawn up a sketch of a reformed state, omitting all 
mention of the higher education, the rule of the philosophers, and the degenerate 
forms of government. He might have closed the work abruptly with the demonstra- 
tion of the main thesis at the end of the ninth book. Or, if he wished to add the 
myth, he might have omitted or found another place for the digression in which the 
banishment of the poets is justified on deeper grounds. But these bare possibilities 
do not raise the slightest presumption that the Republic was, in fact, pieced together 
out of detached and disjointed essays. The different topics were closely associated in 
Plato’s thought. And if they were all present to his mind from the beginning, it 

of Aristophanes yield at the most a terminus post quem. the picture of the tyrant (577) ‘‘must” fall after the first 

Cf. Hiemer, “Entstehung und Komp. d. Plat. Rep.,” Jahr- 
bicher far Phil., Suppl., N. F., Vol. XXIII, p. 655; ADAM, 
The Republic of Plato, Vol.1, pp. 345-55. HIEMER (pp. 660 ff.) 
disposes of the attempt to daté the Republic by the allu- 
sion to Ismenias (336A), and to Polydamas (338 C), by the 
supposed allusion to Eudoxus (530), and by REINHARDT’S 
reference of 410BC to Isocrates’s Antidosis, 181, and of 
498 DE to the Areopagiticus. He himself, with as little 
proof, thinks that 498 DE alludes to the Euagoras. He 
dates the completion of the Republic circa 370: (1) because, 
after Christ, he believes that the protest against interne- 
cine war between Greeks (471 A-C) ‘‘must” refer to the 
destruction of Platwa by the Thebans in 374; (2) because 

Sicilian journey and before the second when Plato was on 
friendly terms with Dionysius the younger; (3) because 
Curist has “ proved” that the eleventh epistle (circa 364) 
is genuine, and the eleventh epistle implies the completion 
of the Republic and the beginning of the Timeus. 

607 PFLEIDFRER, Zur Lésung d. plat. Frage, Ῥ. 19: ‘Das 
Zusammenwerfen ganz verschiedener Phasen in der Rep., 
wie ich behaupte, musste nothwendig far Jeden, der sonst 
gerne Phasen und Perioden gesehen hatte, die geahnten 
Grenzlinien wieder verwischen.” 

608 Republic, Vol. II, essay III. 

609 Vol, ΠῚ, p. vii. 

δ0 Tue Unity ΟΕ Puato’s THovearT 

would not be easy to suggest a more natural and effective order of presentation than 
that in which we now read them. 

To prove, then, that, as a matter of fact, the “parts” of the Republic were com- 
posed at different times recourse is had to two other fallacies: (1) it is assumed that 
what is not explicitly mentioned in any part is not known to the author at the time; and 
(2) slight variations in phrasing are taken to imply serious differences of doctrine. 
The application of this method to the theory of ideas and to Plato’s psychology has 
already been considered.”” A few words may be added here on the second point. 
Rohde™ says that the immortality of the soul is ignored in the earliest part, ΤῸ, 
411; first appears as a paradox in X, 608 D; and is assumed in its sublimest form 
in VI, VII. But his arguments will not bear scrutiny. ‘Was nach dem Tode kom- 
men moge, sollen die φύλακες nicht beachten” (III, cap. iff.), is an unwarranted 
inference from Plato’s polemic against Homeric verses that represent death as terrible 
to all men, even the good—an idea which Plato would always have repudiated. The 
sneers in 363 C Ὁ and 366 A Β at future rewards are directed against low ideals—the 
μέθην aidwov—or are intended to emphasize the necessity of first proving that virtue 
is desirable for its ownsake. When that is done, it is ἤδη ἀνεπίφθονον (612 B) to add 
the rewards; and there is no more inconsistency in reintroducing in a nobler form the 
premiums which the gods bestow upon virtue after death than there is in the with- 
drawal of the supposition that the just man is to be reputed unjust, and in the affirma- 
tion that in fact honesty is the best policy, though that is not the sole or the chief 
reason for practicing it.” 

The omission of all reference to immortality in the first nine books would prove 
nothing. It is equally ignored in the first nine books of the Laws, and is first 
explicitly mentioned in XII, 959. Glaucon’s dramatic surprise at Socrates’s confident 
assertion of immortality proves nothing for Plato. The idea is familiar to the Gorgias 
and Meno. And even if we deny the reference of 611 Β to the Phedo, and with 
Rohde place the Phedo after the Republic, the tenth book of the Republic knows the 
ideas, and even the τρίτος ἄνθρωπος, and cannot therefore be placed before the Gorgias 
by those who make use of arguments from development. In speaking of immortality 
Plato naturally tries to qualify and limit the doctrine of the tripartite soul.’ He can 
only fall back upon poetical imagery and affirm his faith that in its true nature the 
(immortal part of the) soul must be one and simple. It is a waste of ingenuity to 
attempt to find a consistent chronological development in this point in the Phedrus; 
Rep., II-V, X; Phedo, and Timeus. It is perfectly true, as Dimmler argues,” that 
611 Psyche, pp. 588 ff. 

610 Supra, pp. 36,-40 ff. kann irgendwelche utilitaristische Begraindung nicht 

612 SIEBECK (p. 144) and DtMMLueEr (Vol. I, p. 248), it is 
true, find fault with this too, on the ground that the 
Socrates of the tenth book does not repeat every point of 
the hypothesis like a lawyer, and forgets the stipulation 
that the unjust man was to have the power, if detected, 
to defy punishment, or the wealth to buy off the gods. 
Dfimmler also objects that ‘‘nachdem die Perspektive auf 
die Ewigkeit als μέγιστα ἄθλα der Tugend bezeichnet war, 

mehr interessieren.”’ Terrible logic! Are modern believers 
in immortality wholly indifferent to utilitarian considera- 
tions “815 Zugabe”? And had Plato no interest in the 
psychological proofs that the virtuous life is, even in this 
world, the most pleasurable, given in the Laws, the Phile- 
bus, and the ninth book of the Republic? 

613 Supra, pp. 42, 46. 

614 Vol. I, pp. 236 ff. 


if the soul is really one, the definition of justice as a relation between its parts loses all 
meaning. But such “inconsistencies” are inherent in human thought, and prove 
nothing for the relative dates of Book X and Books JI-V. Can any modern theo- 
logian produce definitions of the virtues that will apply to man in his earthly state 
and to the disembodied soul? 

Lutoslawski, while rejecting the fancies of Krohn and Pfleiderer, holds it pos- 
sible to show that the first book of the Republic falls between the Goryias and the 
Pheedo, and that the remaining books follow the Phedo and reveal traces of progressive 
development of doctrine. The following parallel illustrates the force of his arguments: 

P. 318: “ Here®® for the first time occurs a 
formulation of the law of contradiction as a 
law of thought, while in the Phedo and earlier 
books of the Republic it was a metaphysical 

P. 277: “This sharp and general formula- 
tion of the law of contradiction,®* not only as 
a law of thought as in Phedo,*" but for the 
first time as a law of being .... is a very 
important step.” 

Lastly, a word must be said of the attempt to trace a development in Plato’s 
treatment of poetry. The contradictions of those who employ this method might be 
left to cancel one another.”” But the whole procedure is uncritical. Plato was always 
sensitive to poetic genius, and there was no time when he might not have praised 
Homer without conspicuous irony.” But he always regarded the poet as an imitator, 
whose aim is pleasure rather than the good, whose ethical teaching must be inter- 
preted or controlled by the philosopher, and whose fine sayings are the product of 
“inspiration” rather than of knowledge. The Apology™ anticipates the Republic in 
the doctrine that the poets do not know whereof they speak, and the Phedrus in the 
theory of poetic inspiration. The Gorgias, 502 BCD, deals with the moral influence 
of poetry upon the masses in the tone of the Republic and Laws, and like Republic, 
601 B, strips from the body of the poet’s discourse the meretricious adornment of the 
poetic dress. The doctrine that poetry is μίμησις is sufficiently implied in Cratylus, 
423, where the mimetic value of words is discussed, and where povovx7 is classified as 
μίμησις. The differences between the tenth and the third books of the Republic 
cannot be pressed. The third book hints that there is more to come ; and the tenth 
book announces itself as a profounder discussion, based on psychological distinctions 
brought out in the intervening books. But it is begging the question to assume that 
they were discovered by Plato after the composition of the third book. The fact that 

615 Cf. supra, pp. 6, 7, and HiRMER, p. 641. 
616 436 B. 617 102 E. 618 602 Εἰ. 

619 LUTOSLAWSEI says that Plato’s scorn of poetry de- 
veloped after the Symposium, and that the tenth book of 
the Republic is therefore later than the Phedo, which 
praises Homer without irony, and earlier than Phedrus 
and Thecetetus, which take for granted the low estimate of 
the poct. But NaTorpP, thinking of other passages of the 
Phedrus, is positive that such a dialogue could not have 
been written after the rejection of poetry in the Republic; 
while DUMMLER (Vol. I, p. 269) places the Symposium after 

the Republic, and sees in it a return from the bitter mood 
of the Gorgias and Republic to a calmer and more generous 
state of mind: ‘‘Da ist er auch gerecht gegen andere; 
Homer und Hesiod, Lykurg und Solon sieht er unter sich, 
aber hoch tiber anderen!” 

620 Pheedo, 95A, οὔτε yap av... . Ὁμήρῳ θείῳ ποιητῇ 
ὁμολογοῖμεν οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς; Laws, 776 EH, ὁ δὲ σοφώτατος 
ἡμῖν τῶν ποιητῶν ---οἰπ both passages seriously, as the con- 
text shows. 

62123C; cf. the Jon. and Meno, 99 E. 

622 394 D, ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω ἔτι τούτων, 

82 THe Unity or Puato’s THouGHT 

in emphasizing the distinction between dramatic and narrative poetry Plato carelessly 
speaks as if the former alone were imitative, proves nothing.” A far more important 
new point made in the tenth book is already distinctly implied in the Protagoras — 
the antithesis between the principle of measure in the soul and ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου 
δύναμις,“ to which poetry makes its appeal. The mood of the Symposium differs 
from that of the Gorgias and the Republic. But this does not prove either that the 
Symposium is earlier, or that Plato had been mellowed by success. A banquet at 
which Agathon was host and Aristophanes a guest was obviously not the place for a 
polemic against dramatic poetry. But even here the ironical superiority of the dialec- 
tician is maintained, and the inability of the poets to interpret or defend their art is 


The value of Plato’s life-work would be very slightly affected even if it were true 
that in the weakness of extreme old age the noble light of his philosophy did “ go out 
in a fog of mystical Pythagoreanism.” It is not in the least true, however, and the 
prevalence of the notion is due mainly (1) to the uncritical acceptance of the tradition 
concerning Plato’s “‘latest” doctrine of ideas and numbers; and (2) to the disparaging 
estimate of the Laws expressed by those who care only for dramatic charm of style, or 
by radicals like Grote, who are offended by the “‘ bigotry” of a few passages. A word 
must be said on each of these points. 

1. Aristotle’s account of Plato’s later identification of ideas and numbers has 
been generally accepted since Trendelenburg’s dissertation on the subject.” Zeller 
rightly points out that the doctrine is not found in the extant writings, but adds that 
for Plato numbers are entities intermediate between ideas and things of sense. In 
my discussion of the subject™ I tried to establish two points: first, that we need not 
accept the testimony of Aristotle, who often misunderstood Plato, and was himself 
not clear as to the relation of mathematical and other ideas; second, that the doctrine 
of numbers as intermediate entities is not to be found in Plato, but that the passages 
which misled Zeller may well have been the chief source of the whole tradition about 
ideas and numbers. The first point is a matter of opinion. I did not deny the testi- 
mony of Aristotle, and no one who chooses to accept it can be refuted. The relation 
of ideas to numbers was doubtless much debated by the scholastics of the Academy. 
Aristotle’s reports of the intolerable logomachy do not make it clear just how much 
of this nonsense he attributed to Plato. But I do not intend to enter upon the inter- 
pretation of the eleventh and twelfth books of the Metaphysics. No reader would 

623 393 C, 394 Ὁ. 


624 Protag., 356 Ὁ. man is “inspired” by the tragic muse, another by the 

625 Rep., 602, 603. 

626 201 B, κινδυνεύω, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲν εἰδέναι ὧν τότε εἶπον. 
Καὶ μὴν καλῶς γε εἶπες, φάναι, ὦ ᾿Αγάθων, Cf. also 223 D, where 
Socrates compels Agathon and Aristophanes to admit τοῦ 
αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι κωμῳδίαν καὶ τραγῳδίαν ἐπίστασθαι ποιεῖν. 
This is thought to contradict Repub., 395 A, but the contra- 
diction is removed by pressing τέχνῃ in what follows. One 

comic. If poetry were a matter of science, the poet could 
use both forms, even as the scientific interpreter of poetry 
would not, like the “inspired” Ion, be limited to Homer. 
This we may plausibly conjecture to be the meaning. But 
it is only conjecture. 

627 Plat. de id. et numeris doctrina, 1828. 

628 De Plat. id. doctrina, pp. 31 ff. 


follow me, and no results could be won. If Aristotle’s testimony be accepted, there is 
an end of controversy. Plato taught in his lectures the doctrine of ideas and numbers. 

But the second point is not so elusive. It is possible to test the argument that 
the extant writings do not recognize an intermediate class of mathematical numbers, 
and yet might easily suggest the notion to mechanical-minded students. Now Zeller 
in his fourth edition confounds the two questions. He gives the impression that he 
is answering me by a Quellenbelege from Aristotle and Philoponos. He wholly 
ignores my interpretation of a number of specific Platonic passages, which he appar- 
ently takes for the mere misunderstandings and blunders of a beginner. I have no 
hope of convincing Zeller, nor do I wish to force myself into a polemic with the 
honored master of all who study Greek philosophy. But, as Mr. J. Adam, a scholar 
whose scrupulous candor makes it a pleasure to argue with him, has expressed surprise 
in his edition of the Republic that I still adhere to my opinion in spite of the mass of 
evidence, I will endeavor to state my meaning more plainly. 

The theory of ideas, the hypostatization of all concepts, once granted, numbers 
do not differ from other ideas. The phrase, περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν (Rep., 525D), 
denotes ideal numbers or the ideas of numbers, and ὁρατὰ ἢ data σώματα ἔχοντας 
ἀριθμούς are numbered things, things of sense participant in number.” That is all 
there is of it, and there is no extant Platonic passage that this interpretation will not 
fit. For educational purposes it is true that mathematical science holds an inter- 
mediate place between dialectic and the perceptions of sense. Mathematical 
abstractions (ἡ περὶ τὸ ἐν μάθησις, Rep., 525A) are the best propedeutic to abstract 
reasoning generally. But there is no distinction of kind between them and other 
abstractions, σκληρὸν μαλακόν (Rep., 524A ff.). Mathematical science as διάνοια is 
midway between the pure νοῦς of dialectic and the δόξα of-sense. But that is because 
of its method—the reliance on diagrams (images) and hypotheses. In themselves its 
objects are explicitly stated to be pure νοητά“ The “mathematical” numbers then 
are plainly the abstract, ideal numbers of the philosopher. The numbers of the 
vulgar are concrete numbered things. There is no trace of a third kind of number. 
Those who have not yet learned to apprehend abstractions mockingly ask the mathe- 

629 It may be permissible to add that he seemstohave the νοητά being divided into two classes by τέικαι. The 

read other parts of the dissertation with more attention, 
since, to mention only two cases, he adds on p. 745 a refer- 
ence ἃ propos of the τρίτος ἄνθρωπος to Republic, 596, 597, 
and Tim., 31 A, with the interpretation of their significance 
given on p. 30; and he omits from p. 547 of the third edition 
a sentence criticised on p. 49 of the dissertation. Another 
slight but significant point may be mentioned. Aristotle 
himself makes a not wholly clear distinction between 
mathematical ideas (τὰ ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα, almost tech- 
nical) and other ideas. In illustration of this I objected 
to Zeller’s interpretation of De An., 432a2, ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσί τοῖς 
αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι... . τά τε ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα (‘die 
abstrakten Begriffe’”’) καὶ ὅσα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἕξεις καὶ πάθη. 
My objection was that both grammar and Aristotelian 
usage showed that ὅσα τῶν αἰσθητῶν, etc., are also abstrak- 
te Begriffe (in the German or English sense of the words), 

sentence still stands, and I am quite willing to leave the 
question of Flichtigkeit to any competent scholar, e. g., to 
M. Rodier, who translates “les intelligibles, aussi bien les 
concepts abstr2its (ou mathématiques) que (ceux qui ont 
pour objet) les qualités, etc.” 

630 Adam translates αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν, ‘numbers them- 
selves,” which is quite right. My point is that ‘‘ numbers 
themselves’? are proved by the context and by Philebus, 
56 E, to be ideal numbers. For Adam’s further argument 
ef. infra, p. 84. 

631 Rep., 510 D, τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα... καὶ δια- 
μέτρον αὐτῆς, add’ οὐ ταύτης ἣν γράφουσιν. 511 Ὁ, καίτοι νοητῶν 
ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς. 

632 Phileb., ὅ6 Ὁ E, 

84 THe Unity or Pruato’s ΤΗΟΘΗΤ 

maticians (Rep., 526A), περὶ ποίων ἀριθμῶν διαλέγεσθε; and the answer is, περὶ τούτων 
ὧν διανοηθῆναι μόνον ἐγχωρεῖ, coupled with an exposition that recalls the Parmenides 
of the pure idea of unity.’ Simple as all this appears, it might easily be misunder- 
stood by the pupils of the Academy. Mathematics was intermediate from an 
educational point of view. In cosmogony numbers and geometrical forms are the 
mediators between chaos and the general idea of harmony and measure. The 
expression, numbers (arithmetic), of the vulgar and numbers of the philosopher would 
lead a perverse ingenuity to ask of the mathematicians, in the words of the Republic, 
περὶ ποίων ἀριθμῶν διαλέγεσθε; Plato’s use of “dyad” and “triad” as convenient 
synomyms for the pure idea of two and three would be mistakenly supposed to imply 
a distinction.” The innocent question (Rep., 524 ΟἹ, τί οὖν ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα αὖ καὶ τὸ 
σμικρόν͵ ὁ would suggest that it was a terminus technicus for some mysterious ultimate 
philosophical principle, and set students upon hunting it and its supposed synomyms 
through the dialogues, and, inasmuch as μέγα + σμικρόν indubitably = 2, it might 
well be identified with the indeterminate dyad and its supposed equivalents, or any 
other “principle” posited in antithesis to the one.” The folly once set a-going, there 
are no limits to its plausible developments. All the unanswerable questions as to the 
relation of ideas to things may assume special forms for special classes of ideas. Plato 
himself shows this for ideas of relative terms in a much misunderstood passage of the 
Parmenides.“” The problem of the relations of numbered things, of the supposed 
mathematical numbers, and of ideal numbers, offered a rich feast for the quibblers and 
the ὀψιμαθεῖς of the Academy. ‘Before and after” is essential to number, but there 
is no “before and after” in the ideas. Multiplicity is inherent in number, but the 
“idea” even of a million must be one. Other ideas may be imperfectly copied by 
things, but is not the number five entirely present in five things? Echoes of this 
pitiful scholasticism are preserved for us in the metaphysics of Aristotle. But what 
possible reason can there be for attributing it to Plato? Adam himself (Vol. ΤΙ, p. 
160) repeats the disconsolate question: περὶ ποίων ἀριθμῶν διαλέγεσθε ἐν οἷς τὸ ἕν οἷον 
ὑμεῖς ἀξιοῦτέ ἐστιν, ἴσον τε ἕκαστον πᾶν παντὶ καὶ οὐδὲ σμικρὸν διαφέρον : and asks: 
“ Are we then io suppose that there are many ideas of ‘one’?” The answer is: “Yes, 
precisely, to the extent that there are many ideas of anything.” We have already 
seen (Rep., 476A) that every idea is per se one, and yet, not merely as reflected in 
phenomena, but τῇ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ appears many. The contradiction is inherent in 
the theory of ideas. As against the multiplicity of phenomena, we insist on the indi- 
visible unity of the idea. But when we find the idea involved with other ideas in a 
number of instances, we are forced to use the plural. Plato does not, however, here 

633 Cf. Idea of Good, p. 222; Phileb., 56E, εἰ μὴ μονάδα ‘Again, great and small, swift and slow are allowed to 
μονάδος ἑκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσάν τις exist nowhere without the mind, being entirely relative, 

θήσει. and changing as the frame or position of the organs of 
634 Tim., 53 B ff.; Phileb., 66A. sense varies.” 
635 Pheedo, 101C; Parmen., 149C; Pheedo, 104, 637 De Plat. id., Ὁ. 37. 
636 Plato is using the terms precisely as BERKELEY does 638 133C ff.; ef. 4. J. P., Vol. IX, p. 288. 

when he says (Principles of Human Knowledge, X1): 


in terms pluralize the “one.” He says: Of what numbers do you speak in which the 
one, 2. e., the idea of one, present in each as a constituent and essential part of the 
more complex idea, etc.? Of course, this implies a multiplicity of units in each num- 
ber, and still more in all; but only as any idea is multiplied when it appears in a 
number of others. The multiplication of the idea τῇ τῶν σωμάτων κοινωνίᾳ is more 
easily evaded than that τῇ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ, because in the first case we may use the 
imagery of pattern and copy, while, in the second case, the idea is an essential con- 
stituent part of that into which it enters. In the special case of numbers, the paradox 
is still more glaring. But Plato is not one to be frightened from the path of philo- 
sophical consistency by a paradox which he rightly regarded as largely verbal. In 
the Parmenides he amuses himself by showing that the idea of “one” itself apprehended 
τῇ διανοίᾳ μόνον καθ᾽ αὑτὸ breaks up into many.” This does not make it the less 
necessary for the mathematician to apprehend the pure absolute idea of unity and 
restore it as fast as it is disintegrated by analysis or the senses.™° 

2. Despite many passages of stately and impressive eloquence, the Laws will 
remain the type of ‘‘frigidity " for those who, like Lucian, read Plato mainly for the 
dramatic vivacity of the Phedrus or the artistic beauty of the Symposium. Our 
purpose is not to deny the altered mood and style that mark the masterpiece of Plato’s 
old age, but merely to protest against the notion that it may be safely neglected by 
the serious student, or that it presents a doctrine essentially different from that of the 

if Plato was not to rewrite the Republic, it was almost inevitable that his political 
studies should assume the form of a project of detailed legislation for a possible Greek 
city. But even here, while recognizing that many of his theoretic postulates will have 
to be mitigated in practice,“ he holds fast in principle to the ideals of the earlier 
work.” A harmony of the Laws and Republic, however, though not a difficult task, 
would demand more space than can be given to it here. We need not delay to examine 
the contribution of the Laws to our knowledge of Greck institutions, or the very con- 
siderable influence which it exercised upon the speculations of Aristotle and later 
Greek thinkers. One service which it renders to students of the dialogues we have 
already often noted. 

As the years wore on, Plato naturally grew weary of Socratic irony, of the game 
of question and answer, of the dramatic illustration or the polemical analysis of eristic. 
Even in the earlier dialogues he sometimes evades or contemptuously explains away 
an equivocation which elsewhere he dramatically portrays or elaborately refutes. In 
the Laws this is his habitual mood,“ and in consequence the Laws may often be 
quoted for the true Platonic solution of problems which Socratic irony or dramatic art 
seems to leave unsolved in the earlier dialogues.” 

While acknowledging this change of mood, we must be on our guard against the 

639 143 A, 144 E. 640 Rep.,525E; supra, n. 647, 41 746, 644 627 B, 627 D, 644 A, 864 B. 
642739 C ff., 807 B. 643 Rep., 486 CDE, 437A, 4544; 645 Supra, pp. 13, 19, nn. 70, 71, 298, 
Cratyl., 431A; Symp., 187A; Euthyd., 277 E. 

86 THe Unity or Prato’s THovcat 

exaggeration of its significance by Grote, Mill, and Gomperz. Grote had little appre- 
ciation of Plato’s substantive thought at any stage. He cared only for the dramatic 
illustration of the elenchus. This, which for the author was a means to an end, was 
for him the real Plato. The exposition of positive doctrine he treats as the work of a 
totally different person—a dogmatic Plato who has “ceased to be leader of the oppo- 
sition and passed over to the ministerial benches.” This view, which appears even in 
Grote’s treatment of the Gorgias and Theetetus, is still more prominent in his criticism 
of the Republic. In the case of the Laws this feeling is intensified by the deep 
repugnance aroused in Grote’s mind by Plato’s whimsical provisions for the conversion 
or punishment of those who denied the truths of natural religion or traded upon the 
superstitions of the vulgar.“ He cannot speak of the Laws without alluding to that 
unfortunate page; and the vision which he conjured up of the aged Plato as the 
Torquemada of a Pythagorean mysticism makes him totally blind to the real signifi- 
cance of what in wealth of content is Plato’s greatest work. This view was accepted 
by Mill from Grote, and by Gomperz from Mill, and it leads them both to misappre- 
hend the true relation of the Laws to the Republic. Mill says: ‘‘In his second 
imaginary commonwealth, that of the Leges, it [dialectic] is no longer mentioned; it 
forms no part of the education either of the rulers or of the ruled.” Similarly 
Gomperz:"* “Plato in his old age grew averse from dialectic. In the Laws, the last 
product of his pen, he actually turned his back upon it and filled its vacant place at 
the head of the curriculum of education with mathematics and astronomy.” These 
statements, even if we concede that they are true in a sense to the letter, convey a 
totally false impression, as a slight study of the last pages of the twelfth book of the 
Laws will show. Plato does not care to rewrite the sixth and seventh books of the 
Republic. But he defines as clearly as in the earlier work the necessity and function 
of dialectic and the higher education in the state. Even in the first book we are fore- 
warned that to complete the organization of the state the founder must set over it 
φύλακας. . . . τοὺς μὲν διὰ φρονήσεως τοὺς δὲ δι’ ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἰόντας. δ In the twelfth 
book we are introduced to these guardians who are to possess knowledge and not merely 
right opinion. They compose a nocturnal council which is to be the anchor of the 
state.” Recurring to the imagery and the manner of the early dialogues,” Plato tells 
us that as the pilot, the physician, the general represent intelligence (νοῦς) applied to 
the definite ends of their respective arts, so this highest council is the head, the soul, 
the mind of the state, possessing knowledge of the political σκοπός or true end of rule.™ 

646 908-10. 647 Diss. and Discuss., Vol. IV, p. 289. 
648 Greek Thinkers, Translation, p. 466. 

mentioning any other element of the higher education. 
The possessors of φρόνησις will surely be able κατ᾽ εἴδη ξη- 
τεῖν (630E) and will practice the dialectical methods of the 

649 To like effect ZELLER, pp. 955, 956. 

650632 C. The parallelism with the Republic is obvious. 
There, too (412A, 497 C D), there is a similar anticipation of 
the need of guardians who know as distinguished from the 
assistants. In Laws, 818A, there is another anticipation 
of the higher education. Mathematics only is mentioned 
because Plato is explaining that it is not needful for the 
multitude to study it profoundly. There is no occasion for 

“recent” Sophist, Philebus,and Politicus. ZELLER’s attempt 
to distinguish between φρόνησις and the νοῦς of the Republic 
isa false point. φρόνησις is used in Pheedo, 69B. 

651 961 Ὁ. 

652 Protag., 311B; Gorg., 447, 448, 449 E; Euthyd., 291C; 
Rep., 333. 

653 961, 962, 


No state can prosper or be saved unless such knowledge resides in some part of it as a 
φυλακτήριον. The beginning of such knowledge is τὸ μὴ πλανᾶσθαι πρὸς πολλὰ 
στοχαζόμενον ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ἕν βλέποντα, etc. Now τὰ τῶν πολέων νόμιμα aim at many 
things— wealth, power, and τὸν ἐλεύθερον δὴ Biov. Our aim is virtue. But virtue is 
both four and one, The intelligent physician can define his one aim. Must not the 
intelligent ruler be able to define his? It is easy to show how the four virtues are 
many. To exhibit their unity is harder.*’ A man who amounts to anything must 
know, not only the names, but the λόγος of things. And the true guardians, teachers, 
and rulers of a state must not merely rebuke vice and inculcate virtue, but they must 
be able to teach ἥν δύναμιν ἔχει. δ᾽ The state may be likened to the body, the younger 
guardians to the senses in the head, the elders to the brain. They cannot all be 
educated alike. Therefore ἐτέον dpa ἐπί τινα ἀκριβεστέραν παιδείαν τῆς ἔμπροσθεν." 
This is the education already glanced at in our phrases about the unity of purpose. 
The essence of the more accurate method is our old acquaintance τὸ πρὸς μίαν ἰδέαν 
ἐς τῶν πολλῶν Kal ἀνομοίων δυνατὸν εἶναι βλέπειν. δ᾽ The guardian must be able to do 
what Meno could not do—ideiv πρῶτον, ὅ τί ποτε διὰ πάντων τῶν τεττάρων ταὐτὸν 
τυγχάνει. And similarly περὶ καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ and πάντων τῶν σπουδαίων, they 
must not only know in what sense each is one and many, but they must be able to 
expound their knowledge—ryv ἔνδειξιν τῷ λόγῳ ἐνδείκνυσθαι.“ The thing being so 
clearly indicated, it would be pitiful quibbling to object that the word διαλεκτικὴ 
does not happen to occur here. Its omission is possibly due to the fact that the 
Athenian throughout the Laws talks down to the level of his unsophisticated Spartan 
and Cretan interlocutors. Mathematics and astronomy, then, are not substituted for 
dialectic, but are added for a special reason among the σπουδαῖα which the guardians 
must understand with real knowledge. The multitude may follow tradition. The 
guardians must be able to demonstrate the truths of natural religion, as we have done.™ 
Astronomy, the study of the ordered movements of the heavens, is a great aid to this. 
With astronomy is involved the necessary mathematics, which also in their relation to 
music and the arts are of use to him who is to shape the characters and laws of men.™ 
He who cannot learn these things can never be a ruler, though he may be an assistant. 

In the last two pages of the Laws Plato evades giving a detailed account of the 
curriculum of the higher education thus indicated—perhaps he was weary, perhaps 
he did not care to repeat the Republic. ΤῊ any case, there is no justification for the 
statement that the Laws ignore the higher education of the rulers or substitute in it 
mathematics and astronomy for dialectic. On the contrary, the unity of Plato’s 

654962C; of. Rep., 4240. 661 ΟΥ. Pheedr., 265D; and with ταύτης οὐκ ἔστι σαφεστέρα 
655 962 Ὁ. μέθοδος, cf. Phileb., 16B; Pheedr., 266 Β, 
656 Cf, Rep., 563A, ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος 7. 662965 Ὁ. Meno, T4A, τὴν δὲ μίαν, ἡ διὰ πάντων τούτων 
657 Cf. Phileb., 18 B, πῶς ἔστιν év καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον. ἐστίν, οὐ δυνάμαθα ἀνευρεῖν. 
668964Ὁ; cf. Rep., 866 Εἰ, τῇ αὑτοῦ δυνάμει ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἔχοντος 663 966 Β. 

ψυχῇ ἐνόν, 664In Book X. 
659964 E; cf. Tim., 69, 70. 665 967 E. 

660965 A. 666 968 D. 

88 Tue Unity oF Puato’s THOUGHT 

thought is strikingly illustrated by his return in the pages just analyzed to some of 
the favorite ideas of the Republic and earlier dialogues.” 

It is not necessary to prolong this study. The Timceus, so far as it affects our 
argument, has already been considered.’ The Timceus as a whole I have studied 

The object of this discussion and the expression “unity of Plato’s thought” may 
easily be misunderstood. I may therefore be permitted, in conclusion, to repeat that 
I have not meant to sophisticate away the obvious and inevitable variations in Plato’s 
moods, and minor beliefs from youth to old age. Nor in the study of such develop- 
ment would I reject the aid of a sober and critical method of style statistics.°° My 
thesis is simply that Plato on the whole belongs rather to the type of thinkers whose 
philosophy is fixed in early maturity (Schopenhauer, Herbert Spencer), rather than to 
the class of those who receive a new revelation every decade (Schelling). And I have 
tried to show that the method which proceeds on the contrary assumption leads to mis- 
interpretation of his writings. The illustrations given are merely typical. There has 
been no attempt to catalogue exhaustively the opinions of contemporary Platonists. 
The polemic is, I trust, not discourteous, and is, I am sure, not intentionally disloyal. 
In any case, it turns generally on the meaning or relevancy of specific passages and can 
easily be tested. Some excuse for its prominence may be found in Mill’s statement 
that “‘there are few, if any, ancient authors concerning whose mind and purpose so 
many demonstrably false opinions are current, as concerning Plato.” 

667 GOMPERZ supports his view of the anti-dialectical 
tendency of Plato's mind in the Laws by the hostility of 
the Sophist to every kind of antilogy. But surely eristic is 
one thing and dialectic another. The true Socratic elen- 
chus is described and the difficulty of distinguishing it 
from eristic indicated in a locus classicus in the Sophist 
(230B ff.); and both the Sophist and the Politicus employ 
the keenest dialectic in order to meet and defeat eristic on 

Gomperz thinks late, dialectic is still the highest science 
of truth (Phileb.,58). But Plato had other interests than 
dialectic, and it is unreasonable to expect him to fill the 
Laws and Timeus with repetitions of what had been said 
once for all in the Sophist, Politicus, and Philebus. 

668 Supra, p. 37. 669 4, J. P., Vol. IX, pp. 395 Εἕ 

670 As, 6. g., that of Ritter, “Die Sprachstatistik in 
Anwendung auf Platon und Goethe,’ Newe Jahrbiicher 

its own ground (Soph., 259 Ο D). 

Ανάμνησις͵ 32, 43, 44, 19, 0. 109. 
Ανθρωπος μέτρον, 67. 
Cardinal virtues, 12. 
Charmides, 15. 
Copula, ambiguity of, 54. 
Courage, 11, 15, n. 43. 
Cratylus, 75 ff., 54, at 
Definition, 13, "16, 66, u. 86; 
by dich otomy, 50 fF. 
Dialectic, 74, 86 ff.; negative 
goes too far, 17 ff. 
Dichotomy, 50 ra 
Eristic, 13, 14, 19 n. 108, 50, 77, 

Ethics, 9 ff. 

Euthydemus, 76 {f., 54, 

Euthyphro, 12, 31. 

Fallacies of Plato, inten- 
tional, 4, 6, 20, 23 n, 137, 54, 
57 π. 426, n. 32, n. 42, n. 70, 
n. 106, n. 528, n. 548. 

Freedom of the will, 9. 

Generalizations, n. 500, 

Good, idea of, 16 ff., 

Gorgias, 22, 31, 32, a 161, 77. 

In the Philebus, which 

etc,, 1903. 


Government, forms of, 62. 

Happiness and virtue, 25 ff. 

Hedonism, 20. 

Hedonistic calamis; 28. 

Heraclitus, 28, 68 

Hippias Minor, 10 n, 38. 

Ideas, theory of, 27 ff.; diffi- 
culties of, 36, 52, 84; ποὺ 
concepts merely, 29, 80, 88, 
39; not thoughts οἵ God? 
30, 38, 65, n. 512; origin of, 
32; in ‘late’ γ᾽ dialogues, 
37 κε; and numbers, 82 ff. 

Isocrates, 71, 72, ΤΊ. 

Laches, 15, n. 603. 

Laws, 85 ff. δ 

Lie, voluntary and involun- 

tary, 10 n. 38. 

Love (épws), 19 ff. 

Lysis, 18, 19. 

Materialism, 68, 69, n. 283, 

Matter or pee not μὴ ὅν, 
38, n. 502, n. 503. 

Meno, 32, 33, a 

Μὴ ov, fallacy of, 53 ff. 

Method (κατ᾽ εἴδη, etc.) 51. 
Minor dialogues, dramatic, 

Negative dialectic, goes too 
far, 17 

᾽Ονόματα and ῥήματα, 56. 

Parmenides, 51 f£., 34, 36, 37. 

Πάντα pet, 68, 

Pheedo, 35, 41, 77. 

Phedrus, 1 19. 

Philebus, 17n. "93, 22, 23, 43, 
46, 63 ff. 

Pleasure, 22; negativity of, 
3 τι: in mind, not body, 

Poetry, Plato’s attitude- 
toward, 81 ff. 

Political ‘art, 17, 62. 

Politicus, 60 ff., ‘4. 

Protagoras, 12 π. 48, 20, 21, 

βε  μοΙ εν, 40 ff., 66 ff. 
Faxeioloziest terminology, 

Republic, 78 ff., 14, 26, 35 ἢ. 
238, 41, 42, 55, bi, Ὡ. 375. 
Socratic ignorance, 6; in 
minor dialogues drama- 

tic, 15. 
Socratic paradoxes, 9. 
Boul, immortality of, 40 ff., 

Soul, tripartite, 42. 
Sophist, 50 ff. 
gees “Statistik, 1, 5, 7 n. 

Συναίτιον, n. 461. 
Σωφροσύνη, 15. 
Symposium, 19, 77. 
Temperaments, the two, 12 
n. 59, 13 n. 70, 62 π, 481. 
Theeetetus, 86 ff., 88, 55. 
Timeeus, 37, 88. 
Utilitarianism, 20 δι 
Vice, involuntary, 9. 
Virtue, is know ledge, 10; 
unity of, 10; coincides 
with happiness, 25 ff.